THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The No-Threat Problem
Robert W. Tucker

"If Men Were Angels..."
Reflections on the World of Eric Hobsbawm
James Kurth

*

Virtue and Prosperity
Francis Fukuyama

*

Privatizing the World Bank
Nicholas Eberstadt and Clifford M. Lewis

*

Free Trade with an Unfree Society
Daniel Patrick Moynihan

*

The Smithsonian and the Enola Gay
Wilcomb E. Washburn

*

Inchon in the Desert
Henry S. Rowen

* * *

Reviews

Beloff *on Monnet and Delors* • Amiel *on Bernadotte and Shamir*
Iklé *on Goldsmith* • Murray *on Air Power* • Falcoff *on Castro*
Simes *on Messengers from Moscow*

Essays & Comments:
Carpenter, Codevilla, Daniels, Day, King, Lagon, Lempert, Odom, Seitz, Sestanovich, Wriston, and Harries

Number 40 • Summer 1995 • $7.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why Go On Missing the Magazine That Brings You Articles Like These?

● The Case for Global Activism
by Robert Kagan
The world we live in has been shaped – for the better – by the foreign policies of the United States. If we stop shaping it, disaster will sooner or later knock at our door.

● God and the Americans
by Paul Johnson
Religion played an indispensable role in our country's founding and subsequent political self-definition. Now, more than ever, it is essential for the preservation of our moral character as a free people.

● The Peace Process So Far
by Norman Podhoretz
The so-called "peace process" is leading to ever more terrorism, an unstable Palestinian state stretching from the Iraqi border to just outside Tel Aviv, a weakened Israel, and another war in the Middle East. Pray it doesn't happen.

● What the Sex Educators Teach
by Dana Mack
They teach the pleasures of "self-pleasuring" (to grade-school children) and all the erotic possibilities of sex. Maybe even some possibilities that parents don't know about. But there's rarely a word about love, intimacy, or long-term commitment.

● Thinking (Again) About Crime
by James Q. Wilson
Despite what the experts say, there are better ways to prevent crime, police the streets, and punish criminals.

● What To Do About the Arts
by Joseph Epstein
The National Endowment for the Arts has spread mediocrity across the land. We would be better off without it.

● A Jewish Contract With America
by Jack Wertheimer
In declaring war on the new Republican majority, Jewish community-relations agencies are endangering Jewish community relations.

● Agents of Influence
by David Pryce-Jones
Some Western journalists, it turns out, have been working for the KGB, and getting away with the intellectual equivalent of murder.

● "The Bell Curve" and Its Critics
by Charles Murray
Is IQ destiny? A controversial social scientist defends his research from critics who fear the truth and want to squelch debate.

● Immigration and Its Discontents
by Linda Chavez
The furor over immigrants is a symptom of our fractured national identity. We should change our policies, but we should also worry less about race and ethnicity and more about our common culture.

Commentary is accessible, and often brilliant, although it does make intellectual demands on it readers. The rewards? Greater awareness, more insight, and heightened clarity in one's own moral and political thinking.

Intrigued? Call 1-800-829-6270 and we'll mail you a free copy. No strings attached. Just mention this ad. Or write to Commentary, 165 E. 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 40, SUMMER 1995

Contents

ARTICLES

"If Men Were Angels..."
James Kurth ____ 3

Privatizing the World Bank
Nicholas Eberstadt
Clifford M. Lewis ____ 14
Comments:
Walter Wriston
Benjamin King ____ 19

Virtue and Prosperity
Francis Fukuyama ____ 21

Free Trade With an Unfree Society
Daniel Patrick Moynihan ____ 28

Inchon in the Desert
Henry S. Rowen ____ 34

The Smithsonian and the *Enola Gay*
Wilcomb E. Washburn ____ 40

The Illusions of Collective Security
Mark Lagon ____ 50

Confirmation Time
Dimitri K. Simes ____ 56

Love in a Cold War Climate
Peter Day ____ 61

BOOKS

Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence by François Duchêne; *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built* by Charles Grant
Lord Beloff ____ 71

A Death in Jerusalem by Kati Marton
Barbara Amiel ____ 76

Cuba—A Review Essay
Mark Falcoff ____ 82

The Trap by Sir James Goldsmith
Fred C. Iklé ____ 94

The Icarus Syndrome by Carl H. Builder
Williamson Murray ____ 97

CORRESPONDENCE

Ted Galen Carpenter, Angelo M. Codevilla, Robert V. Daniels, Owen Harries, David Lempert, William E. Odom, Russell Seitz, Stephen Sestanovich ____ 102

QUARTERLY

The Prior Question
Robert W. Tucker ____ 108

THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues by National Affairs, Inc. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in P.A.I.S., Historical Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, U.S. Political Science Documents, Political Science Abstracts, and America: History and Life; and available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. © 1995 by National Affairs, Inc. The National Interest is printed by William Byrd Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

PUBLISHER
Irving Kristol

ADVISORY BOARD
Conrad Black
Eliot A. Cohen
Midge Decter
Martin Feldstein
Francis Fukuyama
Samuel P. Huntington
Josef Joffe
Chalmers Johnson
H.J. Kaplan
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Henry A. Kissinger
Charles Krauthammer
Daniel Pipes
Stephen Sestanovich
Paul D. Wolfowitz

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Robert W. Tucker
Anthony Hartley (Europe)

EDITOR
Owen Harries

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Thomas Donnelly

MANAGING EDITOR
Alexandra Parent

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR
Kristen Yessayan

ASSISTANT EDITOR
Erica Tuttle

EDITORIAL OFFICE
1112 16th Street NW, Suite 540, Washington, DC 20036
(202) 467-4884
Fax: (202) 467-0006

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE
$26 for one year, $44 for two years, $59 for three years.
Outside the U.S. and Canada please add $10 annually.
Please send orders and address changes to:
The National Interest, Dept NI, P.O. Box 3000, Denville, NJ 07834.
All other inquiries should be directed to the editorial office.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTORS
Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110
Ingram Periodicals, 1226 Heil Quaker Boulevard, La Vergne, TN 37086-7000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"If Men Were Angels..."

Reflections on the World of Eric Hobsbawm

James Kurth

AS THE TWENTIETH century draws to its end, we can expect a parade of books that will purport to tell us its meaning. The last *fin de siècle* was rich in artistic innovation; this one is more likely to be rich in historical reflection.

But in a certain sense the twentieth century has already ended. It did so half a decade ago. Historians for quite some time have seen the nineteenth century as really lasting from 1789 (the beginning of the French Revolution) to 1914 (the beginning of the First World War), and they have accordingly termed it "the long nineteenth century." So too, historians have recently begun to see the twentieth century as lasting from 1914 to 1989 (the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe) or to 1991 (the end of the Soviet Union), what Eric Hobsbawm in his new book calls "the short twentieth century."[1] As it happens, the two historical centuries—the long nineteenth and the short twentieth—add up neatly to two conventional centuries.

Hobsbawm is an obvious candidate to be the premier historian of the short twentieth century. He has already written a long (three volumes, 1300 pages) history of the long nineteenth century,[2] and he intends this volume on the short twentieth century to be the fourth and concluding volume in a series. He has also written a dozen other major books that deal with basic themes of the two centuries—industrialization, labor movements, revolutionary politics, and even jazz music. He is widely recognized as the most distinguished British historian of a Marxist persuasion.

Hobsbawm's own life began in 1917, soon after the beginning of the short century. While his book is indeed, as its subtitle states, a history of the world, it is also in a sense a biography of Eric Hobsbawm. Both the strengths and the weaknesses—the extremes as it were—of *The Age of Extremes* are a result of Hobsbawm's combination, and at times confusion, of the two.

Hobsbawm divides the twentieth century into three distinct eras: "the Age of Catastrophe" (1914-1945); "the Golden Age" (1945—1973); and "the Landslide" (1973 to the present). This particular periodization has become conventional among historians of the twentieth century, and it is a useful way to order things. Each age is given its own section or Part. Somewhat less explicitly, Hobsbawm also divides his account into three broad areas: the advanced capitalist world (especially Western Europe and the United States); the

James Kurth is professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

[1] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 627 pp., $30.00.

[2] *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962); *The Age of Capital, 1848-1975* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975); *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"socialist" or communist world (the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China); and the underdeveloped world. This too is conventional, corresponding to the long-established, but now-obsolete, division into First, Second, and Third Worlds. As we shall see, some of the flaws in Hobsbawm's book result from particular, and peculiar, combinations of his three-part era periodization with his three-part area division.

A Tale of Three Ages

HOBSBAWM'S ACCOUNT of the Age of Catastrophe in Part One is generally excellent. His chapters on the two world wars, and the Great Depression that linked them, masterfully integrate events around the world, as well as the realms of politics, economics, and culture. In these chapters, he is focusing principally upon the advanced capitalist world. Although this account presents nothing that is particularly original, it is generally comprehensive, coherent, and concise.

In it, however, one chapter, that on "The World Revolution" and the Soviet Union, fits in oddly. For although this chapter is included in the part that covers the Age of Catastrophe, there is virtually no mention in it of the great catastrophes that occurred within the Soviet Union itself during the 1920s-1930s: the Russian Civil War, the Russian famine, the Ukrainian famine, the Great Terror, and the Gulag Archipelago. These catastrophes were as extreme as the others that occurred during 1914-1945—together, they took the lives of more than thirty million people—but they are almost completely omitted from this chapter and indeed from the whole of Part One. Rather, the picture given in "The World Revolution" is one of the political creativity of Lenin, the worldwide enthusiasm for the Bolshevik Revolution, and the heroic exertions of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. We shall return to this anomaly shortly.

Hobsbawm's account of the advanced capitalist countries in the Golden Age (Part Two) is also generally excellent. Once again, he masterfully integrates events around the world, as well as the realms of politics, economics, and culture. Because this age is closer to the present, it has not received the full treatment that historians have given the Age of Catastrophe, and there is less of a settled, consensual interpretation. But although Hobsbawm again presents little that is particularly original, he does draw upon the best accounts of others, ones that are both innovative and sound. He demonstrates that the Golden Age of economic prosperity and social peace resulted from the lessons that the advanced capitalist countries drew from the preceding catastrophes.

In the same Part Two, Hobsbawm includes a chapter that is entitled "Real Socialism." This is a discussion of the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe. But, curiously, unlike the rest of this section of the book, this chapter on the communist world does not begin after 1945. Instead, it begins with 1917, thus returning to the period already addressed in Part One. And now, for the first time, we learn of those early Soviet catastrophes—particularly the Ukrainian famine and the Stalinist terror—although the length of the treatment is still hardly up to the scale of the events described.

The chapter on "The Third World" and the Marxist movements within it during the 1940s-1970s has some of the tone of the earlier chapter on "The World Revolution" during 1917-1945. And just as with the treatment of the Soviet Union, in this first chapter on the Third World and communist China, there is no mention of the great catastrophes that occurred in these regions during these years, especially the Chinese famine that followed the "Great Leap Forward," and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Treatment of these disorders is delayed and given out of sequence in Part Three.

Hobsbawm's account of the Landslide in Part Three is probably the most innovative section of the book. He is consistently penetrating and realistic about events in each of the three worlds. He is particularly lucid and use-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ful in demonstrating how the very economic achievements of the Golden Age in the advanced capitalist countries undermined the foundations of their national states and welfare societies. The result is that we are now living in the midst of a long slide into political paralysis, cultural squalor, and social disintegration. Hobsbawm ends his book with a chapter entitled "Towards the Millennium." In it, he concludes:

> The structures of human societies themselves, including even some of the social foundations of the capitalist economy, are on the point of being destroyed by the erosion of what we have inherited from the past. Our world risks both explosion and implosion. It must change.

The Case of the Misplaced Catastrophes

WHAT EXPLAINS the odd disjunction between when the communist catastrophes occurred in history and when they appear in Hobsbawm's book? Why are the catastrophes of Soviet communism during the 1920s-1930s described not in Part One, where they chronologically belong, but in Part Two dealing with the period 1945-1970s? And why is the treatment of the catastrophes of Chinese communism and Third World Marxism during the 1960s-1970s postponed from Part Two, where they chronologically belong, to Part Three, dealing with the period from the 1970s to the present?

The answer is, I believe, that if Hobsbawm had chosen to describe the Soviet catastrophes in their proper place, it would have been clear that the World Revolution was as great a catastrophe—as much a contributor to the Age of Catastrophe—as were the two world wars. Further, it would have been clear that such extreme catastrophes should have been evident to an honest and intelligent observer even at the time that they occurred, particularly during the 1930s. Someone in the 1990s, after reading such an account, could reasonably conclude that anyone in the 1930s who did not see Soviet communism as a catastrophe was likely to be either a fraud or a fool. But it was precisely in that decade that the young Hobsbawm chose to follow the path of Soviet communism.

Similarly, if Hobsbawm had chosen to describe the catastrophes of Chinese communism and of Third World Marxism in the appropriate part of his narrative, it would have been clear that they should have been evident even at the time that they happened, in the 1960s-1970s. Again, a reader in the 1990s, presented with such an account, could reasonably conclude that anyone who did not see Chinese communism and much of Third World Marxism as a catastrophe was either dishonest or not very bright. But it was in the 1960s-1970s that the mature Hobsbawm chose to follow, or at least to cheer on, Marxist revolutions in the Third World.

In short, Hobsbawm's first chapter on Soviet communism does not present the actual history of that movement in the interwar years. Rather, it presents an historical elaboration on the romantic ideas that the young Hobsbawm held about Soviet communism at the time.

But Hobsbawm is now a distinguished historian. Consequently, he has written a second chapter on the same subject, and this chapter does present much more of the actual history of Soviet communism during that decade. He delays this, however, to Part Two, which otherwise covers the third quarter of the twentieth century—the period during which the mature Hobsbawm gave up his youthful romantic ideas and acknowledged the actual truth about Soviet communism in the 1930s.

Hobsbawm replaced his romanticism about Soviet communism with realism, and redirected his romanticism to Third World Marxism. Consequently, we see a repetition of the pattern of disjuncture. Hobsbawm's first chapter on Third World Marxism and Chinese communism does not present the actual history of those phenomena so much as an historical elaboration of the romantic ideas that the now-middle-aged Hobsbawm held

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about Marxist revolutions in the Third World in the 1960s. However, Hobsbawm's present identity as a distinguished historian must also be expressed. Consequently, he has written a second account of Third World Marxism and Chinese communism in the 1960s-1970s and this chapter does present much more of what actually happened. But, again, this account is held back until the section of the book which otherwise covers the fourth quarter of the twentieth century—the period when the more mature Hobsbawm gave up his earlier romantic ideas and acknowledged the actual truth about Marxist revolutions in the Third World.

In both these cases, then, the logic and sequence of the history is subordinated to the logic of the political autobiography that Hobsbawm is simultaneously offering us, if only in code.

The Limits of Understanding

THERE ARE, then, both pronounced strengths and pronounced weaknesses in Hobsbawm's history of the twentieth century. There is also a pattern to them.

Hobsbawm is excellent at analyzing the advanced capitalist world, in particular the capitalist economies and liberal democracies of Western Europe. He is, in other words, excellent at analyzing the working out in the twentieth century of the two great movements of the late eighteenth century that he presented more than three decades ago in the first volume in his four-volume series (*The Age of Revolution*). These were the industrial revolution in Britain and the political revolution in France, what he called then "the dual revolution." Through two centuries of history and four volumes of writing, Hobsbawm has consistently been sound and sure in his accounts of developments in Britain and France, and in Western Europe more generally.

But Hobsbawm loses the soundness of his understanding and the sureness of his footing when he travels outside Western Europe. This is most obvious when he travels east to analyze Central and Eastern Europe and especially Russia. But it is also evident when he travels west to analyze America.

Whenever Hobsbawm discusses Central and Eastern Europe, especially the Habsburg Empire and its successor states, he becomes unoriginal, superficial, and mechanical. This is all the more curious since he grew up in Vienna. Why is this so? The answer lies in the fact that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have never really been comfortable with the Enlightenment. Hobsbawm has always been a man of the Enlightenment, of the Age of Revolution. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, however, have often been in reaction against the Enlightenment and its revolutions. Hobsbawm never enters into the mentality of most Central and Eastern Europeans. In particular, he demonstrates no empathy with Roman Catholicism, with ethnic nationalism, with populist authoritarianism, or even with the national independence of small countries in the region. Each of these is integral to the experiences of most Central and Eastern Europeans. Toward each, however, Hobsbawm's view has always been that of the outsider, even when he was growing up in the midst of them in Vienna in the early 1930s.

Just as Hobsbawm loses the soundness of his understanding and the sureness of his footing when he travels to the east of Western Europe, so too does he as he travels to the west. When he discusses the United States during the first three quarters of the twentieth century, he again becomes unoriginal, superficial, and mechanical. On occasion he sounds like just another typical and predictable "Brit crit." It is only in his account of the United States in the Age of the Landslide that he rises to the high level of his analyses of Western Europe.

This shallow understanding of the United States is a serious weakness in a book about the twentieth century. As Hobsbawm himself observes, it was the actions of the United States that were decisive in the outcomes of the First and Second World Wars and in the origins of the Great Depression,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

central events in the Age of Catastrophe. It was the actions of the United States that provided the leadership and established the framework for the Golden Age, not only for America itself but for the capitalist economies and liberal democracies of Western Europe.

Why does Hobsbawm misunderstand the United States? One obvious explanation lies in his Marxism. Just as this led him to overestimate the possibilities for the Enlightenment in the Soviet Union, so too it led him to underestimate them in the Soviets' adversary, the United States. A deeper explanation lies in Hobsbawm's particular version of the Enlightenment, a particular combination of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. Since the industrial revolution in eighteenth-century Britain eventually reached its highest development in the twentieth century in the United States, this first track of the Enlightenment could have led Hobsbawm to a rich understanding of twentieth-century America, and indeed he does demonstrate such an understanding of the U.S. capitalist economy. However, the second track of the Enlightenment, the political revolution in eighteenth-century France, leads Hobsbawm away from the United States. The French Revolution never took root in America, because the political territory had already been filled by the earlier American Revolution. Rather, the French Revolution can be seen to have eventually reached its logical conclusion in the twentieth-century Soviet Union.

The American Revolution was certainly an expression of the Enlightenment in some sense of the term, although not in the sense of either the British industrial revolution or the French political revolution. But the American Revolution, and certainly the American Constitution, were also an expression of the age immediately preceding the Enlightenment. As is well known, the Founding Fathers had a skeptical view of human nature. In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison put their view thus:

> But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.

This skeptical conception of human nature is not as explicit as the Christian conception of human sin, but it is consistent with it. It led naturally to the ideas of "ambition checking ambition," "power checking power," "checks and balances," the separation of powers, and the protection of mediating institutions existing between the government and the people.

For the most part, Hobsbawm has always been utterly uninterested in the American Revolution. It has never occurred to him that it might join in significance his two European revolutions. He has also been utterly uninterested in the American version of the Enlightenment. Indeed, he probably thinks that there was no American Enlightenment at all.

The Long March to the East

IT IS THE French Enlightenment and the French Revolution that have always been most meaningful to Hobsbawm. The French Enlightenment, in contrast to the American one, had a confident conception of human perfectibility, one that was consciously and consistently anti-Christian. This confident conception led naturally to the ideas of enlightened despotism, absolute power, and the elimination of mediating institutions between the government and the people, between the state and the society.

In the French conception, the state would be composed of those people who were already enlightened and therefore perfected. Its mission would be to enlighten and perfect the rest of the population. Since the state was enlightened and perfect, while the society remained unenlightened and imperfect, there would be, regrettably but inevitably, a period during which there would be a sharp conflict

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the state and the society, as the state forced the society to do what was best and for its own good. The division between state and society was reflected in other divisions familiar to France, such as that between "the legal nation" and "the real nation," and that between "the Red and the Black." The gap represented by these dichotomies was great enough in France to divide the nation for a century and a half. It reached its denouement in the contrast between the Popular Front of 1936-1938 and the Vichy Regime of 1940-1944.

The ideas of the French Enlightenment were spread by the armies of the French Revolution. In the course of the nineteenth century, they came to be held by the political and cultural elites not only in France, but also in other countries of Western Europe. But when these ideas traveled beyond France, they traveled to countries that were usually less developed and less enlightened than was France itself. This meant that the enlightened part of the country was smaller and the unenlightened part larger than they were in France—which in turn meant that the state would be even more unrepresentative of the society, and that its methods would have to be even less democratic and more dictatorial.

When the political conceptions of the French Enlightenment traveled across the Pyrenées and across the Alps into Spain and into Italy, they resulted in a series of weak liberal regimes, which could maintain power only through the use of political corruption and rigged elections. These weak liberal systems eventually broke down in the early 1920s under the pressures of the First World War, strong labor movements, and class conflict. They were replaced by authoritarian regimes that consciously rejected the Enlightenment.

When these same political conceptions traveled across the Rhine into Germany, they entered into a multitude of small states. The enlightenment party was probably as numerous as it was in France, but it was fragmented into many different political units. Further east, in Prussia and in Austria, the political units were again on the scale of great powers, but the enlightenment party was too weak to ever take and maintain political power.

Still further east, in Russia, the enlightenment party was at its weakest. As Hobsbawm observes, European Marxists at the beginning of the twentieth century were united in agreeing that Russia was not the place for the first Marxist revolution. Russia was far too backward to provide a substantial working class and to support an authentic Marxist mass movement. When the Bolsheviks nevertheless made their revolution in Russia in 1917, most European Marxists continued to hold this view. Indeed the Bolsheviks themselves believed that the Revolution had occurred only because of the "icebreaker" of the First World War, and that it would only be viable if it quickly spread westward, particularly to Germany.

Hobsbawm praises Lenin for making the Bolshevik Revolution, but he is clearly uneasy about how appropriate and how authentic it really was. He argues that a revolution in Russia and the overthrow of the Czarist system were inevitable. This is plausible enough, but a revolution in this general sense is not the same thing as a Bolshevik Revolution based upon professional revolutionaries purporting to represent a tiny industrial working class. The natural political regime in Russia would have been one similar to what arose in parts of Eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, after the First World War—an authoritarian regime of populist leaders purporting to represent a large peasant class. This probably would have been the outcome in Russia if the Social Revolutionaries rather than the Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) had taken power. Hobsbawm also argues (somewhat inconsistently with his argument that revolution was inevitable) that Lenin's brutal methods were necessary to preserve the revolution. In fact, they were only necessary to preserve Lenin's own particular unnatural and artificial revolution against other, more natural and authentic kinds.

Hobsbawm also argues that Lenin's brutal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

methods were necessary to maintain the new Soviet Union as a multinational state and as a great power like its predecessor, the Russian Empire. This multinational argument is plausible enough also. (Indeed, the advent of democracy in Gorbachev's Soviet Union in 1988-1989 brought into being national political movements which soon brought an end to the Soviet multinational state.) But although a non-Leninist Russia would have been stripped of its non-Russian territories and peoples, like the Russia of the 1990s, it still would have been a great power. Russia would have been at the center of a sphere of influence in which the lesser, non-Russian countries would have been politically independent, but militarily and economically dependent upon the Russian center.

The Soviet Union that Lenin created was in fact the most unnatural and artificial political system in the history of the twentieth century. To maintain the power of this unnatural state over its natural society, the most brutal methods, indeed the most extreme terror, had to be employed. The direct result was several of the worst catastrophes in the Age of Catastrophe. When the French Enlightenment, bringing its political conceptions of human perfectibility and enlightened centralized power, arrived in Russia, it was a catastrophe waiting to happen. The Bolshevik Revolution and its creation, the Soviet Union, constituted that catastrophe.

Could Hobsbawm have seen any of this in the late 1930s, when he was a very young man and at the very time that the Soviet catastrophes were culminating in the Stalinist terror? Probably not. For of course it was also at this very time that the Nazi threat was culminating in Hobsbawm's native Austria, and it is not surprising that the threat all around him might blot out the terror further away. As well, at this particular moment during the late 1930s, the central political drama, indeed political romance, was the Spanish Civil War. Hobsbawm, writing in *The Age of Extremes* almost sixty years later, states that it was "the only political cause which, even in retrospect, appears as pure and appealing as it did in 1936." In this romance, fascism (represented by Germany and Italy) was ruthlessly winning, liberal capitalism (represented by Britain and France) was callously appeasing, and communism (represented by Stalinist Russia and by no other great power) was heroically resisting. It is altogether natural that the young émigré escaping from fascist Central Europe should come to believe in communism and the Soviet Union. (It is not so natural, however, that he chose to emigrate, not to the Soviet Union, but to England, the center of liberal capitalism.)

Could Hobsbawm have come to see any of this by the 1950s and 1960s, when he was a mature scholar? It was at this very time that the Soviet catastrophes had become well-known, partly acknowledged by the Soviets themselves during the Khrushchev era. But of course it was also at the very time that the Soviet Union was going through the nearest approximation to a Golden Age it was ever to have—rapid economic growth, modest but steady increases in consumer goods, *Sputnik*, and some normalization of political life.

It was also at this time that Hobsbawm could engage once again in a political romance, this time with the Marxist revolutionary movements in the Third World, especially with the Cuban Revolution, which evoked themes and emotions reminiscent of Spain. It is altogether natural that the mature scholar should seek to recapture his youthful enthusiasm in turning his attentions to this new locale. (Again, however, he chose not to emigrate to some revolutionary Third World country, but to continue teaching in Britain and increasingly to take up teaching in the United States, the new center of liberal capitalism.)

The Real Extremes

HOBSBAWM ENTITLES his book *The Age of Extremes*, but he never directly says what these extremes were. Perhaps this is because he does not like some of the obvious identifications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The real extremes of the twentieth century were the experiences of Russia and the experiences of the United States. If the Age of Catastrophe was 1914-1945, the country of catastrophe was Russia and the Soviet Union. It was the country that experienced the worst of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the Russian Civil War, the Russian famine, the Ukrainian famine, the Great Terror, the Gulag Archipelago, and the Second World War. In three decades, this terrible parade of catastrophes killed more than sixty million people by war, murder, and starvation.

Conversely, if the Golden Age was 1945-1973, the golden country was the United States, and not only during the Golden Age itself. As Hobsbawm describes, the United States came out of both the First World War and the Second World War richer and stronger than it went in. It was, of course, the only major power to do so. By itself, this was enough to make what was the Age of Catastrophe for most of the world into the American Century for the United States.

We can see what happened when the political conceptions of the French Revolution migrated eastward from France, the country that gave them birth. They became progressively less authentic and more alien the further east they traveled. Finally, when they reached the eastern extreme of the European world, Russia, they mutated into a catastrophe.

We can also see what happened when these conceptions migrated westward. They had progressively less impact. In Britain, the potential ground for the conceptions of the French Revolution had already been partly filled up by the moderate ideas of the Glorious Revolution a century before. In the United States, the potential ground for these conceptions had already been completely filled up by the alternative conceptions of the American Revolution a decade before.

When the French Revolution reached the eastern extreme of the European world, it produced a catastrophe; when it reached the western extreme of the European world, it produced nothing at all.

What, however, was the historical trajectory of that other great revolution of the Age of Revolution, the British industrial revolution? Did the economic conceptions of the industrial revolution undergo their own transformation when they migrated outside of Britain, the country that gave them birth?

As it happens, there is a well-known theory about what happened when the industrial revolution traveled eastward from Britain. In the same year (1962) that Hobsbawm published his *Age of Revolution*, the distinguished economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron, published his *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Gerschenkron argued that the later a country industrialized, the more organized the industrialization process had to be. In Britain, industrialization could be undertaken by family firms, but in France it had to be undertaken by investment banks, and in Germany by even larger industrial banks. Finally, in Russia (Gerschenkron's professional specialty), industrialization had to be undertaken by the largest, most centralized organization of all, the state. In short, as industrialization migrated from West to East, the weight of the state became progressively heavier.

Building upon Gerschenkron, we can see that in Russia both the French Revolution and the industrial revolution, the political dynamic and the economic dynamic, grossly magnified the power of the state. When the two tracks converged, when Lenin's authoritarian organization and Stalin's forced-draft industrialization combined, the result was the most total, indeed totalitarian, state in history.

In his second volume, *The Age of Capital*, Hobsbawm briefly addresses Gerschenkron's theory. The model actually fits very well the historical account that Hobsbawm gives of the spread of industrialization in nineteenth- century Europe. But after noting the theory, Hobsbawm dismisses it inconclusively. The likely reason is that Russia illustrates the Gerschenkron model perfectly; indeed it was the terrible *telos* toward which the theory pointed. For Gerschenkron, the economic backwardness of Russia meant that industrial-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ization there had to be monstrous, which perverted the Marxist revolution. For Hobsbawm, the economic backwardness of Russia was overcome by the political innovations of Lenin, which redeemed the Marxist revolution. As it turned out, both Gerschenkron and Hobsbawm were right in their own way. Russian industrialization was indeed monstrous, and Leninist and Stalinist methods made it even more so.

The Industrial Revolution Goes West

BUT WHAT HAPPENED when the industrial revolution migrated in the opposite direction to the West, in particular to the United States?

Since the American Revolution was a political revolution, it had already occupied the potential space for a French-style political revolution. But being a political revolution, it did not occupy the potential space for a British-style industrial revolution. On the contrary, by creating an independent nation with a federal government empowered to enact protective tariffs for national industries (the industrial program of Alexander Hamilton), the American Revolution and especially the American Constitution *opened* the space for an industrial revolution in America.

Given the Gerschenkron theory, one might expect that the industrialization process in the United States, a later industrializer like France and Germany, would have required organization by investment and industrial banks. But Gerschenkron himself never discussed industrialization in the U.S. The likely reason is that the U.S. did not fit his model. In fact, in the United States *all* of his different modes of organizing industrialization manifested themselves, roughly following a pattern of family firms for the textile industry, investment banks for the railroads and the steel industry, industrial banks for the chemical and electrical industries, all of the above for the automobile industry, and the federal government for the aerospace and nuclear industries.

For the first three quarters of the twentieth century, the United States was the most successful example, even exemplar, of the industrial revolution. The explanations for the success of U.S. industrialization, of what Europeans in the nineteenth century already called "the American system of manufacturing," have long been discussed and debated among economic historians. They include such familiar American features as ample natural resources, a large and prosperous population, a skilled and industrious labor force, and an exceptional entrepreneurial spirit. However, it can be useful to focus on some of the contributions of the American Revolution.

The continental scale of the independent United States provided more ample resources and a larger national market than that available to any other industrializing country, other than that perpetual anomaly, Russia. The federal system of government was strong enough to enact protective tariffs for emerging American industry. However, the separation of powers and the protection of mediating institutions provided the best possible framework for the development of the entrepreneurial spirit and the corporate form of business. The skeptical conception of human nature and the related conception of the rule of law provided a sound legal foundation for the predictable enforcement of contracts.

In short, the American Revolution bequeathed to the United States a continental scale and a constitutional structure. The continental scale of the American economic system was a necessary condition for the distinctive success of U.S. industrialization. So also was the constitutional structure of the American political system. Because of the legacy of the American Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, there was an extraordinary strength to the American economy at the beginning of the twentieth century. This strength would continue through three quarters of the century, and it would enable the United States to convert what was the Age of Catastrophe for others into an American Century for itself and, in the third quarter of this century, a Golden Age for others as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Idolatry Within

BUT THE PICTURE of the American economy in 1995, two decades after the end of the Golden Age, is very different. In the middle of what Hobsbawm calls the Landslide is the long slide of the American economy. The explanations for the slide of the American economy have also been long discussed and debated among economists. However, in keeping with our earlier emphasis, it might be useful to focus on the fate of some of the legacy of the American Revolution in this last quarter of the twentieth century.

The continental legacy of the American Revolution is largely obsolete. The American economy no longer operates on a continental scale, but within a global market. It also no longer operates as an industrial economy, but as a post-industrial one, as a service or information economy. Together, globalization and post-industrialization have combined to bring about the de-industrialization of the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the reverse of the industrialization that occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

De-industrialization, in turn, has brought in its train the creation of an urban underclass, once largely composed of young blacks, now also increasingly composed of young whites. This urban underclass, in turn, provides a critical mass, an incubating culture, for an array of social pathologies. Hobsbawm is lucid and accurate in describing this process of social disintegration, not only in the United States but also in Western Europe.

At first glance, the constitutional legacy of the American Revolution still seems to be in good health. The separation of powers is certainly in operation in 1995, with a Democratic President and a Republican Congress. The protection of those mediating institutions which are business corporations also seems to be operating well, despite the perennial complaints of business about over-regulation. But the original and full conception of mediating institutions emphasized churches, local communities, and families. These, as Hobsbawm records at length, are all far weaker today than they were during most of the twentieth century (and most of recorded history). Many American conservatives believe that the threat to the mediating institutions comes from the federal government, or in the terms used in this article, from the logical extreme of the French political revolution, the enlightened despotism of the centralized state. There are indeed threats coming from this direction. However, the most pervasive and relentless threat to the church, the local community, and the family comes from the logical extreme of that other European revolution, the British industrial revolution, expressed in the form of a capitalism and a selfish individualism that are no longer restrained. Hobsbawm systematically describes this destructive dynamic.

The political conceptions of the French Revolution, when carried to their logical extreme as in the Soviet Union, end in tyranny, the idolatry of the state. However, the economic conceptions of the industrial revolution, when carried to their logical extreme as is now happening in the United States, end in anarchy, the idolatry of the self. Most of the great catastrophes of the twentieth century—the First World War, the Second World War, the chain of Soviet catastrophes, a second chain of Maoist catastrophes, and many others—were brought about by one kind of extreme, the idolatry of the state. It was the American calling in the twentieth century to oppose this idolatry, and America's overall and repeated success in doing so that made the twentieth century into the American Century.

Now, at the end of the twentieth century, there no longer seems to be a likelihood of catastrophe issuing from the idolatry of the state. Rather, there seems to be more of a likelihood of a slide into chaos issuing from the idolatry of the self. The twenty-first century will only be an American century if Americans can learn once again to oppose an idolatry, this time the one within themselves. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MISSED THESE?













BACK ISSUES (#1-39) OF *THE NATIONAL INTEREST* ARE AVAILABLE FOR SEVEN DOLLARS EACH.

ISSUE #16 ("THE END OF HISTORY?") IS OUT OF PRINT.
HOWEVER, COPIES OF THE ARTICLE AND RESPONSES TO IT ARE AVAILABLE FOR FOUR DOLLARS.
PLEASE SEND CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO:
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 1112 16TH STREET NW, SUITE 540, WASHINGTON DC 20036,
OR CALL (202)467-4884.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Privatizing the World Bank

Nicholas Eberstadt and Clifford M. Lewis

IN RECENT YEARS several divisions within the World Bank seem to have made a sort of institutional rediscovery: to wit, that the private market economy can confer broad benefits to the public at large. Fortified by this insight, the Bank has been urging Third World countries to privatize their parastatal enterprises and government-owned corporations. In private hands, the Bank now advises, such ventures are likely to be more efficient, more productive—even perhaps more socially accountable.

This is good advice—so good, in fact, that the Bank itself should be prepared to practice what it preaches. It is time for the World Bank to begin an orderly transition to private ownership. With the June 1, 1995 arrival of James D. Wolfensohn, the internationally-known investment banker, as the Bank's next president, the case for privatizing the World Bank over the next five years becomes all the more compelling. For the same skills through which Wolfensohn achieved his great success in the world of finance could be turned toward a successful privatization of this huge financial institution.

Nicholas Eberstadt, a researcher with the American Enterprise Institute and Harvard University, is author of *Foreign Aid and American Purpose* (AEI Press, 1988). Clifford M. Lewis, formerly an official at the World Bank and USAID, directs Stornoway Investments in Washington, DC.

Transition to private Bank ownership promises to save taxpayers in America and other Western countries billions of dollars in the coming years—even to *refund* billions of dollars to their national treasuries. No less important, a privately owned and operated World Bank could be more effective at promoting and supporting international economic development than the current organization—whose very structure encourages unsound, even perverse, economic practices in the countries to which it lends.

Twenty Years Of Drift

THE BANK'S PRESENT problem is as simple as it is profound: having outlived the problem it was designed to solve, this multilateral institution has no defining purpose.

As originally envisioned in 1944, the World Bank was supposed to promote international investment for war-ravaged or decolonizing societies—for countries, so the thinking went, which might otherwise fail to attract foreign financial resources to commercially sound projects simply because world capital markets were not working efficiently.

In 1944, this was a reasonable concern. Contemplating an uncertain postwar order, the global trade and finance crises of the 1930s were still fresh in the minds of the economic architects who met at Bretton Woods. By the early 1970s, however, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dangers the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF) had been built to guard against had been successfully averted.

With the advent of floating exchange rates in 1973, the convertibility of the world's major currencies became automatic, and the IMF was correspondingly shorn of its founding rationale. Similarly, by the 1970s it was no longer plausible to argue that international capital markets were, in some structural sense, unduly averse to risk in developing countries. On the contrary: whatever else one may say about it, the subsequent trillion-dollar "Third World debt crisis" of the 1980s attested eloquently to the fact that large amounts of potentially productive international capital were indeed available to the World Bank's low-income member states.

Deprived of its genuine assignment by real-world developments, the Bank has been floundering for twenty years, lurching after new missions to justify its continued existence: "debt crisis" management, Third World policy reform, aid to post-communist societies, environmentally sound growth, "public enterprise" restructuring, etcetera. In this never-ending quest for a new *raison d'être*, however, the World Bank has drifted ever further away from the practices and standards that actual banks are expected to maintain.

Unbankable Lending

IN MANY OF its lending operations, the World Bank has all but given up on the concept of "bankability." Two major areas of current Bank activity are loans for "structural adjustment" and "human resource development." The former involve loans to governments in return for "policy reforms;" the latter underwrite social spending on health, education, and other programs said to augment "human capital." While philanthropists might deem these to be deserving works, the inconvenient fact for an organization calling itself a bank is that these expensive schemes are being financed without any project collateral for the lender.

The only real collateral in the Bank's "structural adjustment" deals, after all, are the promises of the funded Third World leaders to change their government's existing patterns of behavior at some point in the future. "Investments in human capital," for their part, may or may not bear high economic returns for particular project populations; in either case, however, it is hard to imagine how the Bank would propose to repossess project assets in the event of a loan default.

The Bank counters such criticisms by pointing to its "triple A" credit rating and "preferred creditor status," and by arguing that client governments would not dare renege on World Bank loans for fear of repercussions on their ability to borrow elsewhere. This defense of its activities, however, inadvertently pinpoints a critical flaw in the Bank's standard operating procedures.

For thanks to its triple A credit rating (or more precisely, to the official guarantee that taxpayers from the United States and other Western countries will redeem any bad loans the World Bank should contract), the Bank can offer money for questionable projects, or to economically irresponsible regimes, at rates far lower than any commercial lender would even consider. And thanks to its preferred creditor status, the World Bank can expect to be repaid before any commercial lender in the event of a default, "rescheduling," or financial crisis on the part of a client government. This perverse incentive structure adds an element of moral hazard to all World Bank financial transactions—one which threatens to degrade the quality of loans extended to developing countries, to expose taxpayers in solvent countries to never-ending Third World bailouts, and ultimately to retard the pace of material advance in low-income regions.

The World Bank's problematic con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tribution to current international economic development efforts is vividly illustrated by its role in the Mexican debacle of 1994.

Last year Mexico was the largest single account in the Bank's overall loan portfolio. At that time, the Bank's total loan exposure in Mexico was nearly twelve billion dollars—almost 10 percent of its outstanding lending. Yet Bank staff never warned the Bank's executive directors about the worrisome changes in Mexico's economic fundamentals.

World Bank staff were well aware of the likely results of Mexico's irresponsible shift in its macro-economic policies, but were actually instructed not to mention them. Though the Bank had already invested several billion dollars in "policy reform" lending to Mexico, World Bank officials made no serious attempt to convince the Mexican government to alter its perilous path. The World Bank staff were not allowed to start such a "policy dialogue" for fear that the private sector would draw the *correct* inference: that all was not well in Mexico, even though top World Bank officials at the time were endorsing the country to private investors around the world.

After the financial storm finally broke in Mexico, moreover, the World Bank rushed in as part of the rescue team—proposing two billion dollars in new, crisis-justified loans to the Mexican government, and at rates far below the commercial market's judgment of the appropriate risk premium.

Proponents of the Bank depict the institution as a powerful force for Third World policy reform, and an effective promoter of private investment flows to developing countries. The recent record in Mexico suggests a different reality. Through its actions and inactions, the World Bank amplified an economic dislocation in which private investors lost tens of billions of dollars, and displaced commercial risk-capital with monies guaranteed by Western taxpayers. No less importantly, its feckless approach to "development banking" has arguably worsened Mexico's development prospects for years to come.

A Roadmap For Privatization

IF THE WORLD Bank is to make a positive contribution to *both* the strengthening of the international economy and the alleviation of global poverty, it must abandon its quasi-parasitic niche within the international financial community. It must instead produce value-added services for its customers, on behalf of its owners. This transition can be accomplished by an orderly and deliberate privatization of the World Bank and its subsidiary operations.

How to privatize an enormous, international public enterprise bound by a multiplicity of non-commercial laws and agreements? In practice, the task would not be nearly as daunting as it might sound. Let's look at the easy steps first:

1) We could start with the immediate privatization of the World Bank's private sector development subsidiary, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). IFC has done yeoman service in developing countries—helping to establish, for example, some of the first country funds in emerging markets—but there is no need for an agency owned by governments to manage private deals. IFC would likely sell for a multiple of its five billion dollar current book value. At a minimum, the U.S. could probably sell its share for two billion dollars. Note that privatizing the IFC would not be setting precedents: the Asian Development Bank (ADB)'s version of the IFC already has private shareholders.

2) We could also immediately cease to replenish, and prepare to terminate, the World Bank's concessional aid window, the International Development Association (IDA). Defunding IDA would save American taxpayers alone roughly two billion dollars a year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IDA's principal beneficiaries—the governments of India and China—are already able to borrow commercially; IDA's highly subsidized soft loans simply permit such states to avoid facing international markets. Soft lending, moreover, may have confused more than a few recipient regimes about the distinction between charity and commerce—a confusion all too evident in the now common ritual of "debt rescheduling."

3) We should insist on a strict interpretation of the Bank's existing charter, which stipulates that the World Bank facilitate private investment in productive projects. By a faithful reading of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank would extricate itself from the business of funding social spending programs and "policy reform" efforts in client states. (Note that Bank withdrawal from these areas should not prevent, or even interrupt, the operations in question. If Third World governments deemed activities previously sponsored by the Bank to be truly beneficial, they themselves could arrange further financing; if they deemed World Bank expertise essential to their initiatives, they might wish to hire away the valued personnel.) The Bank could instead, for example, concentrate upon such activities as providing export credits or guarantees for commercial projects in low-income member states. Through such a reorientation, it might even be possible to work out an agreement through which the World Bank would replace the various bilateral export credit agencies now maintained by Western governments. (Such an achievement would benefit the American public in two ways: by saving taxpayers the one billion dollars a year we now spend on the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and by helping to level the international commercial playing field for U.S. exporters.)

4) We should instruct the Bank to adopt "risk transparency." At the moment, the Bank charges only one interest rate on all projects—regardless of the risks inherent in the project itself, or in the country environment. Not surprisingly, this arrangement has turned the Bank into an oasis for dubious projects and ne'er-do-well regimes. A risk-based fee structure would help to impose a financial discipline on both project managers within the Bank and client governments today conspicuously lacking. A risk-based interest structure would reward governments embracing genuine policy reforms, and make borrowing prohibitive by countries whose policies make productive investments impossible—thus effectuating the "policy dialogue" the Bank has pursued so fruitlessly to date.

The Harder Part

THE REMAINING steps to full privatization are more complex, insofar as they involve technical, financial questions and the emendation of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement. There are many feasible strategies for getting from here to there; all of them, however, would include the following changes:

Eliminate Recipient State Repayment Guarantees. Once risk-based lending is introduced, this would no longer be necessary. Such a change would also make future Bank lending to the private sector much easier.

Manage The Bank As A Viable For-Profit Financial Institution. This would entail the shake-up of an increasingly United Nations-style bureaucracy, and the creation of an infrastructure capable of providing high quality, fast-response operational services. It would mean drastic cuts in current overhead and personnel costs, and would result in a smaller and significantly different staff. And it would include the payout of dividends to the governments shouldering the Bank's financial risks—with some adjustment to the true rather than the nominal value of their callable capital commitment. Run like a business, the Bank might be able to earn several bil-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lion dollars a year for its U.S. stockholder alone. Our government could then decide how best to use this money: for bilateral aid, debt reduction, tax reduction, or any other appropriate objective.

Open Bank Membership, And The Bank's Board, To Private Participation. Once regular dividends were being paid, arrangements would be made to sell part of the Bank's capital to private investors, who would be represented by their own executive directors. The pricing of Bank equity would have to reflect a number of factors: the anticipated profit potential of the evolving Bank; the actual (rather than the nominal) share of total Bank capital being offered up for sale; the value of the guarantees Western taxpayers have already extended through outstanding World Bank loans. These are complicated issues—but intrinsically no more complicated than the issues successfully managed by international financiers (including the Bank itself) in dozens of large-scale privatizations over the past decade and a half.

Retire The Taxpayer's Guarantees. This is the final, and most important, step on the path to complete privatization. At this stage, new bondholders would no longer benefit from commitments by the United States (or other convertible currency governments) to back World Bank loans against default; gradually, the composition of World Bank bonds would shift, until government-backed bonds were entirely retired. At the same time, the relative share of private equity investment would be allowed to rise until the World Bank was, in practice, a private international financial institution.

Objections To Our Modest Proposal

MANY OBJECTIONS can, and doubtless will, be raised to the general proposal outlined above. Two of these objections deserve special mention.

The first acknowledges shortcomings in the World Bank's current operating procedures but asserts that, in a world of imperfect alternatives, the World Bank actually functions tolerably well and requires nothing more than some reforms at the margins to improve its performance. One often hears this particular argument from World Bank employees, although it is somewhat puzzling that they should offer it, insofar as it invites a degree of scrutiny into the Bank's current condition and present operations that is far from advantageous to their case.

The second avers that the Bank simply *cannot* be privatized. This argument, however, implicitly holds that the World Bank cannot be expected, now or in the future, to generate value-added through its operations. We reject such a pessimistic prognosis: while the Bank today does indeed suffer from serious problems, none is so serious that it cannot be cured by a well-managed move to private ownership.

Indeed, in a world defined by its tradeoffs, privatizing the World Bank would appear to be one venture in which practically everybody wins. Operating as a private profit-seeking entity, the Bank would reinforce the soundness of the international financial system. It would repay the Western taxpayers who have long supported it. Best of all, it would help to establish new rules for economic policy in low income regions—and thereby hasten the ultimate alleviation of material poverty in our world. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two Comments

Walter Wriston:

WHEN AN organization's mission has been completed and its presence no longer required, there are almost no instances of simply liquidating it, turning out lights and going home. Instead a new mission is invented, since the real objective of bureaucracies—public or private—is survival. The IMF, designed to function in a world of fixed exchange rates, now faces a world of floating currencies. Former Secretary George Shultz has suggested that the IMF be liquidated and its capital spun into the World Bank; another alternative would be to return its capital to the taxpayers from whence it came. The suggestion in this paper on the World Bank takes the middle ground of privatization, combined with a shift away from its new-found mission of international lender of the last resort and returning it to its roots of sound banking and supplying value-added services, like global export guarantees.

New circumstances require new actions. The international capital market has grown so huge and so liquid as to bear little or no resemblance to that which existed at the time of Bretton Woods. There will always be a shortage of capital for poor projects, but good projects get financing in the private market. Propping up nations which pursue untenable and bad economic polices is a far cry from the original mission of trying to help rebuild a war-torn world. The dream of universal development from President Truman's Point Four in 1950 through President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress rested on increasing the investment of money capital in the developing world, and the World Bank was very much a part of that scene. As the money flowed out around the world, however, we learned that capital alone is unproductive—one must have competence created by training and education to create growth. Indeed some studies have shown that recipients of World Bank loans were worse off than before the loans were obtained. A privatized World Bank might return to real-bank lending and eschew subsidized interest rate loans to mega-government projects and make a contribution in the years ahead. In the real world, capital cannot be driven, it can only be attracted. It goes where it is wanted and stays where it is well treated. No government or international agency can repeal those basic laws of capital flows.

Since the World Bank was formed in the years when much of the conventional wisdom decreed that more and bigger government was the answer for all human problems, it is understandable that the charter specifies that it can lend only to governments or against a government guarantee. This of course has the effect of increasing government control over the private sector, generally with bad results. Since the bank was formed by politicians to lend to other politicians, it is useless, not to say ridiculous, to criticize it for making political loans at subsidized rates to government projects. The able and dedicated staff is doing what it was supposed to do. We now know that those programs do not help the world's poor. Indeed there may be a kind of Gresham's Law that bad loans to huge government projects drive out good private loans to the productive private sector. One way to help the poor may be to privatize the bank and change its mission. □

Walter B. Wriston is author of *The Twighlight of Sovereignty.*

Benjamin King:

ALTHOUGH THEY ARE not in the phone book, there is a thriving public relations firm in Washington, known as Nostrum, Gimmick & Fad. Their specialty is to take a promising idea and ram it into the ground. They have had plenty of clients. Privatization seems to be the latest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No one in his right mind would now read the proceedings of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. If, in a moment of insanity, he did, he would find that it had been undertaken, inter alia, to avoid the monumental *private* screw-up of the '20s. If, in a bout of madness, he were to scan the proceedings of the Senate Finance Committee towards the end of 1931, under the chairmanship of Senator Smoot of Smoot-Hawley tariff fame, he would observe a procession of eminent investment bankers explaining why they sold bonds to finance, as likely as not, extravagances such as government palaces and stadiums (as an article emanating in 1950 from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York put it). In fact, because of fungibility, no one really knew what they were used for.

When Eugene Black, the first president to run the Bank for more than a couple of years, was about to retire, Scotty Reston devoted an entire column in the *New York Times* (February 18, 1962) to an extraordinary paean of praise for this "creative pragmatist...the orthodox conservative American banker out of Atlanta via the Chase National, [who] became an international social reformer." There is much more, including reference to his undoubted charm. Under him and his successor, the Bank was indeed a pragmatic institution with few pretensions, intellectual or otherwise. But, arguably, it had a considerable effect on the quality of its clients' projects, individually and in the aggregate. It preached orthodox principles of free markets and fiscal prudence, but there its role was more modest, though not without the occasional success. In flagrant cases, it just slowed lending down or stopped it altogether.

Subsequently, the level of intellectual pretension has moved up a quantum notch, as has the capacity to match it. But, at the same time, so has the urge to institute lending programs and make the fulfillment of targets a criterion of competence. That undercut whatever "leverage" the Bank had and may have had an adverse effect on projects, especially those supposed to be designed to eradicate extreme poverty. Structural Adjustment, which was invented, quite properly, as a response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, was converted to the application of "catch-up" to those of its clients' economies that had fallen by the wayside.

The Bank has indeed broadened its scope. Education has been in its portfolio for many years. It has embraced the cause of women in development and the safeguarding of the environment, for example. So long as these objectives remain objectives and do not become someone's Nostrum or Fad, they are to be applauded. Indeed, the education of young girls is likely to prove in the long run a better "collateral" than an isolated project's assets, which it is ludicrous to suppose can be repossessed.

Recent history in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda (not to speak of Vietnam) should have taught us that self-inflicted disaster, political or economic, cannot be avoided or remedied without the cooperation of the locals. The Bank has a certain cachet as an international institution, but it is not immune to the facts of life. Its original ideals (which by the way included *supplementing* private investment), broadened and tempered by a better understanding of the nature of development, are well worth pursuing, so long as it is done with patience, modesty and integrity. Perhaps it might consider taking a leaf out of a New York bank's book and rewarding those who make a "coherent case for not doing specific deals" (*The Economist*, April 15, 1995, p. 72). But turning it over to the junk-bond market? Hardly. Gimmickry will not help the Bank, from within or without. □

Benjamin King is former department director of the World Bank from 1947-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Virtue and Prosperity

Francis Fukuyama

OVER THE PAST generation, economic thought has been dominated by neoclassical or free-market economists, associated with names like Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and George Stigler. The rise of the neoclassical perspective constitutes a vast improvement from earlier decades in this century, when Marxists and Keynesians held sway. We can think of neoclassical economics as being, say, 80 percent correct: it has uncovered important truths about the nature of money and markets because its fundamental model of rational, self-interested human behavior is correct about 80 percent of the time. But there is a missing 20 percent of human behavior about which neoclassical economics can give only a poor account. As Adam Smith well understood, economic life is deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be understood apart from the customs, morals, and habits of the society in which it occurs. In short, it cannot be divorced from culture.[1]

Consequently, we have been ill-served by contemporary economic debates that fail to take account of these cultural factors. An example is the argument that has taken place in the United States between free-market economists and the so-called neomercantilists over the past decade.

Neomercantilism and Its Limits

PROPONENTS OF the latter perspective—including people like Chalmers Johnson, James Fallows, Clyde Prestowitz, John Zysman, Karl van Wolferen, Alice Amsden, and Laura Tyson—have argued that the dynamic and fast-growing economies of East Asia have succeeded not by following but by violating the rules of neoclassical economics.[2] The Asian fast developers have achieved such astoundingly high growth rates, the neomercantilists argue, not because of the untrammeled working of free markets but because governments in each case stepped in to promote development through industrial policies. For all of their awareness of the distinctiveness of Asia, however, many neomercantilists argue their policy conclusions in the same abstract and universal terms as the neoclassical economists. They argue that Asia is different, not because of culture, but because societies there, reacting to their situation as "late developers" trying to catch up to Europe and North America, chose a different set of economic institutions. This fails, however, to take into account the degree to which the abili-

Francis Fukuyama is a resident consultant at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC, and director of the Johns Hopkins SAIS's Telecommunications Project. This article is taken from the author's forthcoming book, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, 1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ty to create certain institutions and run them effectively is itself culture bound.

James Fallows has made perhaps the most sweeping indictment of neoclassical economics in his book, *Looking at the Sun* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). Fallows argues that the Anglo-American preoccupation with market-oriented economics has blinded Americans to the critical role played by governments and that much of the world outside the United States operates on assumptions very much at variance with the rules of neoclassical economics. Asian governments, for example, have protected domestic industries through enacting high tariffs, restricting foreign investment, promoting exports through cheap credits or outright subsidies, granting licenses to favored companies, organizing cartels to share research and development costs and to allocate market shares, or else funding cutting-edge R&D directly. Chalmers Johnson was one of the first to argue that it was Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) rather than the market that was responsible for guiding the postwar Japanese economy to its extraordinarily high growth rates.[3] Virtually all neomercantilists have charged that the United States has fallen behind in the economic competition with Japan and other Asian states because the free-market orientation of successive U.S. administrations has allowed key industries to fall victim to foreign competition. They have promoted the creation of an American equivalent of a MITI that would subsidize, coordinate, and otherwise promote American high-tech industries in the global marketplace, and have argued for a far more confrontational trade policy that would protect American industries faced with "unfair" foreign competitors.[4]

The debate the neomercantilists have stirred up has centered on whether industrial policies were in fact responsible for Asia's high rates of growth and whether governments are capable of guiding economic development better than markets. The neomercantilists, however, neglect the role of culture in shaping industrial policy itself. For even if we accept the hypothesis that the wise guidance of technocrats was responsible for Asian progress, it is clear that there are sharp differences in the relative capabilities of states to plan and carry out industrial policies. These differences are shaped by culture, as well as by the nature of political institutions and historical circumstances of different countries. The French and Japanese have long statist traditions, while the United States has an equally long history of anti-statism, and there is a world of difference in the training and general quality of human beings that go into their respective national bureaucracies. That there is a great difference in the quality of policies and management that result should not be surprising.

There are also clearly major cultural differences with respect to the nature and prevalence of corruption. One of the chief problems with any industrial policy is that it invites the corruption of public officials, which in turn vitiates any possible beneficial effects of the policy. Clearly industrial policies work better in societies with long traditions of honest and competent civil service. Although the corruption of Japanese politicians has become a national scandal, few accusations of a similar nature have ever been leveled against MITI or Finance Ministry bureaucrats. The same is very unlikely to be the case with bureaucrats in Latin America, not to speak of other parts of the Third World.

Other cultural considerations are likely to affect the success of an industrial policy as well. Attitudes toward authority in Asia may have helped countries there implement industrial policies in ways that would not be possible elsewhere in the world. Consider the question of government help for sunrise versus sunset industries. It may be possible in theory for technocrats in countries not at the leading edge of technology to pick industries or sectors for promotion, but political factors usually intervene to skew government policy in the wrong direction. By definition, sunrise industries do not yet exist and therefore have no interest groups promoting them. Sunset

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industries, on the other hand, are often big employers and usually have vocal and politically powerful proponents. One of the distinctive features of the industrial policies carried out by many Asian governments has been their ability to dismantle older industries with large numbers of employees in an orderly way. In Japan, for example, employment in the textile industry fell from 1.2 million to 655,000 between the early 1960s and 1981; employment in the coal industry sank from 407,000 to 31,000 between 1950 and 1981; and shipbuilding underwent a similarly dramatic reduction in the 1970s.[5] In each case, the state intervened not to prop up employment in these sectors but *to assist in their demise*. Governments in Taiwan and South Korea have presided over similar reductions in employment in older labor-intensive industries.

In Europe and Latin America, by contrast, governments have found it almost impossible politically to dismantle sunset industries. Rather than helping to accelerate their decline, European governments nationalized failing industries like coal, steel, and automobiles, in the vain hope that state subsidies would make them internationally competitive. While paying lip-service to the need to shift resources into more modern sectors, the very democratic character of European governments led them to give in to political pressures to direct government subsidies to older industries, often at tremendous cost to taxpayers. There is no doubt that something similar would happen in the United States if the government got into the business of handing out "competitiveness" subsidies. Congress, responding to interest group pressure, could be relied on to declare that industries, like shoes and textiles, rather than aerospace and semiconductors, were "strategic" and thus worthy of government subsidization. Even in the high-tech area, older technologies are likely to carry more political clout than ones under development. Thus, the most compelling argument against an industrial policy for the United States is not an economic one at all but is related to the character of American democracy.

The significance of the state sector varies enormously from one culture to the next. In familistic societies such as China or Italy, state intervention is often the only avenue by which a nation can build large-scale industries and is therefore relatively important if the country is to play in global economic sectors demanding large scale. On the other hand, societies with a high degree of trust and social capital like Japan and Germany can create large organizations without state support. In other words, in calculating comparative advantage, economists need to take into account relative endowments of social capital, as well as more conventional forms of capital and resources. When there is a deficit in social capital, the shortfall can often be made good by the state, just as the state can rectify a deficit in human capital by building more schools and universities. But the need for state intervention will depend very much on the particular culture and social structure of the society over which it presides.

Neoclassical Hubris

THE OTHER POLE of the current industrial policy debate is represented by neoclassical economists who today dominate the economics profession. Neoclassical economics is a far more serious and sustained intellectual enterprise than neomercantilism. Substantial empirical evidence confirms that markets are indeed efficient allocators of resources and that giving free rein to self-interest promotes growth. The edifice of free-market economics is, to repeat, about 80 percent right, which is not bad for a social science and substantially better than its rivals as the basis for public policy.

But the totality of the intellectual victory of free-market economic theory in recent years has been accompanied by a considerable degree of hubris. Not being content to rest on their laurels, many neoclassical economists have come to believe that the economic method they have discovered provides them with the tools for constructing something approaching a universal science of man.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The laws of economics, they argue, apply everywhere: they are equally valid in Russia as the United States, Japan, Burundi, or the Papua New Guinea highlands, and do not admit significant cultural variations in their application. These economists believe that they are right in a deeper epistemological sense as well: through their economic methodology, they have unlocked a fundamental truth about human nature that will allow them to explain virtually all aspects of human behavior. Two of the most prolific and renowned contemporary neoclassical economists, Gary Becker of the University of Chicago, and James Buchanan of George Mason University (both of whom won Nobel Prizes for their work), have built careers extending economic methodology to what are usually regarded as noneconomic phenomena like politics, bureaucracy, racism, the family, and fertility.[6] The political science departments of many major universities are now filled with followers of so-called rational choice theory, which attempts to explain politics using an essentially economic methodology.[7]

The problem with neoclassical economics is that it has forgotten certain key foundations on which classical economics was based. Adam Smith, the premier classical economist, believed that people are driven by a selfish desire to "better their condition," but he would never have subscribed to the notion that economic activity could be reduced to rational utility maximization. Indeed, his other major work besides *The Wealth of Nations* was *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which portrays economic motivation as highly complex and embedded in broader social habits and mores. The very change in the name of the discipline from "political economy" to "economics" between the eighteenth and late-nineteenth centuries reflects the narrowing of the model of human behavior at its core. Current economic discourse needs to recover some of the richness of classical, as opposed to neoclassical, economics, by taking account of how culture shapes all aspects of human behavior, including economic behavior, in a number of critical ways. Not only is the neoclassical economic perspective insufficient to explain political life, with its dominant emotions of indignation, pride, and shame, but it is not sufficient to explain many aspects of economic life either.[8] Not all economic action arises out of what are traditionally thought of as economic motives.

The entire imposing edifice of contemporary neoclassical economic theory rests on a relatively simple model of human nature: that human beings are "rational utility-maximizing individuals." That is, human beings seek to acquire the largest possible amount of the things they think are useful to themselves, they do this in a rational way, and they make these calculations as individuals, seeking to maximize the benefit to themselves before they seek the benefit of any of the larger groups of which they are part. In short, neoclassical economics postulates that human beings are essentially rational but selfish individuals who seek to maximize their material well-being.

Economists, to a much greater extent than philosophers, poets, clergy, or politicians, preach the virtues of the pursuit of narrow self-interest because they believe that the greatest good to society as a whole can be achieved by allowing these individuals to pursue their self-interest through the market. In one social experiment, a large group of people at a university were given tokens that they could exchange for money that they would receive personally or for money that the group as a whole would have to share. It turned out that between 40 and 60 percent of those in the experiment contributed altruistically to the group's well-being. The only exception was a group of entering graduate students in economics.[9] As F.Y. Edgeworth has succinctly put it, "The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest."

The power of neoclassical theory rests on the fact that its model of humanity is accurate a good deal of the time: people can indeed be relied on to pursue their own selfish interests

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more often than they pursue some kind of common good. Rational self-interested calculation transcends cultural borders. Every first-year economics student reads of studies that show that when the price of wheat goes up relative to corn, peasants shift their output from corn to wheat regardless of whether they live in China, France, India, or Iran.

But every one of the terms of the neoclassical premise that human beings are rational utility-maximizing individuals is subject to significant qualification or exception. Take the assertion that people pursue utility. The most basic definition of *utility* is the narrow one associated with the nineteenth-century utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham: that utility is the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Such a definition is straightforward and corresponds to a commonsense understanding of economic motivation: people want to be able to consume the largest possible quantity of the good things of life. But there are numerous occasions when people pursue goals other than utility. They have been known to run into burning houses to save others, die in battle, or throw away lucrative careers so that they can commune with nature somewhere in the mountains. People do not simply vote their pocketbooks: they also have ideas that certain things are just or unjust, and they make important choices accordingly.[10] There would not be nearly as many wars if the latter were fought simply over economic resources; unfortunately, they usually involve non-utilitarian goals like recognition, religion, justice, prestige, and honor.

Some economists try to get around this problem by broadening the definition of utility beyond pleasure or money to take account of other motivations such as the "psychic pleasure" one receives for "doing the right thing," or the "pleasure" people can take in other people's consumption. Economists assert that one can know what is useful only by what people reveal to be useful by their choices—hence their concept of "revealed preference." The abolitionist dying to end slavery and the investment banker speculating on interest rates are both said to be pursuing "utility," the only difference being that the abolitionist's utility is of a psychic sort. At its most extreme, "utility" becomes a purely formal concept used to describe whatever ends or preferences people pursue.

But this type of formal definition of utility reduces the fundamental premise of economics to an assertion that people maximize whatever it is they choose to maximize, a tautology that robs the model of any interest or explanatory power. By contrast, to assert that people prefer their selfish material interests over other kinds of interests is to make a strong statement about human nature.

It should also be quite evident that people do not always pursue utility, however defined, in a "rational" way, that is, by considering available alternatives and choosing the one that maximizes utility in the long run. Indeed, it is possible to argue that people are usually not rational in this sense. The Chinese, Korean, and Italian preference for family, Japanese attitudes toward adoption of non-kin, the French reluctance to enter into face-to-face relationships, the German emphasis on training, the sectarian temper of American social life: all come about as the result not of rational calculation but from inherited ethical habit.

Rationality and Culture

MOST NEOCLASSICAL economists would respond to these examples by saying that they are cases not of irrational behavior but of imperfect information. Information about relative prices and product quality is often unavailable or requires considerable time and effort to acquire. People will make seemingly irrational choices because the costs of acquiring better information outweigh the benefits they expect from it. It is not rational for people to be "rational" about every single

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice they make in life; if this were true, their lives would be consumed in decisions over the smallest matters. People in traditional cultures will follow the dictates of tradition and act very differently from people in industrialized societies, but that is because traditional culture contains embedded rules of behavior that are rational *for that culture.*

But while habits can be economically rational or may once have had rational causes, many are not, or else take on a life of their own in situations when they are no longer appropriate. It may have been rational, in the context of traditional Chinese peasant society, to seek to have many sons, since sons are their elders' only source of support. But why, then, does this preference persist when Chinese immigrate to the United States or Canada, which have state-sponsored social security systems? The French preference for centralized bureaucratic authority may have been a reasonable reaction to centralized absolutism, but why do the French continue to have such difficulties at self-organization even when contemporary central governments deliberately devolve power to them? It may be rational for a mother on welfare not to marry the father of her child, given the economic incentives established by the welfare system, but why does that habit persist even when the benefits are taken away, and in the light of the clear long-run economic disadvantages to single parenthood? It is impossible to maintain that all cultures embed rules that are totally rational in their own terms. The simple variety of cultures that exist in the world, and the enormous range of cultural adaptations to similar economic situations, suggest that not all of them can be equally rational.

Finally it is very questionable whether human beings act as individual utility maximizers rather than seeing themselves as parts of larger social groups. In Mark Granovetter's phrase, people are embedded in a variety of social groups—families, neighborhoods, networks, businesses, churches, and nations—against whose interests they have to balance their own.[11] The obligations one feels toward one's family do not arise out of a simple cost-benefit calculation, even if that family is running a business; rather it is the character of the business that is shaped by pre-existing family relationships. Workers are never merely counters in a company's table of organization; they develop solidarity, loyalties, and dislikes that shape the nature of economic activity. In other words, social, and therefore moral, behavior coexists with self-interested utility-maximizing behavior on a number of levels. The greatest economic efficiency is not necessarily achieved by rational self-interested individuals, but rather by groups of individuals who, because of a pre-existing moral community, are able to work together effectively.

To say that there is an important side of human personality that does not correspond to the rational utility-maximizer of neoclassical economics does not undermine the basic structure of the neoclassical edifice. That is, people will act as self-interested individuals often enough for the "laws" of economics to be a useful guide for making predictions and formulating public policy. In questioning the neoclassical model, we do not have to resort to the Marxist premise that man is a "species being," giving priority to society over self-interest as a matter of course. But human beings act for non-utilitarian ends in arational, group-oriented ways sufficiently often that the neoclassical model presents us with an incomplete picture of human nature.

The long-standing debates between free-market economists and neomercantilists over whether and how the government ought to intervene in the economy sidestep an important issue. Certainly macroeconomic policy is important, but it must be applied within a particular political, historical, and cultural context. Policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prescriptions arising from either perspective may not be generalizable: the same industrial policy that leads to utter disaster in Latin America may prove effective, or at least not do any harm, in Asia. Some societies can shield their technocrats from day-to-day popular pressures to keep plant X open or to subsidize industry Y more effectively. The important variable is not industrial policy as such but culture. □

---

[1]On this aspect of Adam Smith, see Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in His Time and Ours* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[2]The neomercantilists share with earlier Marxist and Keynesian critics an emphasis on the importance of the state as an economic actor. The Marxists argued for more-or-less total state control of the economy. The Keynesians, by contrast, accepted the need for a strong private sector but argued for massive government intervention through public spending in order to maintain full employment and other social welfare goals. The neomercantilist wave focuses on more modest objectives like the promotion of high-technology industries in a highly competitive and interdependent global market. While neomercantilists would concede that global competition produces beneficial economic efficiencies and that economies should be export oriented and outward looking, they argue the more modest point that the market alone is insufficient to produce technological leadership and hence rapid long-term growth.

[3]Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

[4]For other examples in this genre, see Laura D'Andrea Tyson *Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflicts in High Technology Industries* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993); Karl van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, and John Zysman, *The Politics of Productivity* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Books, 1989); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

[5]James C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr., *Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 20-23.

[6]Gary Becker argues that economics ought not to be thought of as a specific subject of study (e.g., the study of money or wealth) but as a method that can be applied to a wide range of human behavior. See Becker, *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976), pp. 3-14.

[7]For critiques of the rational choice school, see Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). Also, Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "A Disaster in the Making: Rational Choice and Asian Studies," *The National Interest* (Summer 1994), pp. 14-22.

[8]For a fascinating interchange on the limits of the ability of economics to give an account of politics, see the dialogue among James Buchanan, Viktor Vanberg, and Allan Bloom in James Nichols and Colin Wright, eds., *From Political Economy to Economics...and Back?* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990), pp. 193-206.

[9]Steven E. Rhoads, "Do Economists Overemphasize Monetary Benefits?" *Public Administration Review* 45 (1985):pp. 815-820.

[10]On this point see Steven Kelman, "'Public Choice' and Public Spirit," *The Public Interest* no. 87 (1987), pp. 80-94.

[11]Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (1985), pp. 481-510.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Free Trade with an Unfree Society

A Commitment and its Consequences

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

IN LATE JANUARY of this year I went to the Senate floor to speak of U.S. relations with Mexico, in the context of the new North American Free Trade Agreement. My theme was one I had touched upon repeatedly since NAFTA was first proposed during the administration of President Bush: free trade with an unfree society. I had been an enthusiastic supporter of the agreement with Canada, but was troubled by the thought of a similar arrangement with Mexico, and for the most elemental reason. The political and legal arrangements of the United States and Canada being essentially symmetrical, the vast involvement in one another's affairs, indeed the partial ceding of sovereignty implicit in such an agreement, would prove manageable. There would be no political loss and considerable economic gain. Optimality, as an economist might say. By contrast, our political and legal institutions were anything but symmetrical with those of Mexico. For Mexico maintained a Leninist state.

Apart from a gracious note from our distinguished treasury secretary, Robert E. Rubin, there was no response from the executive branch to my statement. In any event, we were then, in January, caught up in an intense effort to save Mexico from defaulting on its foreign debt. This was the first of what is likely to be a sequence of such crises, and it seemed gratuitous to press the argument in that atmosphere. But now the first crisis has eased, thanks in large measure to what Alexander Hamilton, our first secretary of the treasury, termed "energy in the executive," and it may be time to return to the subject.

I begin by calling attention to an essay by William Pfaff, which appeared in the *International Herald Tribune* on March 16. Mr. Pfaff, who writes from Paris, is a foreign policy analyst of exceptional range, depth, and experience. He would be such if he lived in Utica, but living abroad gives him a singular perspective on American affairs. His essay begins with this simple, chilling analogy:

> The commitment the United States now has made to Mexico bears a distinct resemblance to the commitment it made to Vietnam during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, when the troubles in that country were only beginning.
>
> That was war and this is peace. Nonetheless, now, as then, with as little reflection and a simplistic ideology, Washington has taken on responsibility for the fortunes of another nation that it scarcely knows and fails to understand.
>
> In Mexico this American assumption of responsibility is primarily economic, but Mexico's economic plight is inseparable from the political crisis afflicting the seven-decade-

Daniel Patrick Moynihan is senior Democratic senator from New York. His most recent book is *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford University Press).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long dictatorship in Mexico of the PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party, historically the vehicle of Mexican nationalism...

Even without the debt crisis a national upheaval is under way in Mexico which not even the Mexicans can be sure they can solve. Washington's commitment to a solution is an engagement with the uncontrollable and the unforeseeable.

In my January statement I was unapologetic about discussing government in the abstract, maintaining that Speaker Newt Gingrich, by encouraging us to read or reread *The Federalist*, was directing us to just such abstractions, which had very much engaged the founders of the nation. They had ransacked history for different "ideal types" of government to provide lessons to be learned and contrasts to be made with the new American republic which they had set about constructing. In their spirit, then, here is a definition of Leninism from the *Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* (the capitalized words are employed in the original for purposes of cross reference):

Leninism: The term refers to the version of MARXIST thought which accepts the validity of the major theoretical contributions made by Lenin to revolutionary Marxism. These contributions fall into two main groups. Central to the first was the conception of the revolutionary party as the vanguard of the PROLETARIAT. The workers, if left to their own devices, would concentrate on purely economic issues and not attain full political CLASS consciousness, and therefore the revolutionary seizure of power needed the leadership of committed Marxist ACTIVISTS to provide the appropriate theoretical and tactical guidelines. The role of the party was thus to be a "vanguard" in the revolutionary struggle...

The second major theoretical contribution made by Lenin was to draw the political consequences from an analysis of CAPITALISM as both international and imperialist. The phenomenon of IMPERIALISM divided the world between advanced industrial nations and the colonies they were exploiting. This situation was inherently unstable and led to war between capitalist nations thus creating favorable conditions for REVOLUTION. For Lenin, the "weakest link" in the capitalist chain was to be found in UNDERDEVELOPED regions of the world economy such as Russia where the indigenous BOURGEOISIE was comparatively weak, but where there had been enough INDUSTRIALIZATION to create a class-conscious proletariat. The idea of worldwide SOCIALIST revolution beginning in relatively backward countries led to the inclusion of the peasantry as important revolutionary actors affording essential support to the proletariat in establishing a socialist order...

As compared with the ideas of Marx and Engels, Leninism gives more emphasis to the leading role of the party, to backward or semicolonial countries as the initial site of revolution, and to the peasantry as potential revolutionary agents...

Clearly, Leninist doctrine and Soviet example had considerable appeal to the revolutionary leaders and intellectuals who came to power in Mexico in the 1920s. It happens this was a time of great artistic energy, perhaps especially in the mural paintings of Diego Rivera, Jose Clemente Orozco, and David Alfonso Siquieros. To this day one can see on the walls of government buildings in Mexico City vast scenes of revolutionary tumult. Amid a sea of yellow sombreros and silver machetes there is sure to be found an incongruously bearded Lenin, turned out in a starched collar and black necktie. That, and, of course, swarms of red flags.

If the Soviet "experiment" attracted sympathizers, even adherents, in the United States in those years, I would hazard that public opinion showed even greater sympathy for the goings-on in Mexico. A wonderful encounter came at the time of the construction of Rockefeller Center in New York City in the early years of the Great Depression. Diego Rivera was commissioned to paint a fresco for the lobby of the central

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RCA building, as it then was. Word got out that it would include not only red flags, but Lenin himself. Nelson A. Rockefeller, who was managing the enterprise, demurred. Much hullabaloo followed, leading in turn to a poem by E.B. White of *The New Yorker*, "I Paint What I See," describing an imagined encounter between the youthful scion of great wealth and the revolutionary artist:

> *"Whose is that head that I see on my wall?"*
> *Said John D.'s grandson Nelson.*
> *"Is it anyone's head whom we know, at all?*
> *A Rensselaer, or a Saltonstall?*
> *Is it Franklin D.? Is it Mordaunt Hall?*
> *Or is it the head of a Russian?"*
>
> *"For twenty-one thousand conservative bucks*
> *You painted a radical. I say shucks..."*
>
> *"For this, as you know, is a public hall*
> *And the people want doves, or a tree in fall,*
> *And though your art I dislike to hamper,*
> *I owe a* little *to God and Gramper,*
> *And after all,*
> *It's* my *wall..."*
>
> *"We'll see if it is," said Rivera.*

It was, then, no accident (!) that when Leon Trotsky fled the Soviet Union, having lost out to Stalin in the struggle to succeed Lenin, he did not settle in Paris, as failed revolutionaries were supposed to do. He went instead to Mexico City, where he set up in considerable style, surrounded often as not by American acolytes.

Two things are to be said about the coming to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico in 1929. First—and the great English historian Sir John Plumb has made this point—it was a blessing for the Mexican people who for decades had lived through indescribably bloody and agonizing turmoil. Of a sudden, stability was achieved. (Sir John makes the point that revolutions are easy; it is the onset of stability that is rare in human experience.) The second point is that nothing like the Leninist terror followed the coming to power of the PRI. Diplomatic relations with the Papacy—severed since 1867 when Benito Juarez implemented strict controls of Church power—had become particularly hostile in 1926, with the strict enforcement of the anti-clerical provisions of the Constitution. Now, in 1929, the Mexican government and the Church reached a *modus vivendi*, and after that Catholicism, the religion of the people, was generally not suppressed. (Though one should not fail to bear in mind Graham Greene's *The Power and the Glory*.)

Even so, one-party control, and the corruption that so quickly follows, settled on the Republic of Mexico. As the 1994-95 edition of *Freedom in the World*, the authoritative annual survey published by Freedom House, states:

> Since its founding in 1929, the PRI has dominated the state through a top-down corporatist structure that is authoritarian in nature and held together through co-optation, patronage, corruption and, when all else fails, repression. The formal business of government takes place secretly and with little legal foundation.

In correct Leninist practice, the party controlled not only the state, but all the private institutions that might seem to be arrayed against the state, most importantly the trade unions.

Of late, however, the Leninist state in Mexico appears to have entered a time of troubles, possibly of disintegration. As Pfaff writes, "a national upheaval is underway." Tim Golden of the *New York Times* gives this account of the May Day celebrations in Mexico City this year:

> Defying the pro-Government union leaders who have dominated Mexican labor since the 1930s, independent unions and leftist political groups turned the celebration of Labor Day today into an outpouring of anger at the eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic policies of President Ernesto Zedillo...[F]or the first time in decades, May Day's main political act was something other than a loyal tribute to the Government and its long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. Leaders of the pro-Government unions have canceled their traditional parade through the square weeks ago, apparently out of fear that they would be unable to control the critics in their ranks.

Trade union subservience to the PRI has been a settled fact for half a century, one that hardly escaped the notice of the American labor movement. More recently the party seems to have begun parceling out hugely profitable state enterprises or resources to favored business leaders, who have evidently become fabulously wealthy. A dacha outside of Moscow is one thing; the PRI elite have shown the world the way things might have been. On February 23, 1993, as the NAFTA negotiations were wrapping up, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari invited thirty leading businessmen to a party fundraising dinner with tickets at $25,000,000 each. This occasioned some raised eyebrows. President Salinas forthwith endorsed campaign contribution limits and the head of the governing party, Genaro Borrego, announced that it would no longer accept donations of more than one million pesos, or about $325,000.

Mr. Borrego further explained that "It was some businessmen who proposed the quantities to contribute" to the party. This explanation may not immediately recommend itself, and yet there would be a certain oligopolistic logic in keeping up the price of admission to a monopolistic party! The twentieth century seems to be demonstrating, however, that such arrangements are not stable. The problem of accession has returned.

On March 23, 1994, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate of the PRI, was assassinated in Tijuana. One Mario Aburto Martinez was arrested at the scene, convicted and sentenced to forty-five years in prison. The administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who had chosen Colosio as his successor, maintained that the assassination was the work of this lone gunman. However, on February 25, 1995, the new Mexican Attorney General Antonio Lozano Gracia announced the arrest of a second suspected gunman, Othon Cortes Vázquez, a PRI security guard.

A second political assassination occurred on September 28, 1994, when Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the secretary-general of the PRI, was killed in Mexico City. On February 28, 1995, Attorney General Lozano Gracia announced the arrest of Raul Salinas de Gortari, the brother of former President Salinas, in connection with Ruiz Massieu's assassination. The investigation into this assassination had previously been carried out by the victim's brother, Mario, who was soon after arrested in the Newark, New Jersey airport with $46,000 in undeclared cash. The Mexican attorney general has since located $10 million in U.S. bank accounts linked to Mario Ruiz Massieu, money he apparently obtained while in charge of Mexico's counter-narcotics program.

Add a further twist to the tale. Former President Salinas, whom the United States hoped would be the first president of the World Trade Organization until this story was revealed, is now living in the United States in virtual exile.

Now another political murder would seem to have occurred. On May 10, 1994, the former Jalisco state attorney general, Leobardo Larios, who previously had been responsible for investigating the 1993 killing of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo, was assassinated in Guadalajara. At the time of Cardinal Posadas Ocampo's assassination, the first official explanation of the killing was that he had been accidentally killed in the crossfire between two rival drug cartels. When the autopsy later revealed, however, that he had been shot fourteen times at close range, Leobardo Larios postulated that the Cardinal had been mistaken for the leader of a local drug ring, despite the fact that he was wearing his clerical garb.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Revelations such as these are familiar. Power in Mexico has resided within the PRI, the line between the party and the state has been blurred, and on occasion arguments within the party are settled by murder. These features of Leninist totalitarianism appeared early in the Soviet state. In *Political Succession in the USSR* (1965), Myron Rush explains:

> [W]hile Lenin still ruled, he exercised his power through both the Party and the government. In the Party, formally, he had no special position but was simply a member of the Politburo along with six others; he headed the government, however, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. He governed through the state apparatus directly, through the Party apparatus indirectly...The Party, as the embodiment of the Revolutionary will, decided overall policy.

Mexico continues to maintain the Leninist model of having the president fulfill the official role of head of state, while controlling the party without formal title, though the party and the government appear to be moving apart somewhat. Much of what has happened of late in Mexico echoes an earlier time of change and violence. But there is much that promises a new era altogether.

On May 23, 1991, as the U.S. Senate debated granting fast track authority to enable the administration to negotiate NAFTA, I went to the floor to explain my opposition: Mexico lacked an independent judiciary. This was, and I fear still is, a matter of seeming small interest to our Department of State. But observe: it has become a matter of considerable interest to the rulers of Mexico. On May 12, 1994, the first *ever* presidential election debate took place between Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Léon, the PRI candidate who succeeded the assassinated Colosio, and his opponents from the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of Democratic Revolution (PDR). During the debate, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos of the National Action Party charged that Zedillo does not "get a passing grade in democracy." If elected, Mr. Fernandez de Cevallos promised to form a plural government. In turn, Zedillo used the debate to announce his intentions to establish a truly independent judiciary. The CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service records him as saying, "I am proposing the total reformation of our judicial system. This must be deep-rooted reform, starting virtually from ground zero, because we need a justice system that will function for the Mexican people."

Once elected, President Zedillo in one stroke cleared the bench of all twenty-one sitting Supreme Court justices. These judges had been appointed for life. While the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, like most things in Mexico, reality is something quite different. Appointments to the court are made by the president and approved by the Senate (in which 95 of the 128 senators belong to the PRI). Again, Freedom House is instructive:

> The judiciary is subordinate to the president, underscoring the lack of a rule of law. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the executive and rubber-stamped by the Senate. The court is prohibited from enforcing political and labor rights, and from reviewing the constitutionality of laws. Overall, the judiciary system is weak, politicized and riddled with corruption.

Very possibly President Zedillo means to change this and much else. The North American Free Trade Agreement surely indicated a desire by Mexican elites to begin to put the institutions of the Leninist state behind them. Pfaff writes:

> The new president, Ernesto Zedillo, a product of the PRI system, is attempting to reform the party and the way it has perpetuated itself in power. For the first time crimes committed within the party leadership are being exposed to public view, investigated and given the promise of prosecution.

Free elections have appeared. In May an opposition (PAN) candidate won "a landslide"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

victory for governor of the central Mexican state of Guanajuato. Again, Golden of the *New York Times* (which has been covering Mexico brilliantly) observed, "It was only the fourth official victory for the opposition in a gubernatorial vote in sixty-six years...." But a beginning? More than just possibly.

It may be the United States can help. More to the point, we have no choice but to try to help. We have made a huge commitment to this relationship. There is no point in arguing now whether we should have done so. We did, and we are obliged to live with the consequences.

As I write, the U.S. president has just returned from Moscow, where the great transition from totalitarianism is underway, to what purpose and what end we do not know. But surely, we know that it matters to us. The Department of State has focused attention on the matter, has proposed policies, responses. The same intelligent, patient, persistent attention now needs to be paid to the incipient transition in Mexico. There is, perhaps, not that much America can do, given our long history of aggression against Mexico, and the consequent suspicion of our motives. But we can at least let it be known that we have some inkling of what they are going through. There are small "d" democrats in Mexico who need to know this. If there is anything we have learned from this hideous century it is that it makes all the difference when those who resist totalitarian regimes know that there are those abroad who know of their resistance. □

Ten Year Anniversary Special Offer

Order your complete set of *The National Interest*
38 issues—(omitting only #11 and #16, which are out of print)
available for just $200 plus postage.

Please contact our editorial office at:
1112 Sixteenth Street, NW, Suite 540
Washington, DC 20036, or call (202) 467-4884.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Inchon in the Desert

—*My Rejected Plan*

Henry S. Rowen

THE VOICE SQUAWKED from the loudspeaker in the Pentagon's command center: "We have an event. We have an event. The latitude is...the longitude is...the missile is heading towards Tel Aviv. Arrival in six minutes and seventeen seconds...."

Those disembodied words, spoken in the early evening (Washington time) of January 16, 1991, were the first indication of a Scud missile attack by Iraq on Israel. It was to be followed by many more, against both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

During all of this I was the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, on leave from Stanford University business school and the Hoover Institution. My responsibilities were to support the undersecretary of defense for policy, Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary Dick Cheney on political-military matters throughout most of the world including the Middle East.

The attack was especially poignant for me because it dramatically marked the failure of a plan to prevent it. The plan, which was vigorously pushed by Secretary Cheney, was not carried out because of opposition by our military leaders, notably the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Colin Powell, and the commander in the field, General Norman Schwarzkopf. Had it been implemented, there was a good chance it would have caused the downfall of Saddam Hussein without the need for either a major air or big ground campaign in Kuwait.

To explain what happened, one must review the situation that existed shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States was rushing forces to Saudi Arabia to block any further southward advance of Iraqi troops toward the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. As it soon became evident that Saudi Arabia was secure, our attention then focused on how to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait. One method was to rely on economic sanctions. As for military means, two courses seemed available: one was the use of air power, which could greatly weaken Iraq's military and also might, so air power enthusiasts hoped, bring about collapse of the regime. The other was the tried-and-true method of destroying and expelling Iraqi forces through the combined use of ground and air power.

On the political front, the Bush administration was working with great vigor and success to build a broad coalition of countries to oppose Iraq and restore Kuwait's independence. But given the heterogeneity of this coalition, there were grounds for worrying about its robustness in the face of some untoward events.

Henry S. Rowen is professor of public management at the Graduate School of Business and senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, president of the RAND Corporation, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, and deputy assistant secretary of defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A particularly feared event was an Iraqi missile attack on Israel. (We also were worried, with good cause, about missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, including on our bases there, but this possibility did not entail great political risks.) In the spring of 1990, Saddam Hussein had delivered a speech, to which we had paid inadequate attention, in which he spoke of "burning half of Israel." Such attacks, damaging enough in themselves—especially if the Scuds had warheads filled with chemical agents—would put the Israeli government under great pressure to retaliate against Iraq. We feared that this might lead some of the Arabs to abandon the coalition. In any case, it was an event very much worth preventing.

Unhappy Choices

BY THE END of September 1990, some of us on the staff of the secretary of defense were not satisfied with what we knew or inferred about these various options. Although there were many advocates in Washington for letting economic sanctions do the job, in the policy part of the Pentagon there was no confidence in this route. The intelligence community had little expertise on the economy of Iraq, but Patrick Clawson, a former International Monetary Fund desk officer for Iraq then at the University of Pennsylvania, did. For many of us, his story on how Iraq had coped with earlier periods of severe deprivation and how sanctions could and were being evaded clinched doubts about this course. Although the sanctions route would be debated in Washington for months to come, clearly it would have failed to liberate Kuwait.

We were confident that an air campaign could destroy Iraq's air force and air defenses, would greatly weaken its ability to support forces in Kuwait, and might cripple its military command-and-control system. But an air campaign by itself could not be counted on to do the entire job, especially in a prolonged campaign. It did not require much imagination to anticipate rising domestic and international political opposition to a campaign that, although it was designed to avoid civilians, was bound to hurt some of them. Moreover Saddam had the means and had demonstrated the brutality to guarantee that innocent people would become victims of our attacks.

In particular, we were not confident of air power's ability to so weaken the deployed and dug-in troops in Kuwait that a ground war, one possibly costly in lives, would be unnecessary. The Iraqi forces in Kuwait were, so we estimated (overestimated as it turned out), battle-experienced from the long war with Iran, numerous, not badly equipped, dispersed, and dug in. Clearly coalition air and ground power could defeat them, probably quickly, but the cost in casualties was a worry.

Least of all did we have any good reason for expecting that we could destroy Iraq's mobile Scud missile launchers. The Scud threat was not seen as a significant military one because they were so inaccurate. But because they could hit cities (and did manage to hit an American barracks at Dhahran) they were a political danger, especially if directed against Israel. Moreover, a missile armed with chemical agents might kill hundreds of thousands of people in Tel Aviv or Haifa (or Riyadh or Dhahran). These were possibilities to block if at all possible. But we had no good reason to believe that mobile Scud missile launchers could be destroyed from the air. As it turned out, we probably did not destroy a single one that way.

My concern about these options was heightened by the revelation that General Schwarzkopf's first tactical concept entailed going "up the middle" against Iraqi forces. As I told Dick Cheney, this could be the charge of the Light Brigade into the Wadi of Death. And no one had a clue about how to deal with the predictable Scud attacks.

By the middle of September I was exhausted from weeks of intense work (and suffering as well, I learned later, from a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

debilitating allergy). I took a week off in the south of France to recover—and to think about what to do about Iraq. I took along several books on Arab history. Reading them made it abundantly clear that the desert had been swiftly and easily crossed by Arabs for thousands of years; most of it presented no barrier at all to camels, "ships of the desert." One of these books was the *History of the Arab People* by Sir John Bagot Glubb, who had led the famous Arab Legion in Transjordan. Talking with a neighbor in Gordes reinforced this point. He had been interned in the British embassy in Baghdad in 1941 when the Iraqis concluded that the Germans were going to win the war and threw the British out. He described how the revolt against the British was abruptly ended when the Arab Legion, under the command of General Glubb Pasha, came swiftly across the desert in armored cars from Transjordan.

All of this led to an idea: that our forces in a sudden move could occupy the Western Desert of Iraq all the way west to Jordan and north to the Euphrates River. Because the limited range of the Scuds required them to be launched from somewhere in that area, occupying it would effectively eliminate the danger of Scud attacks on Israel, along with all the attendant destruction and political risks to the coalition. The Western Desert had few



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inhabitants and few Iraqi forces in it. The large majority of Iraq's forces were in Kuwait and most of the rest were in the north opposite Turkey or in the east opposite Iran. There were also some in the Baghdad area. We could rapidly achieve complete air superiority; we had the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions as well as mobile armored and mechanized ground forces. My goal, no doubt a too optimistic one, was to enable our forces, with adequate logistics preparations, to occupy the Western Desert of Iraq within twenty-four hours from a standing start. The Iraqis would simply be unable to respond effectively to such a move.

Operation Scorpion

ON RETURNING to Washington I went directly to Paul Wolfowitz and described this idea to him. He saw its potential power right away. Then we went to see Dick Cheney, who showed great interest. His instructions to me were to set up a planning cell and to tell *no one* else about it; he would take the idea from here. Indeed he did.

The small planning group that was set up was headed by retired Army Lieutenant General Dale Vesser who was on Wolfowitz's planning staff. Vesser was a respected officer with highly relevant experience and, it is fair to say, someone not easily taken in by some civilian's cockamamie ideas about military affairs. The plan got dubbed Operation Scorpion. The problems in carrying out Scorpion were largely logistical; apart from an Iraqi division at Salman there wasn't much opposition out there. And the distances were substantial: from Hafar al Batin in northeastern Saudi Arabia, the western edge of the Coalition forces, to the Jordanian border is about five hundred miles; the distance to Arar, a junction with a road leading north into Iraq, is three hundred miles. The distance from possible entry points into Iraq north across the desert to the Euphrates River is another one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles. Coalition forces moving along most of the relevant routes would be largely unopposed. Fuel and ammunition and other supplies would have to be moved forward in advance for this armada (a possible tip-off to the Iraqis) or carried along with the forces (a big supply job).

Though these distances were long, there were some favorable aspects. The view initially put out by some people that much of the desert was impassable by heavy vehicles didn't survive discussion with those who had done it, including explorers for oil. Moreover, the map shows several roads, including, most importantly, the Tapline Road, which runs alongside an old pipeline the entire length of the Saudi-Iraqi border. Our forces, other than the airborne, which would be used to seize key points in the desert, could move rapidly along this road inside Saudi Arabia and then make coordinated right turns along roads and across the desert in Iraq. Roads were important because, unlike tracked vehicles, our wheeled supports could not go through the sands. One obvious shortcoming was in tank transporters. If our tanks tried to go the whole way on their treads, the desert would probably have been littered with them, and perhaps with broken-down vehicles. The Euro-centered U.S. Army usually moved its heavy armor by rail but there weren't any railroads in this part of the world and we had to search far and wide for strong enough transporters to carry our sixty-five-ton armored behemoths.

After working on this problem for a week or so, another thought emerged, one that led Wolfowitz and me to see Dick Cheney again. I put it more or less this way: "When our forces have occupied the Western Desert up to the Euphrates, some of them will be within sixty miles of Baghdad. Saddam might pull his troops out of Kuwait to try to defend Baghdad but they will never get there because our air will destroy them; Saddam might be overturned;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he might flee. Something will happen in Baghdad." Cheney responded that this was an even more interesting observation. Again he told me to tell no one, and to keep working.

Naval images came to mind, and not only ones of "ships of the desert." Those with only a passing knowledge of modern military history doubtless know of one of the boldest and most successful strokes in modern warfare, the famous Inchon landing during the Korean War ordered by General Douglas MacArthur when his outnumbered troops were pinned down in the "Pusan Perimeter" in southern Korea. He totally transformed the situation on the peninsula by using our naval and air superiority to make an amphibious landing on Korea's west coast. The analogy with the situation in the Gulf was close, although the relevant medium was sand, not water. Like the sea, the Western Desert was (largely) uninhabited, and like the sea, movement across it would be swift. And, as in Korea, we totally commanded the air. I didn't use the Inchon precedent in promoting my idea, although in hindsight I should have. (As with all analysis, however, the precedent should not be pushed too far. After MacArthur's troops occupied South Korea they pushed north and then ran into big trouble with the Chinese. Operation Scorpion was designed principally to keep Scuds from being launched against Israel; in so doing it created an imminent threat to the Iraqi heartland.)

We did not discuss actually going into Baghdad. That wasn't part of the plan, although it did include the option of cutting off Baghdad from the north and south. Nor did we work up ideas for how to disengage from the Western Desert other than to observe that our occupation of it would be useful in a settlement of the war. Pursuing such matters rested on feedback from Cheney and that wasn't coming.

Vesser estimated that this plan called for a large increase in coalition (meaning, as a practical matter, U.S.) troops—two hundred thousand more (a virtual doubling) because he judged that we needed to maintain our full strength south of Kuwait while mounting this flanking operation to the west. Even without the extra strength, it was the best answer on what to do if, for whatever reason, we had to move in October or November with only the forces then available in Saudi Arabia. In that situation, an up-the-middle approach was most unappealing, whereas a bold, outflanking maneuver, especially given our air power, was clearly superior. Vesser's conclusion on the extra forces needed seemed unduly conservative to me but, as it turned out, at about the same time we reached this conclusion, Cheney and Powell proposed to President Bush just such a large increase of American forces.

From then on, I was largely in the dark. Cheney wasn't giving me feedback nor was anyone else saying much. But a new book, *The General's War*, by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, fills in the story. According to them, Cheney took this idea, which he called the Western Excursion, to President Bush for his approval. He then pushed it with Powell and Schwarzkopf. They didn't like it. Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, says, "The plan was as bad as it possibly could be." It was seen as logistically too hard and of doubtful strategic benefit.

But Powell knew that Schwarzkopf's up-the-middle plan wouldn't do, so he ordered the development of one that included an enveloping movement to the west to catch the Iraqi Republican Guard in the Kuwait area. This had tactical merit and was seen as a sop to Cheney's Western Excursion. Schwarzkopf, who assailed the Western Excursion, like Powell came to see that he couldn't beat something with nothing. So they debated how far west the forces should go. As Schwarzkopf put it in his book, "The western excursion wouldn't die." The British commander in the Gulf,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General Sir Peter de la Billière told me later, "Dick Cheney kept pushing us to go west; he wouldn't give up." Ironically, Schwarzkopf was apparently looking for an "Inchon-like" maneuver, or so he told Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice in mid-October. But when offered it, he rejected the opportunity to carry out the world's greatest "naval" maneuver on sand.

Dubious Decision

WHY DID POWELL and Schwarzkopf resist Cheney's pressure to go west? Clearly they didn't stop it altogether because the famous western envelopment around Kuwait did occur, but the "Inchon landing" did not. So, the Scuds flew and Saddam is still in power. At the tactical level, perhaps there was an under-appreciation of our air power's ability to dominate the Western Desert. Strike aircraft couldn't destroy mobile Scud launchers hiding in culverts but could have blown away any Iraqi unit venturing across the Euphrates. More fundamentally, our military leaders wanted to achieve a bully victory and go home—with unhappy memories of Vietnam replaced by a splendid showing in the Gulf. They did not want to get bogged down in Iraq, an image that hardly fitted the terrain but was a real enough concern all the same. The administration, both on the military and foreign policy sides, wanted to avoid creating a vacuum of power in Baghdad for fear that the resulting struggle among Shi'ites and Sunnis would bring in Iran, and the Kurds might declare independence, thus bringing in Turkey. And so on.

For those with such priorities, ideally not one American soldier or tank would touch Iraqi soil; but that position was tactically untenable. (For reasons of Arab political politesse, the Arab members of the coalition did not join U.S., British, and French forces in moving into Iraq.) If the entire job could be done from the air, splendid, at least to the air force. If, as the army types were convinced—and with good reason—ground forces had to be used, it should be circumscribed, swift, and short. Schwarzkopf also never took the Scud threat to Israel very seriously. In order to keep our lines with Israel distinct from those with the Arabs, Israel had not been put in his command's area of responsibility. When the missiles were flying it was difficult to get the general's attention on a place he saw as irrelevant to his plan for Kuwait's liberation.

Some of these reasons had considerable merit and many things worked out splendidly. Air power demonstrated for the first time on a large scale what precision weaponry could accomplish, and did much damage to Iraqi forces in Kuwait, including convincing many soldiers to go AWOL. The western enveloping operation worked like a charm and had the war not been called off most of the Republican Guard units there would have been destroyed or captured. But it was only through political skill and/or luck that the Scud attacks did not produce an Israeli response that would have caused internal problems for our Arab partners and might have led to some quitting the coalition. Certainly air power failed to stop the Scuds. And the mind set of our military and political leaders that caused us to leave enough of Saddam's—and, more fundamentally, the Baathist Party's—power intact has resulted in a highly unstable situation there. Our military and political leaders feared that causing a political change in Baghdad would destabilize the area. But the Gulf looks anything but stable now.

Would it—and we—have been worse off had Operation Scorpion been carried out? History only rolls by once so we cannot be sure. But when Iraqi troops started moving toward Kuwait in October 1994, our 1991 decisions looked decidedly more dubious. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Smithsonian and the *Enola Gay*

Wilcomb E. Washburn

NOT SINCE 1855 has the Smithsonian been riven by a controversy to equal that precipitated by the proposed *Enola Gay* exhibit. The issue then was whether the Smithsonian should be the national library, as the librarian Charles Coffin Jewett wanted, or a research institute, as Secretary Joseph Henry preferred. Henry won, but not before a congressional investigation led by Jewett's backers on Capitol Hill put Henry's leadership to the test. Today the possibility of a similar congressional investigation hangs threateningly over the Smithsonian.

The Smithsonian is currently seen neither as a national library nor as a research institute. Rather it is regarded as a museum, or collection of museums, whose principal purpose is to put on exhibitions for the general public. Its published annual report no longer even lists the publications of its research scholars. The jewel in the crown of all Smithsonian museums is the National Air and Space Museum (NASM), the world's most visited museum. The history of its establishment, dating from its authorization (but not funding) by Congress in 1946, reflects a continuing debate between those who wanted to "memorialize" and "enshrine" the sacred symbols of American ingenuity in conquering air and space (such as the Wright Brothers Flyer and the Apollo II spacecraft), and those who wanted to "educate" and "interpret" their broader meaning.

The extraordinary increase in visitors to the Smithsonian to see the Mercury spacecraft in which Alan Shepard and John Glenn were hurled into space in 1961 and 1962, and the even more intense excitement when the moon rocks brought back by the 1969 Apollo II mission were exhibited, turned the tide in favor of those insisting that a great new museum be funded to enshrine such glorious objects. Stirred by the passionate arguments of Reserve Brigadier General Senator Barry Goldwater on the floor of the Senate in 1970, an appropriations bill was finally included in the Smithsonian's 1972 budget.

The first director of the Air and Space Museum was astronaut Michael Collins, who piloted the spacecraft on the spectacular Apollo mission to the moon in 1969. He opened the museum on July 1, 1976, on the two hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, another reminder of the patriotic character of the institution's birth. When the *Enola Gay* exhibit

---

Wilcomb E. Washburn has been director of the American Studies Program at the Smithsonian Institution since 1965. He served as a translator in the Allied Interpreters and Translators Section of General MacArthur's SCAP headquarters in Tokyo and later as a Civil Information and Education Officer in the Toyama Prefecture Military Government Team 1946-47. While he observed the preparation of the *Enola Gay* exhibit from a distance as a Smithsonian employee, he was not involved in its preparation. He is a retired colonel, USMCR.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was being planned in the 1990s, one observer was uncertain whether the staff of the Air and Space Museum could "overcome" the celebratory character of its establishment "and make the exhibit of the *Enola Gay* the educational opportunity it is planning...Can it make this shrine into a school?" he wondered.[1]

In 1987 Martin Harwit, an astrophysicist rather than a retired military officer like most of his predecessors, was appointed director of the National Air and Space Museum. By that time many of the curators of the museum's early years, who were experts on the technical aspects of the hardware of air and space craft, had retired, left, or been let go. A new corps of curators, trained as social historians in America's universities in the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, has taken their place. The Smithsonian's newer curators, sensitive to the condescension or condemnation of their university colleagues for representing an institution whose exhibits were considered celebratory rather than critical, technical rather than interpretive, gradually shifted their emphasis to match the approach of their academic colleagues. From an ideological point of view that shift usually meant moving to the political left and to a view of the United States as more often than not the cause of the world's problems.

Warning signs might have alerted the Smithsonian's top administrators to the coming storm. "The West as America" exhibit in the National Museum of American Art in 1991 was so totally reflective of the Marxist fantasies of the academic left that it amused and outraged even such liberal institutions as the *Washington Post*. The Smithsonian reacted defensively, making a hasty modification of some of its exhibit labels and bringing in academic proponents of "the new Western history" to defend the exhibit's point of view.

The "Science in America" exhibit in the National Museum of American History—opened in 1994 after a long preparation period in which the American Chemical Society, which underwrote the exhibit, almost withdrew in disgust—caused a less explosive but slower burning reaction. The exhibit emphasized discrimination against women and minorities in science, pollution of the environment, and other negative aspects of science, while underplaying its positive achievements. Officials of the American Physical Society as well as the American Chemical Society expressed their dismay and disappointment directly to the secretary, and change seems to be in the works.

Hardball

THE ELECTION OF November 1994 changed radically the grounds of the debate over the Smithsonian's future. Instead of "softball" questions traditionally floated to Smithsonian secretaries during the annual hearings on its budget (nearly 80% of which is provided by the taxpayers), the new Smithsonian secretary, Ira Michael Heyman, chosen by the Board of Regents in May of 1994 and installed in September, had to expect "hardball" questions drilled close to his head by the new Republican majority. New members appointed in January 1995 to the Smithsonian's Board of Regents included Rep. Samuel Johnson (R-Texas), Rep. Robert Livingston (R-La.), Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), and Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.). Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), and Rep. Norman Y. Mineta (D-Calif.), were reappointed to the Board.

Secretary Heyman, coming on board as the latest Smithsonian controversy was erupting, at first sought to calm the waters and steer a middle course. Writing in a statement drafted "well before my installation as Secretary" and published in the October 1994 issue of the *Smithsonian* magazine, Heyman put the *Enola Gay* controversy in terms of "principles of fundamental importance to the Smithsonian." One was "the independence of the Institution

[1]Alex Roland, "Celebration or Education? The Goals of the U.S. National Air and Space Museum," *History and Technology*, 1993, vol. 10, p. 88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from detailed political direction," making it "analogous to a public university." Heyman's "public university background" made him "especially sympathetic to this viewpoint." The other principle related to the question of the Smithsonian as a museum exhibiting objects "without context" and "without any particular educative role." Heyman expressed distaste for "those who argue that we should present our positive accomplishments...more as propagandists than as educators." Yet, he added, "it is the responsibility of the curators of the Smithsonian to organize their exhibitions 'fairly.'"[2]

Heyman had the practical experience of standing between the California legislature and the distinguished Berkeley faculty, but dealing with Speaker Willie Brown of the California legislature was different from dealing with Speaker Newt Gingrich of the U.S. House of Representatives. Heyman's goal in both relationships was to uphold academic freedom while keeping the funding authorities supportive. But he became increasingly convinced that academic freedom in a great public museum is different from that in a great public university. Over the years, exhibits—particularly showy blockbuster exhibits—have assumed a larger role, while research in museums has become increasingly invisible. Directors have assumed "I am the museum" personalities and curators have been reduced from the role of "curator-in-charge" of exhibitions to "resource persons." Directors or their delegated "project managers" now determine the character of museum exhibits and approval is too often measured by the extent to which the exhibit opening attracts VIPs and is noticed in the "Style" section of the newspaper. It is rare that a curator is even mentioned in the press coverage. There is frequently no individual author or creator of an exhibit: hence, the notion of academic freedom for an individual to express his views in an exhibit, as in a book, is often beside the point.

With Capitol Hill now dominated by the conservative Right, the Smithsonian's movement to the liberal Left in the previous ten years caught it "zigging" when the rest of the country was "zagging." Under the previous secretary, the Smithsonian had enthusiastically pursued affirmative action (though the word "diversity" replaced "affirmative action" in Smithsonian documents in the late 1980s), and had begun to emulate the universities in their effort to achieve proportional representation of approved minorities (which did not, of course, include such minorities as Polish-Americans, Catholic-Americans, or Jewish-Americans, however disproportionately represented or unrepresented they might be; these were all lumped into the category of a disfavored white majority). I will not attempt to deal with the evolution of the *Enola Gay* script, as fascinating as such an exercise would be, except to say that various revisions of it were sent out for comment to outside organizations, such as the Air Force Assocation and NASM's own Advisory Committee on Research and Collections Management (headed by Richard Kohn of the University of North Carolina). As disagreements came to a head the controversy became public and was soon being aired in the press, along with internal memoranda among Smithsonian officials. The essence of the disagreement was summed up in a memo by Tom Crouch, chief supervisor of the exhibit, to Director Harwit:

> Do you want to do an exhibition intended to make veterans feel good, or do you want an exhibition that will lead our visitors to think about the consequences of the atomic bombing of Japan? Frankly, I don't think we can do both.

Those scripts are now available for sale from the "Historians' Committee for the Free Discussion of Hiroshima," a group of historians organized to bring pressure on the Smithsonian, following Secretary Heyman's decision to cancel the original plans for the exhibit in favor of a scaled-down version that would, he hoped, overcome the controversy of

[2]"Smithsonian Perspectives," *Smithsonian* (October 1994), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the original proposal. Gregg Mitchell, a member of the committee, has prepared a "Summary of Changes in the Script" under the headings "What They've Deleted," "They've Revised the Script to Show That," and "What They've Added," and has made statistical comparisons between the number of photographs of Japanese bomb victims and those of American crew members.[3]

In addition to the Historians' Committee, the Organization of American Historians (OAH), the largest organization of professional historians concerned with American history, formally involved itself in the fray with an Executive Board Resolution at its October 22, 1994 meeting "condemn[ing] threats by members of Congress to penalize the Smithsonian Institution because of the controversial exhibition on World War II and the dropping of the atomic bomb." The Board resolved that "The OAH further deplores the removal of historical documents and revision of interpretations of history for reasons outside the professional procedures and criteria by which museum exhibitions are created." It also proposed to join with other professional organizations to draft a Statement of Rights, Responsibilities and Professional Autonomy of American Museums and Historical Societies, stimulated by an article by Alfred F. Young which proposed, in the wake of the controversies over the Smithsonian's "The West as America" exhibit and the "year-long political attack" on the script for the *Enola Gay* exhibit, "that American museums adopt a Bill of Rights to protect freedom of interpretation."[4]

The Single Estimate

THE DEBATE OVER the "academic freedom" of the curators to say whatever they want has a surface logic. If the curators at NASM were in a university, they could present their interpretation in class, or in a publication, without a review by anyone in the university (least of all the president) and without the fear or threat of sanction by their universities, which would not be held responsible for their individual views.[5] No administrator at Stanford is concerned that Professor Barton Bernstein has estimated that the planned invasion of Kyushu in November of 1945, and a proposed assault on the Tokyo plain scheduled for March of 1946, would have cost fewer than fifty thousand American lives.[6] But Bernstein's estimate of possible American casualties, adopted by Director Martin Harwit as the figure to be cited in the final script, was the straw that broke the back of the fragile agreement between NASM and the American Legion, which had been engaged in a dialogue with the museum over the details of the script.

The decision to provide a single estimate of potential casualties was a poor decision, because the question of how many casualties would have occurred is unanswerable. Any single estimate given under the authority of

---

[3]Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima, 1914 Biltmore Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. This organization, initially funded by the Cummings Foundation, closed up shop on April 17, 1995, when the funding ran out. Inquiries about the original script should be directed to the War Resisters League, 339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012. The fifth and canceled *Enola Gay* script can be obtained for $37 from James Douglas, Assistant General Counsel, Smithsonian Institution, MRC-028, Washington, D.C. 20560.

[4]Alfred F. Young, "S.O.S. Storm Warning for American Museums," OAH Newsletter, vol. 22, no. 4, November 1994, p. 1.

[5]A possible exception should be noted. The Harvard Medical School has called into question the status of tenured psychiatry professor John Mack, whose book on aliens from outer space seems to accept the reality of such beings. *Washington Post*, April 16, 1995, p. A4; see also the *New York Times*, May 4, 1995, p. A18.

[6]Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995), p. 151.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the museum would be bound to mislead the general public. Why? Because there are any number of estimates of possible casualties, made before and after the end of the war, written and unwritten, all conditional upon imponderable and uncertain events, and expressed with a variety of motives. Every American participant in the invasion of Iwo Jima and that of Okinawa, from private to general, as well as every American in uniform who did not participate in those battles but who was expecting to participate in the invasion of Japan (as were two Smithsonian regents, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Barber Conable) could legitimately and rationally guess at the number of casualties that American forces might have suffered in an invasion of Kyushu and Honshu, using Iwo Jima and Okinawa as yardsticks. A wall of NASM could have been covered with the varying numbers of expected American casualties, none of which would correspond with any historically certain figure, whether put forward by a general or a private. Had the curators wished to emphasize the uncertainty of such estimates, they could have plastered a wall with such numbers, each with a question mark after it. Significantly, all the estimates of expected casualties considered by the curators, as well as estimates of Japanese willingness to surrender with or without conditions, are by Americans, not by Japanese historians whose views were not solicited and who may not, in any case, have dealt with such questions. I have been unable to elicit answers to such questions from any of my Japanese historian acquaintances. Japanese political leaders were briefly interviewed after the war by members of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. But, despite the Survey's conclusion that Japan would probably have surrendered before the end of 1945, even absent the bombing, the Russian entry into the war, and the invasion—a conclusion cited triumphantly by revisionist scholars such as Gar Alperovitz—the evidence from the actual interviews with Japanese at the time does not support the conclusion, as Robert P. Newman has pointed out.[7]

That American scholars, most of whom have written without a linguist's knowledge of the Japanese language or an anthropologist's knowledge of Japanese culture, should presume to assess with accuracy Japanese willingness or unwillingness to surrender without the dropping of the atom bomb (or to assess the consequences for the future had the war ended in a negotiated settlement) is as foolhardy as asserting their own ability to estimate accurately the casualties of an invasion of Japan. But even if an American historian or political scientist possessed such skills—indeed, even if he were a Japanese scholar well trained in his own language and culture—he could only guess what Japanese policymakers, up to and including the emperor, might have done had the bomb not been dropped. What we do know among the indisputable facts is that even after the dropping of the first bomb on Hiroshima the Japanese cabinet was almost equally divided on the question of surrender, even conditional surrender. Even after the second bomb fell on Nagasaki and the emperor dramatically intervened to break the cabinet deadlock, the recorded announcement of his decision to be broadcast to the nation had to be protected from die-hard military officers who believed Japan should die with honor ("*gyokusai* of the one hundred million") rather than suffer the disgrace of surrender.[8] An American belief that the Japanese were beaten is not the equivalent of a Japanese belief that they had to surrender.

---

[7]Robert P. Newman, "What New Consensus?" *Washington Post*, November 30, 1994, p. A27.

[8]The possibility of a "heroic sacrifice" or "death with honor" of the entire Japanese population, expressed as a national slogan, derived from reports of the self-sacrifice of many Japanese civilians, who leaped to their death off the cliffs at Marpi Point rather than surrender during the battle for Saipan in June 1944. Haruko Taya Cook, "The Myth of the Saipan Suicides," *Quarterly Journal of Military History*, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 17-19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moral Dilemmas

TO COMPOUND THEIR insistence on an imaginative historical interpretation of what might have been, the NASM curators presumed to speculate on the implications for the future of nuclear weapons, giving the exhibit not only a double dose of historical crystal ball gazing but also stepping into a philosophical and moral morass of controversial ethical imperatives. Was it immoral to kill by radiation and blast an enemy who was being killed, without moral objection, by conflagration and suffocation? (The prohibition against making civilians the direct target of military operations had long since been abandoned by all the warring powers.) No overt comparisons were made by the curators between the ethics of killing by fire, radiation, or (if one extended the comparison to Cambodia, Rwanda, or Burundi) by rocks, clubs, machetes, guns, or even swords, an instrument occasionally used by Japanese to decapitate prisoners. Nevertheless, the growing strength of the post-World War II movement to freeze, ban, control, or abolish nuclear weapons provided the curators with an opportunity to link the effectiveness of strategic bombing, with or without nuclear weapons, to the moral questions surrounding its use. In their earlier World War I exhibit on air power, the curators, in addition to taking an ironic look at what they regarded as the excessive adulation of World War I "aces," and incorporating for the first time a ground-based perspective of aerial bombardment, introduced the specter of the nuclear age in the form of an enlarged photograph of the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima. It was a conscious effort to make the visitor think about the implications of strategic bombing today by reference to its simplified beginnings.

Those who are familiar with the debate over the effects of strategic bombing in both the Pacific and European theaters in World War II know that the optimistic estimates of air power enthusiasts were, for the most part, not even partially realized. But the atom bomb was more than a blockbuster. It was a city buster, as those who saw Hiroshima and Nagasaki soon after the bombing can attest. But the time and perspective from which one considers the issue of the bomb do much to shape one's ethical stance. Certainly Albert Einstein, worried that the Germans might first perfect the atom bomb, was under pressure to persuade Roosevelt to develop American atomic capabilities. The same response might have been triggered by Japanese efforts to develop such a bomb, had they been known in the West. The moral and intellectual confusion of those who worked to develop the American atom bomb spans the spectrum from those who had objections to its very development to those who engaged in espionage in the belief that the Russians should be provided the secret of the bomb. Such moral conflicts were clearly in the mind of the leader of the American group, J. Robert Oppenheimer, who, on the successful demonstration in the New Mexican desert of the bomb's feasibility (and controllability), quoted the words from the Bhagavad Gita, "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds."[9]

The questions surrounding the production and use of the bomb extended also to the problem of estimating the seriousness of the radiation effects of atomic weapons (fortunately we do not have to speculate on equivalent problems stemming from biological and chemical weapons, which were not widely used during the war). Even during the Korean War, during which I was recalled to active duty in the marine corps, training exercises were held to demonstrate that American military forces

[9]Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 333. The word "shatterer" is sometimes substituted for the word "destroyer" in this quotation. For a discussion of Japan's own wartime effort to build an atomic bomb, see John W. Dower's essay "'NI' and 'F': Japan's Wartime Atomic Bomb Research," in his *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: New Press, 1993), especially pp. 60-96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could prevail on an atomic battlefield. I was lucky enough not to participate in any of these exercises. But recently I talked at the Bethesda Naval Hospital with a navy pilot who flew, without adequate protection, through the nuclear cloud during bomb tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954, and who is now paying the price. These examples suggest, in contrast to the views of the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima, that the radiation effects of nuclear weapons were not fully known, either for the Japanese targets of the first bombings or the American participants in later experiments.

Decision Time

I WILL NOT attempt to determine who blinked first in the face-off between the secretary of the Smithsonian and Capitol Hill over scrapping the original concept of the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Secretary Heyman stated in a letter to *The New Republic* that "Speaker Newt Gingrich and I never negotiated any arrangement concerning the *Enola Gay* exhibit. I came to the decision to scale it back independently. I then consulted with the Smithsonian's Regents. Days after, I notified the Speaker of my decision in the course of a phone conversation about another subject."[10] Being an expert administrator who comprehended the forces arrayed against him, Heyman may have acted like the Chinese generals discussed in Sun Tzu's *On the Art of War* who, after making a sophisticated analysis of the forces each possessed, would agree to accept the logical result of their potential battle without a fight. It was not only the expedient decision, it was the right decision, both intellectually and morally. As secretary of the Smithsonian, Heyman must accept responsibility for the actions of all the institution's employees, as he was not expected to do as chancellor at Berkeley. He quickly realized that he had been let down by his subordinates, who, with their supporters in the university, were crying about "academic freedom" to justify, in the context of a commemorative exhibit on the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of World War II, their ideologically tinged speculations on the brutality and racism of that war as waged by the United States, the flawed character of American political decision-making in the utilization of weapons in that war, and the dangerous infatuation of American leaders with the possible use of nuclear weapons in the future. Had one of the curators written a book or article conveying his views on the subject and obtained publication through the usual refereed channels, little would have been said about it. It would have joined the vast scholarly literature on World War II. Even if discredited later, as much American scholarly literature on Soviet communism has been, neither the author nor his institution would have been particularly embarrassed.

While scaling back the size and character of the exhibit, Heyman vigorously upheld the commemorative and educational objectives of the Smithsonian under his leadership. "I never intended to exclude 'celebration' of the past from the need to teach the past," he wrote in a letter to *Insight* magazine in response to a critical article.[11] He also proposed a series of academic style seminars in which controversial issues could be debated among scholars. The first such conference, on the theme of "Presenting History: Museums in a Democratic Society," took place under Smithsonian and University of Michigan auspices, at Ann Arbor on April 19. That most of the "usual suspects" of the academic left—scholars such as Gar Alperovitz, Eric Foner, Noam Chomsky, Todd Gitlin, Richard Barnet, Daniel Ellsberg, Victor Navasky—combined with other more moderate voices, mobilized under the rubric of the "Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima," to condemn the Smithsonian for

[10]Correspondence, *The New Republic*, April 10, 1995, p. 4.

[11]Correspondence, "Mission of the Smithsonian Is to Teach *and* Celebrate," *Insight*, February 13, 1995, in response to Stephen Goode's article "Political Correctness Comes Out of the Attic at the Smithsonian."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allegedly caving in to political pressure could not have surprised Heyman. His Berkeley campus was famous as the epicenter of 1960s radicalism, and the revolution begun there had been "tenured" in the 1970s and 1980s in elite American universities. The radical elite retains its preeminence in the universities, even in the face of the collapse of communism and the discrediting of socialism, although academic discourse no longer rings with celebrations of the latest Marxist revolutionary and denunciations of the fatal flaws of capitalism. Indeed, Heyman probably sensed that it was an advantage to be attacked by such a crew, even though there were many sincere scholars among the group who failed to see the distinction between being a cog in a public museum created to "memorialize" American achievements and educate a general public, and being a tenured professor writing a book for which the author alone was responsible. Heyman, indeed, outflanked and rendered superfluous the *Enola Gay* curators by flatly asserting that *he*—not they—was now the curator of the exhibit and *he* would be the author of the script that will accompany the *Enola Gay* when it is finally exhibited to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. That he is a former marine, albeit one too young to have served in World War II, has added to his credibility on Capitol Hill. The *Enola Gay* label that finally emerges is likely to resemble the brief one proposed by Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., the commander of the *Enola Gay*, or the equally simple label on the *Bock's Car*, the plane that dropped the second bomb on Nagasaki, which is now at the U.S. Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Field in Dayton, Ohio. It would be in the tradition of earlier museum labels that identified particular objects and their use, without engaging in extensive interpretation or speculation about their larger meaning.

Heyman's repudiation of the work of his subordinates, and his promise to Congress to conduct a review of NASM's management, resulted not unexpectedly in the "resignation" of Director Harwit on May 2, 1995. The terse announcement by Secretary Heyman also noted that Harwit had "decided not to accept the Institution's offer to remain as senior scientist."

What Kind of Symbol?

IS HIROSHIMA A symbol of power or of suffering? Professor Rinjiro Sodei of Hosei University, Tokyo, in his paper at the Organization of American Historians meeting in Washington on March 30, posed these alternative views. From a contemporary Japanese point of view Hiroshima is a symbol of suffering. When I was in Japan in 1946, however, Japanese expressed to me their awe of the power that we clever Americans were able to bring to bear on them while they were unable to do the same to us, despite their best efforts. In the context of 1946, of course, there were many reasons why one did not hear criticism of America's use of the atom bomb (along with other types of bombs) to destroy Japanese cities. By 1995, however, as Professor John Dower of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology put it at the same OAH session, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum virtually implies that the war began with the attack on Hiroshima, and the city has become for many Japanese and Americans a symbol of suffering and the abuse of power. Indeed, President Clinton's comment that the United States should not apologize for using the bomb and that President Truman was right to have authorized it, immediately created an uproar in Japan. "Nearly everyone here," wrote T. R. Reid, the *Washington Post* correspondent in Tokyo, "views the U.S. decision to use the nuclear weapon as a war crime or, as Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama put it earlier this year, 'that atrocity.'"[12]

The hostility displayed by the academic

[12] *Washington Post*, April 14, 1995, p. A24. Ian Buruma has brilliantly captured Japanese feelings regarding their responsibility for the war (or lack of it) in his *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

community toward the display in a positive light of symbols of American power such as the B-29, the atom bomb, and sometimes even the American flag, reflects the turmoil occasioned by the 1960s, the Vietnam conflict, and the Cold War. Comments reflecting this attitude have been thrown about by opponents of the Smithsonian's *Enola Gay* policy. At the Organization of American Historians session alluded to above, one heard such phrases as "Valhalla of Air and Space," "historical cleansing," "equivalent to denying the Holocaust," "New McCarthyism," and "gunfighter nation."

The air force is the particular victim of the *Enola Gay* controversy. The army, navy, and marines have their own memorials and museums in Washington; the air force is uniquely dependent upon the Smithsonian to recognize its achievements. With the changing character of the Smithsonian, and of its curators and exhibits, the patriotic, celebratory result anticipated by the Congress and the air force in 1972 quietly began to slip away.

The danger that the Smithsonian's budget could be cut because of the political controversy engendered by the *Enola Gay* exhibit still remains. The critics of the Smithsonian are right to assert that the controversy is part of the current "culture wars" being waged over the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the National Standards for American History, school choice, and affirmative action. Secretary Heyman might seem an unlikely candidate to turn the Smithsonian around. As chancellor at Berkeley he implemented many of the same changes that have more recently altered the character of the Smithsonian. But he was, to some degree, acting under what Charles Krauthammer has called "the near comic overreaching of California's affirmative action forces," acting through mandates imposed by the California legislature to create an ethnic spoils system based on proportionality for the favored ethnic groups of the state.[13] Now, if the national trend to the right continues, he will be acting under mandates to create a system of opportunities and rewards based on individual merit—or disability—rather than group identity. A less self-assured and forceful administrator might have attempted to compromise with the increasingly unrepresentative but still powerful academic establishment. But this route, in my opinion, would spell disaster for the Smithsonian, outraging its supporters on Capitol Hill and setting the stage for a major reorganization of the institution at the hands of its current critics. I am hopeful that Heyman will avoid such a course.

The original *Enola Gay* exhibit plan was not a material culture exhibition. It was history at its farthest remove from the specific description of artifacts. Although it rested on the "hook" of the fiftieth anniversary of the famous flight of its central object, it was not "object-driven." Rather, it was "idea-driven," in keeping with recent trends in the museum world. But even in terms of these trends it was exceptionally speculative history, of the kind least capable of documentation and most conducive to the working of the individual imagination. Few would object to an individual historian, like Charles Beard, concluding that Roosevelt deliberately lured the Japanese into war with the United States, or to a filmmaker like Oliver Stone suggesting that the FBI or CIA may have killed President Kennedy. Everyone—even the partisans of such theories—recognizes that they constitute challenging theses, not agreed-upon history. Few would argue that such theses deserve to define the events they discuss in a national museum for a public audience. Heyman, in a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San

[13]Charles Krauthammer, "Affirmative Action: The Debate is Over...," *Washington Post*, April 14, 1995, p. A14. The most extreme of these measures was a bill mandating public universities to produce ethnic graduation rates that matched those of California's high schools, a bill that was overturned only by the governor's veto.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Francisco, emphasized that "curators—professionals with scholarly training and abilities—should be afforded freedom to present their views largely unsupervised by the directors of the museums in which they work...Scholarly work, of comparable quality [to that of university professors], translated into an exhibition in a museum, and in particular a national museum, however, is seen as an official statement and a national validation."[14]

Counterfactual propositions have their role in history. The Speaker of the House, Professor Newt Gingrich, has a novel in press based on the counterfactual proposition that Germany did not declare war on the United States immediately after Pearl Harbor. What would have been the result had that in fact happened? Could President Roosevelt have obtained a declaration of war against Germany under such circumstances? It is a question that has fascinated me for years, and I have many theories concerning it. But this is not history. It is part of the mystique that surrounds history.

Similar speculation surrounds the question of the ending of World War II, had the United States been more flexible in modifying its policy of "unconditional surrender." Had the Japanese surrendered under more liberal conditions than they received, and made unnecessary the dropping of the atom bomb, would they have brought their still undefeated armies home from Southeast Asia, China, Manchuria, the Indonesian archipelago, and the Pacific—as the Germans did after World War I from France—only to claim later that they were never really defeated in battle and must now avenge the "unjust" terms of surrender that limited their future freedom of action?

Or another counterfactual proposition: what if the Russians had insisted on going ahead with their recently revealed plan to invade Hokkaido before the Americans invaded Kyushu, and occupied the northern portion of Japan as they did the northern portion of Korea and the eastern portion of Germany? Or, if they had possessed the bomb before the Americans (they were not far behind), might they have decided to occupy all of Japan?[15] Would Japan have made its remarkable recovery, or would it be an impoverished state on the North Korean or Eastern European model?

The extraordinary capacity of American policymakers to misjudge the enemy (and, indeed, their own countrymen), has been reemphasized by the recent publication of Robert S. McNamara's memoir, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*. McNamara, in his characteristic style, lists eleven reasons for American failure, all related to the policymakers' misjudgments of everything from Vietnamese history and culture to the effects of aerial bombardment on North Vietnam. Historians, who follow after policymakers and think they are cleaning up the mess left by the latter, are equally mistaken if they think they fully understand what the policymakers failed to grasp. The general public, for whom public museum exhibits are designed, has every right to be skeptical of the clairvoyance of policymakers and historians, to insist upon an accurate description of the objects displayed, and to derive directly from those objects whatever emotional or intellectual meaning they may have without the coercive guidance of those in whose care they have been entrusted. □

---

[14]I. Michael Heyman, "The Smithsonian: From the Spirit of St. Louis to Enola Gay," Remarks to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, November 10, 1994, p. 10. Note the careful definition of "curators" and "scholarly work."

[15]David M. Glantz, "The Soviet Invasion of Japan," *Quarterly Journal of Military History*, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 96-97, discusses new information indicating that Stalin was ready to land troops on Hokkaido two months before the scheduled American landings in Kyushu.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Illusions of Collective Security

—Mark P. Lagon

> In the wake of such general conflicts as the Napoleonic wars or World Wars I and II, two conditions prevail that are virtually essential to the fact, or the illusion, of collective security: (1) The victorious powers are momentarily in concert; this provides the basis for equating their provisional coalition to a disinterested concern for universal world order. (2) The defeated powers, are by consensus of the victors, clearly labeled the "aggressors."
>
> —Earl Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1975/6).

EARL RAVENAL'S rule applies equally in the wake of the Cold War. Buoyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, proponents of collective security have been writing up a storm, producing literature full of hope for the future. Central to this new vision of collective security are new roles for two familiar Cold War international organizations: the United Nations, now freed from a paralyzing standoff between two superpowers with vetoes in the Security Council; and NATO, the victor over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, now reaching to embrace new friends and missions.

Much of the hope placed on the UN in a new era is grounded in the belief that it can finally provide for collective security. The hopeful cite the collective expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as evidence of this. As a function of its only unique virtue, all-encompassing membership, the UN becomes the natural instrument for the wishful tinkerer in trying to implement collective security.

More surprisingly, perhaps, with war in the Balkans and evidence of instability elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, collective security also figures increasingly in the context of developing a new role for NATO. As Josef Joffe writes:

> [Collective security] has been the *idée clef* in the debate on post-Cold War security in Europe. Only the label has been modernized. Instead of C[ollective] S[ecurity], advocates use terms such as "overarching security system," "pan-European security," "co-operative security" or "expanded CSCE."[1]

While the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now officially the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE) and West European Union (as the security organ of a post-

Mark P. Lagon is research associate at the American Enterprise Institute, adjunct professor of government at Georgetown University, and author of *The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter* (Praeger, 1994).

[1]Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," *Survival* (Spring 1992), p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Maastricht EU) have gotten some attention in this discussion, most hopes have fallen upon NATO as the prime agent for Europe's collective security, and the alliance's Partnership for Peace has been seen as an instrument for defining such a mission.

Before one can determine whether the UN, NATO, or the OSCE is an appropriate vessel for pursuing collective security, it is necessary to understand precisely what is meant by the term. And that involves clarifying not only what "collective security" is, but what "security" itself means. For, unfortunately, both terms are now in danger of being stretched into unrecognizable shapes and established distinctions ignored, to accommodate the agenda of some of their users. After a recent Freedom House symposium on the expansion of NATO, for example, I asked one of the participants, Michael Mandelbaum, whether his use of "collective security" to include preparation to meet threats from outside the membership of the alliance fit the traditional meaning of the term. Mandelbaum dismissed my query as a semantic quibble. A lot more than a quibble is at stake.

A Taxonomy

RICHARD BETTS HAS noted the propensity of many to apply the label "collective security" to institutions and processes which do not fulfill the unique, defining criteria that were set out and championed by Woodrow Wilson, the century's leading proponent of the concept:

> [I]n the generations after Wilson many felt the need to endorse collective security while defining it in ways that overlapped significantly with traditional arrangements...If a collective institution is really to function as a security system rather than a slogan, the elements that are conceptually unique rather than those which are shared with other constructs should set the standard for assessing the idea.[2]

What are these unique elements? Perhaps the best way to define collective security is in terms of a three-part typology.

First there is "collective security" as it has been conventionally understood until recently. It reflects a security arrangement whereby a clearly delineated group of nations agrees that if one nation in their membership encroaches upon the sovereignty of another, the rest of the members will take collective action against the aggressive member. This *internal* focus is the distinguishing mark of collective security, and the basis for action against aggression is, hence, universal group consensus minus the aggressor(s). Thus, collective security is and has always been a commonly agreed upon arrangement to protect the status quo within a given group from change brought about by warfare, without identification of coalition partners or threatening revisionist powers beforehand. The League of Nations is the archetypical and indeed original example of collective security in practice. Japan and Italy made a mockery of it when their expansionist designs in Manchuria and Abyssinia went unpunished. Its abject failure has much more to do with its premises than an insular America's failure to join it.

A second distinct security arrangement may be labeled "unspecified collective defense." Collective defense is a formula whereby group members are concerned with threats from *without*. But subscribers to a collective defense arrangement, established to deal with outside threats, need not know or declare at the time of entering into the arrangement who the outside threat might be. Collective defense of this kind is concerned with creating a pledge for united action against one or more *unspecified* external aggressors; it is limited to outside aggressors, but unlimited as far as they are con-

[2]Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes for War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security* (Summer 1992), p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cerned. An example is the "Little Entente" of the 1920s and 1930s, the alliance formed in 1920 by the three successor states of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Its purpose was to guard against the twin dangers of Hungarian revisionism and a Habsburg restoration. The threats to its members were diverse and diffuse—including Germany's threat to Czechoslovakia, Italy's to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union's to Rumania. And when the League of Nations sat dormant as Italy assaulted Abyssinia and Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, these partners turned to France to guarantee their unspecified collective defense arrangement.

Third, and complementing the above, there is "specified collective defense," an alliance in the strictest and most limited sense. It represents preparations made against outside threats which have already been identified. The expansive literature on alliances is concerned overwhelmingly with this articulated collective defense. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as it existed from 1949 until the end of the Cold War is an archetypical example, and a remarkably successful one.

Two observations about this typology. First, the widest conceptual divide lies between collective security and the two types of collective defense. This is to say, the difference between an arrangement aimed at coping with an aggressor arising within the membership and one aimed at external threats, whether clearly identified or not, is greater than the difference between an arrangement to cope with an unknown (or unacknowledged) threat and one aimed at dealing with a known enemy. Second, other things being equal, the likely success of these arrangements is in ascending order. Historically, an alliance against a specified threat has worked and will work better than an unspecified collective defense; unspecific collective defense, in turn, has worked and will continue to work better than collective security.

The late 1940s illustrate this hierarchy of efficacy. The United Nations was created to provide collective security. It would fail to keep the peace over the next forty years, as the two superpowers exercised their Security Council vetoes. Just as this UN gridlock was becoming apparent, the 1948 Treaty of Brussels—involving the Benelux countries, Britain and France—was signed. At this early moment in postwar history, not only the Soviet Union but Germany was seen as a potential threat, and in order to cover both, the treaty provided for *unspecified* collective defense. The following year the North Atlantic Treaty, based on American leadership, was signed—clearly a *specified* collective defense agreement, with the Soviet Union and its satellites as the identified enemy. The fact that the UN, the Brussels Treaty Organization, and NATO were formed in succession reflects the relative efficacy of the three types of organizations they represent.

A fundamental conceptual failing goes a long way toward explaining why collective security is at the bottom of this list in terms of credibility, and why its historical record is dismal: the argument that sustains it involves circular logic. Joffe puts it well:

> [Collective security] *presupposes*, rather than creates, its own necessary condition: a common commitment to the peace. If so, institutions do not matter. When all are agreed, there will be stability no matter what—with or without collective security. Synonymous with a sturdy *status quo*, collective security turns outs to be a state of affairs, not a mechanism that brings it about.[3]

What to Make of NATO?

THOSE WHO ENVISION NATO as an instrument of collective security exhibit this circular reasoning. Collective security would surely work as a new goal for NATO, but it would do so precisely because it

[3]Joffe, p.44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is unnecessary among its present members, who are not likely to go to war with one another. NATO's members are democracies; democratic nations very rarely fight one another.

NATO's very success has prompted the search for a new role. As Betts observes,

> [C]ollective security generates interest more by default than by its own merits: unilateralism seems ineffective or illegitimate, and alliance without adversary seems anachronistic and empty.

Obviously the alliance has lost its original utility as an instrument of specific collective defense, since the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union no longer exist. But the Partnership for Peace not only seeks to move away from specific collective defense, but from any kind of collective defense altogether. Henry Kissinger has identified the essential flaws: "The Atlantic Alliance assumed that its threats came from outside the treaty area, while the Partnership seeks to pacify threats within its area by affirmations of good intentions."[4]

There is some concrete good to be won from these good intentions, and much to be said for the idea of regular, systematic contact between the democratizing nations and the established democracies in NATO. In particular, the Visegrad nations could be "socialized" in the ways of democracy, and particularly in the vital norm of civilian control of the military instrument of policy. Arguably, NATO in its earlier Cold War existence already performed this valuable function with respect to West Germany, Portugal, and Turkey; but in earlier days these benefits were only by-products of alliance, not its central purpose.

If collective security presupposes what it pretends to create, and NATO has lost its enemy, is there a realistic future role for the alliance? Conceptually, what I have termed unspecified collective defense remains an option. It is closer in purpose to NATO's original collective defense mission than is collective security, and an unspecified collective defense arrangement can easily and quickly be transformed into a specified one.

It is possible to see the glimmerings of such a future in the alliance's role in the Desert Shield and Storm operations. Though the Gulf War fed hopes for collective security, the American-led coalition was not in essence a collective security arrangement under the auspices of the United Nations, as many observers now assert. The Bush administration cobbled together a coalition using the UN as a forum, but basing substantive membership upon NATO, along with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia. In this light, the role of the NATO core within the Gulf War coalition could be a useful model. In contrast to its utter failure in the Balkans—caught between incongruent roles as interposed neutral and anti-Serb partisan—NATO was quite successful in the Gulf War. It led a campaign against an opponent, Iraq, which was not previously "specified" as a threat to NATO members' interests, but which proved to be just that. Accordingly, if anything, unspecified collective defense should be NATO's new mission.

Security is Security

A FELLOW SUFFERER along with "collective security" in this new world of stretched concepts and mangled language is the notion of "security" itself. Simply put, and for the sake of clarity and precision, international organizations created to sustain the security of their members should continue to define "security" as the protection of the territorial integrity of those nations against external attack. It should not be defined in terms of internal conflict within nations, economic development, social development of the "nation-building" variety, or any broader processes

[4]Henry Kissinger, "It's an Alliance, Not a Relic," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1994, p. A19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and phenomena vaguely related to nations' interests.

This point needs to be made because the strict definition of "security" is under energetic assault. For example, the secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ties all these phenomena together in one undifferentiated mess:

> The concept of security, which has traditionally been defined in strictly military terms, has evolved to encompass the economic, social and environmental problems that threaten national and international security. We have seen how problems emanating from poverty, social unrest and humanitarian tragedies in just one state can—if left unchecked—reach a magnitude that disrupts an entire region. That is why I believe that there can not really be peace without development.[5]

Americans, too, are particularly susceptible to this line of reasoning. Twenty years ago, Robert Packenham of Stanford University identified the cultural tendency of American government officials and academics to assume "all good things go together," so that there is no need to distinguish clearly between them, to confront the task of ordering priorities, to consider whether some are incompatible with others, and that choosing is unavoidable.[6] Now there is a corollary trend: all bad things go together. The Clinton administration has created a position of undersecretary of state for global affairs, occupied by Tim Wirth, which deals with a grab bag of issues from human rights to sustainable development to AIDS to population control to environmental protection and so on—a collection that has nothing in common except that it involves trying to cope with "bad" things.

Lumping these issues together packs excess baggage into the new mission statements of organizations devoted to security. Thus, under President Clinton, the financially strapped Pentagon has been ordered to divert spending toward projects which are not defense, such as defense conversion, medical research and environmental clean-up; Jeane Kirkpatrick has called this "reinventing defense." This seeing all phenomena as connected, and the consequent inability to see any one problem clearly, is reminiscent of the kind of thinking that elsewhere gave us a crime bill in which midnight basketball leagues became part of crime fighting. But defense is defense just as crime fighting is crime fighting.

All-inclusive thinkers of this kind fill many of the senior posts in the Clinton administration. Ashton Carter, when he was chairman of the executive board of the Harvard University journal, *International Security*, proposed expanding that distinguished journal's focus after the Cold War:

> [T]he Cold War period was in a sense anomalous: the "normal" complexity and range of international security concerns and behaviors were unnaturally foreshortened, dominated by a single conflict with a rather narrow set of characteristics—heavily military, bipolar, static, and with stakes that by the end were almost abstract. Now international security issues will exhibit themselves in all their variety once again—issues of markets, resources, technology, ethnic animosities, political philosophy, and different conceptions of world order, as well as armies and nuclear

---

[5] "Setting a New Agenda for the United Nations," interview with Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Journal of International Affairs* (Winter 1992), p. 290.

[6] Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 123-129. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 5-7. Huntington noted this assumption in the study of political and economic development. Packenham argued that such beliefs among elites affected policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> weapons. There will be a lot to understand and thus a lot for the [International Security] community to do.[7]

Holding these views, it was more or less inevitable that Carter should end up as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in a Clinton administration.

In a similar spirit, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, who served in the early days of the Clinton administration, has written:

> The 1990s will demand a redefinition of what constitutes national security. In the 1970s the concept was expanded to include international economics as it became clear that the U.S. economy was no longer the independent force it had once been, but was powerfully affected by economic policies in dozens of other countries. Global developments now suggest the need for another analogous, broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental, and demographic issues.[8]

While all of the issues cited by Carter and Tuchman are worth considering in policymaking, their relevance to security is highly questionable. What they are certainly not relevant to are international organizations charged with keeping the peace, and, on occasion, fighting wars. This omnibus view of social problems around the globe is a pernicious force threatening to divert organitions like NATO and the UN from their primary purpose.

"Keeping the peace"—maintaining sovereign nations' territorial integrity from other aggressive nations—is too often permitted to slide into ill-conceived military and social interventions in the affairs of nations, glibly labeled "peacekeeping." And these interventions do not even meet the narrow criteria of interpositional peacekeeping. This slide will occur all the more easily with the expanding impact of the "chaos industry" inside and outside of government today.[9]

Of course, in the end there is more at stake than mangled terms and stretched concepts: these international security organizations are meant to deter and, if necessary, fight wars. Perhaps it is well to keep in mind Earl Ravenal's sardonic coda to his observation about the perennial enthusiasms for collective security: "But of course this situation does not last." □

---

[7]Ashton B. Carter, "Chairman's Note," *International Security* (Winter 1990-91), p. 3.

[8]Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining National Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989), p. 162.

[9]For instance, Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), pp. 44-76; and "Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the 21st Century," U.S. Institute of Peace symposium, Washington, DC (30 November-1 December 1994). For a critique, see Jeremy D. Rosner, "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team," *Washington Post*, August 14, 1994, pp. C1-C2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Confirmation Time

A Review of *Messengers from Moscow*

Dimitri K. Simes

THE END OF Soviet communism has given Westerners unprecedented access to Moscow's historical resources. Various archives have been opened and living witnesses to history are suddenly prepared to tell their stories, even in front of foreign television cameras.

The abundance of new information coming straight from the horse's mouth is unlikely, however, to settle American debates about the origins and nature of the Cold War. History is an imprecise science allowing for a variety of interpretations—particularly when those doing the interpreting have a strong predisposition, or even a vested interest, in seeing things a certain way.

Still, the four-part documentary series *Messengers from Moscow*, shown in the United States by PBS and in Britain by the BBC, represents a powerful blow to two fundamentals of the liberal dogma—namely, that the Cold War resulted from a Western overreaction to largely defensive, even if rather heavy-handed, Soviet policies and that the preoccupation with the communist menace inside Western democracies amounted to a vicious witch hunt. The series, ably directed by Daniel Wolf and produced by Eugene B. Shirley with Herbert E. Ellision as chief consultant, is based on numerous on-camera interviews with Soviet insiders ranging from Stalin's second-in-command Vyacheslav Molotov to Brezhnev's personal physician. The accounts they present are sobering.[1]

Molotov, in a 1972 taped conversation with poet Felix Chuyev, stated point blank that expanding Soviet borders "as far as possible" was his official duty. In Molotov's view, "there could not be a peaceful Germany unless it takes a socialist path." But he cautioned that it had to be accomplished "carefully," without provoking a war with the West.

The Soviet instrument of choice during the initial postwar period was the manipulation of Western communist parties which, the Comintern's dissolution notwithstanding, were obedient instruments of the Kremlin at that time. These tactics prevailed over local resistance in East Germany and elsewhere in Soviet-occupied Central Europe. But where Moscow was not in a position to support its communist clients through brutal repression, the gamble failed miserably.

However, that failure did not happen for lack of trying. It was the dual U.S. policy of militarily containing the USSR and stabilizing fragile Western European democracies through the Marshall Plan that demonstrated to Stalin the futility of further offensive action in Europe.

Dimitri K. Simes is the president of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, a bipartisan public policy institution with offices in both Washington, DC and Yorba Linda, CA.

[1]Tapes and transcripts of *Messengers from Moscow* are available from Pacem Distribution International, 505 South Beverly Drive, Suite 130, Beverly Hills, CA 90212, or call (213) 852-4912, fax (213) 852-9729.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stalin was a genuinely cautious and calculating statesman. Yet his kind of caution demanded as much control of everything within reach as he could realistically obtain short of war. Moreover, his definition of acceptable conduct was totally uninfluenced by moral considerations or domestic political constraints. It was Stalin's calculations of U.S. will and power that played a decisive role in shaping his definition of a prudent foreign policy.

Where, as in Korea, Stalin felt that aggression had a chance to proceed with impunity, his risk-taking would become bolder. The documentary shows an official cable from Stalin to his ambassador to North Korea stating, "agree to accept" regarding Kim Il Sung's design to invade the South. Other documents and participants in the Soviet decision-making process confirm this as well: Stalin was not only informed about Kim's plans, but also gave them a green light.

The documentary then goes one important step further. It implies that Stalin actually ordered the North Korean attack. Retired KGB Colonel Gavriil Korotkov, interviewed for the series, claims that Kim would never have dared to contemplate the invasion on his own. According to him, the idea came from Soviet advisors acting on Stalin's orders. Kim then brought it to the Soviet ambassador who immediately consulted Stalin, giving Stalin an opportunity to approve the operation that he himself had masterminded. No supporting evidence or rationale is offered to explain such a complex and seemingly unnecessary procedure, except that Stalin was a devious person. However, if he was looking for a way to distance himself from the invasion, why was giving Kim orders through Soviet advisors any different from directly using the ambassador?

Kim Il Sung's subsequent performance, from the 1954 armistice until his death in 1994, demonstrates that he did not need much outside encouragement to act with great boldness and ruthlessness against not just South Korea, but the United States as well. Furthermore, Stalin, while having quite a propensity for shooting "minor" foreign communist leaders, had a record of allowing them some initiative, provided it was not at odds with his own preferences. This was particularly true in Asia. While Kim was a former Soviet army major, with his country in the shadow of China and the growing independence of Mao, he was bound to be granted some autonomy from Moscow.

What is beyond denial, however, is that Stalin personally and directly approved Kim's aggression. Clearly, where American deterrence looked uncertain, the Soviet dictator was prepared to take considerable chances. Implications of what would have happened in Europe absent such deterrence are obvious and ominous.

Similarly, the documentary is persuasive in showing that the willingness of Western communists to engage in espionage and subversion on Stalin's behalf was a real and serious problem. An interview with a former top French communist official reveals an extensive intelligence network established by the party with branches in most sensitive government departments. The network was under the party control and the party itself received instructions from, and shared everything with, Moscow.

The documentary does not deal with the communist underground in the United States. Nevertheless, evidence is mounting that American communists regularly engaged in clandestine activities on Stalin's behalf. New materials from the Soviet Communist Party archives recently published by Yale University Press (Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism*, 1995) prove that American communists in the Thirties were at least as willing to spy for the Soviets as their French counterparts.

The documents do not mention Alger Hiss, whose case became a cause célèbre for American anti-anti-communists, but they substantiate the testimony of his principal accuser Whittaker Chambers in many important respects. Not only was there an extensive American communist underground linked to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet intelligence, but this network also provided the NKVD with secret State Department documents, exactly as Chambers described.

New testimony from Moscow demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that, while McCarthyism was not an appropriate response, Richard Nixon had it exactly right in his crusade against Alger Hiss. What was dangerous and contemptible was not his exposure of Hiss, but, on the contrary, the liberal establishment's staunch defense of a man who was convicted of perjury by due process only because the statute of limitations on espionage had expired. Being of the politically correct persuasion and of the right social strata was put above truth and duty to the nation.

Stalin's death in 1953 and the subsequent critique of "the cult of personality" at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in 1956 started a new era in Soviet history. While totalitarian oppression continued, the bloody purges came to an end, as did the unity of the international communist movement. The tensions with China that existed even under Stalin quickly developed into an open split. In order to survive, major Western European communist parties, shocked by the revelations of the crimes of the late dictator, had to distance themselves from Moscow. Eastern European upheavals became a fact of life while Nikita Khrushchev pronounced that peaceful co-existence with the West was a key objective of Soviet foreign policy.

But, as *The Messengers from Moscow* makes clear, the Soviet Union still very much expected to achieve world domination. The Third World gave Stalin's heirs a new hope and new opportunities. Former KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny correctly observes in the documentary that "the Soviet Union had absolutely no hand in the Cuban revolution." But he and other Soviet officials interviewed in the series stated that once the Kremlin discovered that Fidel Castro was a closet communist, it moved boldly and quickly to establish a foothold in America's backyard.

As during Stalin's time revolutionary romanticism was not an obstacle to hard-nosed geopolitical thinking. As early as October 1960, considerably before the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev told Cuban editor Carlos Franqui about his plan to put missiles in Cuba to be used as a major bargaining chip to obtain a guarantee of non-interference from the United States, as well as to achieve the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. Franqui also reveals that, during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet leader made a decision to remove the missiles without even consulting Castro, thus creating the first strain in the relationship with Havana.

If Franqui is right in his description of the unceremonious ruthlessness of Soviet power politics—and other accounts substantiate his version—is it logical to think that Moscow would have gone to nuclear war if John Kennedy, in addition to the blockade, had ordered air strikes against the missiles and other military targets in Cuba? Would Khrushchev have been so incensed by the fact that Soviet equipment and personnel suffered in the process that he would have risked a global calamity?

The documentary does not address these questions. A number of prominent Americans, most notably former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who during the glasnost years conducted joint seminars with various Soviet officials and generals involved in Moscow's deliberations on the Cuban missile crises, came to the conclusion that if Kennedy had used force, the Kremlin would have upped the ante, perhaps with the use of tactical nuclear weapons already stationed in Cuba.

This is a highly questionable conclusion. Only Khrushchev himself, and perhaps not even he, could have answered with confidence what he would have done in the case of a limited U.S. air strike. There is a profound difference between building a military capability and being prepared to use it in a position of relative weakness (the Soviets were aware of the clear-cut strategic nuclear superiority of the U.S.) when your own vital interests are not involved.

While Khrushchev was perhaps mesmerized by Cuba there is no evidence that he and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his Politburo colleagues considered it a part of the vital interests of the Soviet Union. Those people close to him, with whom I discussed the matter, unanimously felt that, in the end, Khrushchev would have blinked. This does not mean that Kennedy made a mistake in not going beyond the blockade. Like his Soviet counterpart, the American president had to consider terrible risks especially since there was an opportunity to achieve his minimal objective without firing a shot. Still, the argument that using force against Cuba in 1962 was not a credible option is exaggerated.

The series rightly suggests that there was no doubt in Moscow that Khrushchev was the greatest loser in the Cuban Missile Crisis, a fact which contributed to his ouster two years later in October 1964. But from the standpoint of the Soviet leadership, the outcome of the affair told more about the recklessness of the First Secretary than about the U.S. will to punish the Soviet Union for its transgressions in the Third World. After all, while Khrushchev was personally humiliated, Kennedy still had to make the commitment to respect Cuban sovereignty. American missiles in Turkey were also soon withdrawn exactly as Moscow had demanded. True, since they were scheduled to be removed anyway, Kennedy denied Khrushchev a face-saver by refusing to link them publicly to the Soviet missiles in Cuba. However, the U.S. victory was not so clear-cut that it had the power to discourage Khrushchev's successors from supporting other Third World communist regimes in order to shift—to use the Soviet term—"the correlation of forces in the world" in Moscow's favor.

The temptation to move history in Moscow's direction came rather quickly in Vietnam. In addition to fitting Soviet ideological predispositions, helping Hanoi was an effective formula for putting the United States on the defensive. Also, as the top China expert in the Soviet foreign ministry, Mikhail Kapitsa, observed in the documentary, rivalry with China for world communist leadership was encouraging Moscow to take a more radical stand on Vietnam.

The combination of Richard Nixon's trip to China and his largely successful Vietnamization program changed Soviet calculations. In an interview contained in the series, Leonid Brezhnev's foreign policy aide Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov states that President Nixon's visit to Beijing was taken very seriously in Moscow. I myself was a young scholar at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at that time and remember vividly what a shock it was to the Soviet foreign policy establishment. Soviet analysts were also impressed with the ability of the South Vietnamese to hold their own ground, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. By the end of 1972, the Brezhnev government started a process of painful reassessment of the costs and benefits of its North Vietnamese connection.

Watergate interrupted the process. With Nixon's resignation and the congressional assault on U.S. foreign policy, Moscow gradually concluded that America was neither a formidable rival nor a reliable partner. After the North Vietnamese triumph in 1975, the Soviet Union was only too willing to practice diplomacy of force in the Third World from the African Horn to Afghanistan. Moreover, even enlightened Soviet officials began to feel, in the words of *Izvestia*'s Aleksandr Bovin, that the principal objective of détente was to make the change in the global balance of power "as painless as possible."

The documentary does not address the hypothetical question of what would have occurred if Nixon had been allowed by the Congress to finish his term, escape defeat in Vietnam and, at the same time, deliver to the Soviets the expected economic benefits of détente. There is at least a realistic possibility that, exactly as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had hoped, Soviet behavior in the Seventies would have been moderated. South Vietnam would have survived as an independent state. There would have been no killing fields of Cambodia and tribal massacres in Laos. And, without these encouraging victories, the Soviets would not necessarily have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seen Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan as welcome opportunities for expansion.

However, such hypothetical questions may bring us too far. History works in unpredictable ways. It is equally possible that, if the Soviets had not overreached themselves, their empire would not have collapsed so pitifully in 1991. Moscow's geopolitical victory in the 1970s was a pyrrhic one contributing to the end of its own state.

The main reason for the Soviet demise was the internal weakness of the system. Brezhnev's health was failing. His personal physician states in the documentary that as early as 1975, the time of his Vladivostok Summit with President Gerald Ford, Brezhnev was aready addicted to sedatives which eventually destroyed his sense of reality. Most other Politburo members well into their seventies were not faring much better. Together they looked like a group of walking zombies.

A totalitarian system based on a command economy could not function without strong central leadership. Key constituencies, particularly the military-industrial complex, did pretty much what they wanted as if there was no tomorrow. Remarkably, as officials interviewed in the documentary reveal, neither the foreign ministry nor the KGB was consulted about such important developments as the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe in the late seventies. They learned about it from Western sources. Similarly, it was from Western sources that the KGB, according to its then chief of analyses General Mikhail Leonov, was getting its information about the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy. At the sunset of the Brezhnev era, there was no clear answer to the question raised by the documentary, "Who was really in charge?"

It was not difficult to see—even at the time—that such a situation could not last long. Back in 1978, I wrote that there existed "the urgent need for change" creating "a political and social environment favorable to reform. Faced with the dilemma of stagnation or innovation, the elite may choose the latter—as distasteful as it may be to some of its sectors—as a lesser evil." (Simes and Associates, *Soviet Succession: Leadership in Transition*, The Washington Papers, Vol. VI, p.21, 1978).

What nobody inside or outside the Soviet Union predicted was that reforms would quickly go out of control and lead to the speedy death of not just the communist system, but also of the Soviet Union itself.

Messengers from Moscow quite appropriately points out that Ronald Reagan's assertive posture played a role. The Reagan Doctrine forced the already overextended Soviet Union to pay a heavy price for its Third World exploits. And, as former Chief of the General Staff Victor Kulikov admitted in his interview in the series, the Strategic Defense Initiative—taken most seriously by the high command—forced the Soviets to exhaust themselves economically. For the first time since the Second World War, the Soviet leadership found itself squarely on the defensive with ever declining resources to face the new challenges it helped to generate.

Yet for the Soviet Union to collapse in such a sudden and disorderly fashion, in addition to objective factors—to paraphrase Lenin—a subjective factor had to be added. A clue to what it was is provided in an interview with Mikhail Gorbachev's ideas man, Aleksandr Yakovlev. Yakovlev admits that both he and Gorbachev did not realize at the beginning of perestroika how fundamental the ills of the system were and what a radical change would be required to address them.

As great reformers as they were, Gorbachev and Yakovlev were appallingly blind about the very nature of the system that produced them and which now they were determined to reform. They failed to see that communist dogma, totalitarian controls, and a police state were not aberrations but the true foundations of their regime. Once these foundations were shattered, the regime was unable to rule. The Soviet Union itself could no longer stay together. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Love in a Cold War Climate

Peter Day

THE NAME AINO Kuusinen is all but unknown in the United States. This is unfortunate, for the life story of this undercover agent—a highly attractive, intelligent, and courageous woman, who spoke her English with an American accent—is a parable that illuminates an entire age.

In the early 1920s she escaped from the ties of a respectable middle-class Finnish family by marrying a fellow Finn in the new communist *nomenklatura* in Moscow. She then worked for the Communist International (Comintern) and met virtually everyone who was anyone in that world. For most of the 1930s she traveled as a Soviet agent: to depression-struck New York where for some three years she worked for the Comintern; through Europe as Hitler consolidated his power; to Tokyo where for another three years she worked for the Red Army in collaboration with the Sorge spy ring. In the 1940s and 1950s, by falling back on her original vocation as a nurse, she survived some fifteen years in Stalin's Gulag. In 1966, still vigorous and spirited, the old lady outwitted her minders to escape to Western Europe, where she wrote her memoirs. She subsequently suffered a not uncommon fate for defectors, dying as a lonely recluse in exile. Despite this, in her survival of the camps and her escape from the empire she once served may be found those elements of courage and hope which occasionally alleviate the grim narrative of twentieth-century totalitarianism.

Peter Day is a journalist and publisher in Sydney, Australia. From 1978-1984 he was a U.S. correspondent for *The Australian*. He is currently writing a book on the life of Aino Kuusinen.

A Non-Person in America

TWO DECADES AGO, when her memoirs first appeared in Europe, they were well received.[1] But when a U.S. edition was published in 1975, it was effectively strangled at birth. American academics dismissed Aino Kuusinen as an "adventuress" with a "vivid imagination." Her credibility was destroyed by an outright libel, which has remained undetected, and whose consequences persist. Perhaps the most baleful of these consequences is that today's scholars have been deprived of an important source on the roots of the perestroika movement which ultimately brought down the Soviet empire.

[1]Aino Kuusinen, *Before and After Stalin: A Personal Account of Soviet Russia from the 1920s to the 1960s* (West Germany: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1972), translated into English (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1974). The U.S. edition was published by Morrow as *The Rings of Destiny: Inside Soviet Russia from Lenin to Brezhnev*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Any American scholar who today picks up a copy of her memoirs will light upon a brief preface written by a reputable scholar, warning that the memoirs are effectively worthless as an historical source. The authority of the man who supplied this preface—a Professor John Hodgson of Syracuse University—is supported in a separate foreword to the memoirs by the noted German commentator on Soviet affairs, Wolfgang Leonhard. Leonhard describes how he befriended Kuusinen after her defection, discussed the writing of her memoirs, and accepted responsibility for their posthumous publication. It was he who contacted Hodgson—as a "leading expert"—to help check the manuscript and he thanks Hodgson fulsomely for his contribution.

The particular significance of Aino Kuusinen's credibility, or lack thereof, is that she was not only a Soviet agent; she was also the wife of Otto Kuusinen, an "old Bolshevik" who survived near the center of power in Moscow from the time of Lenin until his death under Brezhnev. The important role of the shadowy Otto Kuusinen in the genesis of Gorbachev's perestroika is now acknowledged. Professor Charles Fairbanks, Jr. of Johns Hopkins, for example, makes much of his seminal influence: he points out that Kuusinen's protégés included a whole raft of reform-minded young intellectuals within the old Soviet apparat—and Yuri Andropov.[2] Fairbanks observes that after Kuusinen's death in 1964, Andropov "inherited the subsequently influential intellectuals" from his old mentor. Then, when Andropov selected Gorbachev as his heir apparent before his death in 1984, "this entire heritage came into the hands of Gorbachev and those who influenced him...." Fairbanks quotes one of Gorbachev's perestroika group, Georgi Arbatov, as acknowledging how "indebted" they all were to Kuusinen as a teacher.

Even in 1974, when the Soviet Union seemed a permanent fixture, the historical face value of Aino Kuusinen's memoirs was significant. As Leonhard points out in his foreword, this was the first time the wife of such a high-ranking Soviet official had come over to the West. Her "deeply impressive and absorbing" memoirs covered nearly five decades of Soviet communism, from 1918 to 1965, from "dizzy heights to the utmost depths."

But Leonhard also spices this with some mild disclaimers about Aino Kuusinen's reliability. He writes that her account was colored by the emotional effect of her experiences, particularly in the labor camps. This is the sort of comment that was once routinely made about any memoirist who survived the Gulag. But since Leonhard was the old lady's self-described friend, patron, and editor, the American reader could readily infer that he was actually tempering his criticism through a sense of *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*, and that it had been left to his esteemed colleague Hodgson to deliver the merciful *coup de grâce*.

Hodgson put forth the allegation that she was an habitual liar. In support of it, he offered just one specific example of a lie that she allegedly told. This was so self-evidently damning, apparently, that no further support was necessary. "With the vivid imagination of a self-centered adventuress," he wrote, "she claims in the face of contradictory evidence that she sought assistance from the U.S. embassy in Moscow on two occasions, in 1947 and 1948, after her release from the Vorkuta camp."

Hodgson did not bother to spell out the "contradictory evidence" to which he claimed to be privy. In any case, the truth,

---

[2]Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "The Nature of the Beast," *The National Interest* (Spring 1992). See also Frederick Kagan, "The Secret History of Perestroika," *The National Interest* (Spring 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contained in a detailed report to be found in the archives of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, is that she *did* visit the U.S. embassy in Moscow after her release from Vorkuta, exactly as she described.[3]

The Bukharin Connection

"IT SEEMS EXTRAORDINARY," Aino Kuusinen wrote of her husband, "that this man who so profoundly influenced the policy of a great nation was not a Russian by birth but an outsider, who at heart cared nothing for Soviet interests." Although Leonhard opined in the 1970s that she sometimes portrayed Kuusinen as being "more important than he actually was," Western scholars now generally acknowledge that he had more influence than they previously had realized. He is a key figure in the debate over the roots of Gorbachev's perestroika, and especially over whether those roots may be traced to the relatively liberal approach of the 1920s Soviet New Economic Policy (NEP) and the cultural influence of the NEP's champion, Nikolai Bukharin. Stephen Cohen, Bukharin's biographer, is the scholar most widely identified with this view. On the other side, Charles Fairbanks finds no "concrete historical link" with the NEP or Bukharin. He argues instead for the paradox of "the Stalinist roots of perestroika." Kuusinen and his protégé Andropov, Fairbanks asserts, were "left-Stalinists" or "Zhdanovites"—a reference to Andrei Zhdanov, the brutal Stalinist who laid down the ideological justification for the Great Terror of the 1930s. But we can see from Aino Kuusinen's memoirs that there is a link between Gorbachev's ginger group and the NEP. Bukharin and Otto Kuusinen were personally very close.

Fairbanks is of course not alone in his apparent ignorance of the friendship between Kuusinen and Bukharin; even Cohen, in his *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1980), seems unaware of it. This is perhaps not surprising in a work which is styled a "political" biography and largely eschews personal life. For one of Kuusinen's traits—and a key reason for his survival under Stalin—was his avoidance of "politics." Aino Kuusinen explained that as a Finn, and thus an outsider, her husband was able to detach himself from much of the internecine conflict around him. She writes that he was "at pains to be considered a foreigner who had no concern with conflicts inside the Kremlin and no ambition to supplant anyone." He "avoided official receptions and ceremonies whenever he could and the only time he wore his Soviet medals was on the day of his lying in state. Speech making and popularity hunting were not for him." This explains his obscurity: in an extremely dangerous environment, he retained the invisibility of a stick insect.

But Bukharin used to seek him out. To the extent that Cohen's description of Bukharin as "in every respect a twentieth-century intellectual" is justified, it may also be applied to Kuusinen: they were both linguists with interests in international literature, theater, politics, and particularly art.[4] Those broad intellectual interests set them apart from the Russian leadership. Kuusinen's apartment became a kind of home away from home for Bukharin, who was the only person Kuusinen permitted to visit unannounced. In Aino Kuusinen's

[3]Report No. R-285-48, Office of the Military Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow, signed by assistant military attaché Robert Dunlap, August 10, 1948. All DIA and FBI documents mentioned in this article were declassified wholly or in part and released to the author in response to requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

[4]Cohen tells us that art was a "passion" for Bukharin and that he actually considered being a painter before becoming a revolutionary. And according to Aino Kuusinen, when her often taciturn husband spoke "of the history of art and of the lives of the painters, he was like a different man...."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

words, after Bukharin had put *Pravda* to press, he would come and "sit till the small hours discussing Comintern affairs or problems of Marxism and socialism, and fetching snacks from the larder...." When Bukharin succeeded Zinoviev as chairman of the Comintern in 1926, it was "a good thing for Otto," she said, "as Bukharin was his closest friend among the Russian communists."

Sexual Superman?

BUT LET US return to the issue of Aino Kuusinen's credibility. Professor Hodgson gave her a motive for discrediting her husband, specifically saying she possessed "the pride of a woman scorned by a man whose philosophy, as stated by Otto Kuusinen himself, was that he was too developed both intellectually and physically to find satisfaction in a single woman...."

This "philosophy" does flesh out rather nicely the reptilian personality picture of the man which emerges from other sources. Treachery and servility were important elements in his survival. When his protégé Andropov came to power in late 1982, Otto Kuusinen was presented to readers of the *New York Times* as a brave father figure. Harrison Salisbury described how, "[Andropov's] mentor, the late politburo member Otto Kuusinen went to Stalin after his son's [Esa's] arrest and begged for his life." This was the exact opposite of the truth. Russian historians agree that Kuusinen did nothing to save his son—less than nothing, in fact. Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, in *The Time of Stalin*, relates how Stalin asked Kuusinen why he didn't petition for his son's release: "Kuusinen bowed submissively before the sultan: 'Apparently there were substantial reasons for his arrest....'" Roy Medvedev gives almost exactly the same account in his *Let History Judge*. These authorities thus support Aino Kuusinen, who wrote, "He did not lift a finger when his own son was arrested in Karelia and sent to Siberia, where he contracted tuberculosis. When Beria discovered who it was he had the boy released, but it was too late, and he soon died of the disease." (The son's wife, who was arrested with him, died in the camps.)[5] Given his response to the arrest of his own son, it is hardly surprising to discover that, as Aino wrote, "Kuusinen did nothing to save his principal Comintern assistants or his first wife's brother...In the same way Kuusinen did nothing to help his Finnish comrades, and was partly responsible for their liquidation."

It is evident that Kuusinen had no more loyalty for the women in his life than he did for his immediate family or his political comrades. But Hodgson did not explain why this should be held to diminish *Aino* Kuusinen's credibility. There is certainly no evidence in her memoirs that she was overly perturbed by his sexual misdemeanors. The only mention she made of them was the bland observation that he was "far from blameless in his official relationships" as a senior Comintern official. She compared him to the notorious Zinoviev: "an inveterate skirt-chaser and convinced that no female could resist his charms."

There is no doubt of the charms that attracted Otto Kuusinen to the woman he made his wife—the charms, in Leonhard's words, of a "beautiful, intelligent, educated and self-possessed woman." They met in 1919, in Helsinki. She was a young, unhappily married housewife; he an outlawed revolu-

[5]The pretext for Esa's arrest is not known. But if he was formally charged, it probably would have been for the crime of "Finnish nationalism." Esa was one of some twelve thousand Finns who emigrated to the largely Finnish-speaking Soviet "republic" of Karelia in the 1920s and 1930s. Most were subsequently rounded up and sent to prison camps in the late 1930s. There were few trials; to be caught speaking Finnish was sufficient to be convicted of the crime of "Finnish nationalism." Finns called this microcosm of Stalin's war on the nationalities "the great hate."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionary on a clandestine visit to the city. He had fled into exile in Moscow the previous year, leaving behind a wife and several children, following the defeat of the Finnish "Reds" in a brief civil war. According to the memoirs of Arvo Tuominen, a close Finnish communist friend of Otto's (see his *The Bells of the Kremlin*, University Press of New England, 1983), when Kuusinen returned to the city he fell "head over heels in love" with the "elegantly dressed, very attractive" Aino. He courted her assiduously. Tuominen reported seeing literally hundreds of pages of effusive, romantic love poems which Kuusinen wrote her. Aino said that at the time she was looking for a way of "making something more out of my life than merely being a housewife." For a while she made efforts to start a private medical clinic in Helsinki as a trained nurse, but they came to nothing. She and Kuusinen married in Moscow in 1922.

Tuominen's memoirs suggest that they separated some years later, not because Otto was "too developed both intellectually and physically," but because she offended his *amour propre* in ways that he did not want to admit. From 1924 she was a full-time Comintern "advisor on Scandinavia," with a large office at the Lux Hotel and German assistants. As a member of what their friend Bukharin identified as the "new class" of the Soviet bureaucracy, she made friends with other talented, educated, and ambitious women, including Alexandra Kollontay, the feminist firebrand and apostle of women's sexual liberation, for whom Otto Kuusinen bore an ill-disguised antipathy.

She also made friends among other Comintern men. Tuominen records that "something slight" developed between her and another prominent Finnish communist, Yrgo Sirola. Tuominen thought it was "at most a fleeting kiss." From the context, the time seems almost certainly to have been early 1922, before she married Kuusinen. But whatever and whenever it was, when Sirola later confessed it to Otto Kuusinen, Tuominen says it caused "a serious break" between the two men.

Tuominen, who received his information mainly from Kuusinen himself, after he arrived in Moscow to stay with him some years later, reported that Aino had "angered the women in the Comintern's women's division with her lust for power, her intelligence (and perhaps her feminine charm) and caused unrest also in some men..." He wrote, "When his wife created such havoc within the Comintern circle, Kuusinen began sending her on missions outside Moscow."

Aino's recollection in her memoirs was that it was Sirola who in 1930 first mentioned the proposed mission to the United States. She agreed—but only provided her husband did also. "I was careful not to say how pleased I was at the prospect," she wrote. Then one night Otto asked her if she would like to go. "I said I would," she recalled, "to which he replied angrily, 'Aha, now I know you want to leave me.' I made no answer, and neither of us spoke another word that evening."

Her desire to leave Moscow is in no way surprising. She wrote, "I had no regrets at leaving Moscow and was glad of a respite from the petty bureaucracy of the Comintern and the growing atmosphere of depression generally. The forced collectivization campaign that had just begun threw a dark shadow over daily life. There were frightful tales of cruelty and starvation...."

Stalin's Spin Doctor

BUKHARIN WAS THE leading opponent of collectivization, and as such Stalin's last outstanding rival. In April 1929, on the day Bukharin was dismissed from the Comintern and the editorship of *Pravda*, Aino Kuusinen ran into Stalin's Georgian protégé Beso Lominadze in the Comintern building. Lominadze was leading the Stalinist attack on Bukharin. She recalled, "Like everyone else he knew of the close links between Bukharin and Kuusinen, and he asked me:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'What does Kuusinen think of things now?'

'How do you mean?'

'Well, it looks to us in the youth organization as though he'll be for it next. What do you think?'

'I'd rather not say, but I know nothing will happen to Kuusinen.'

'How can you be so sure?'

'It's quite simple—Otto knows how to keep out of trouble.'

And so he did. Kuusinen immediately denounced his old friend. Aino said he "always knew exactly when to switch to a new master. This was how he managed to survive the paroxysm of the terror, when heads were rolling on every side."

As Bukharin once observed, Stalin was "consumed with a craving to become an acknowledged theoretician. He thinks that this is the only thing he lacks." Kuusinen stepped into the breach: he became Stalin's private spin doctor. Tuominen said that, apart from himself, Kuusinen was "the only Finnish communist leader (in the Soviet Union) to survive," and that he did so because "he was a specialist whom Stalin needed...there was not another one like him." Tuominen called him Stalin's "advisor on ideological and international questions." He was able to produce theoretical condemnations of the old Bolsheviks to order by keeping up card files on their ideological "heresies." One of the doomed, Karl Radek, called Otto Kuusinen "Stalin's noose-greaser."

For all his servility, Kuusinen possessed the spin doctor's typical secret contempt for his master. According to Aino Kuusinen, "He never for a moment thought anybody his intellectual superior, least of all Stalin." Tuominen supports this with various anecdotes. He tells us that while churning out one-liners deifying Stalin, Kuusinen privately enjoyed parodies such as "the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, as the great Stalin has so aptly put it." Tuominen agreed that Kuusinen was never a Stalinist, that "the despot was repulsive to him." But in the atmosphere of immense suspicion created by a paranoid dictator, it worked to Kuusinen's advantage that he was a foreigner, so that, "neither Stalin nor Khrushchev had to fear that Kuusinen would try to overthrow him."

Thus, Kuusinen was able to survive the tyrant, becoming a key influence on the younger generation of postwar bureaucrats, particularly from 1959 to his death in 1964. This was the period which saw the rebirth of Bukharinist ideas and approaches, before the long stagnation under Brezhnev. Tuominen wrote that, under Khrushchev, Kuusinen "finally got a chance officially to disown all the work in which he too had participated, and to prove Stalin the most heretical of all heretics. Surely those were the greatest moments of Kuusinen's life."

Femme Fatale

IT IS TRUE THAT Aino Kuusinen's life in the 1930s sounds like the figment of a vivid imagination: a beautiful blonde espionage agent, traveling under various glamorous aliases through the capitals of Europe, and traversing the globe in ocean liners, in the era when, as Evelyn Waugh observed, the going was still good. Scholarship aside, the wrongful discrediting of her memoirs robbed American readers of the extraordinary story of a most extraordinary woman. Yet her memoirs are quite down-to-earth—unlike some of the earlier FBI reports on her, which suggest what a memoirist with a "vivid imagination" might well have made of such a life. Some of these read like script submissions for Hitchcock melodramas, with Aino Kuusinen in the Bergman role and Peter Lorre and Sydney Greenstreet characters everywhere. She is even presented as a master of disguise, who once attended a national party convention "masquerading as a man," à la Marlene Dietrich. Naturally, the city of Shanghai, espionage capital of the Orient, where Aino Kuusinen did indeed spend many months, figured prominently in these lurid adventures. One agent speculated that she was the "attractive young blonde attired in a squirrel fur coat"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whose photograph, taken in Shanghai, was discovered among the papers of a Nazi double agent killed by a cab driver in New York's Times Square in 1941. Great stuff.

Nonetheless, the FBI's most prized ex-communist informants, including Whittaker Chambers, confirmed that Aino had indeed been active in the United States during the early 1930s. The reports of the FBI's Finnish informants also confirmed Aino's account that her mission consisted mainly of rationalizing the various Finnish-language American newspapers under Communist Party control. These reports brought out that she was a tough operator who did not hesitate to remove from the Party payroll employees who refused to toe the Moscow line. The Finnish-language newspaper *Vapaa Sana* reported that this "youthful, beautiful blonde" had been capable of reducing at least one Communist Party member to tears.

J. Edgar Hoover's inquiries into Aino Kuusinen's activities originally arose out of a puzzle over the identity of "Ingrid," sometimes also known as "Olga:" a mysterious blonde with an American accent who reported to Moscow from Tokyo through the spy ring of Victor Sorge, the brilliant Soviet agent who in the 1930s had wormed his way into the German embassy in Tokyo posing as a good Nazi newsman. His ring's most famous coup was warning Stalin—a month in advance—of Hitler's June 1941 attack on Russia. (Stalin took no notice of the warning, nor of similar ones given by the British on the basis of "Ultra" intercepts.) The Sorge ring was captured by the Japanese late in 1941, and after the war records of their interrogations became available to the American occupation forces. Sorge and his associate Max Klausen did not disclose the true identity of "Ingrid," and Aino Kuusinen in 1948 did not disclose the code names or aliases she had used in Japan. But eventually Hoover found that the Sorge/Klausen descriptions of "Ingrid," and the information Aino had given the military attaché in Moscow about her activities in Japan, matched completely.

In May 1953, Hoover formally instructed his investigators that the "Ingrid" mystery had been solved: she was definitely Aino Kuusinen. But this was only publicly revealed by Aino herself, when her memoirs were published. And because of the scholarly black hole into which the memoirs fell at the time of their publication, "Ingrid's" identity remained unknown in America, even to scholars with a specific interest in the Sorge ring—including the late Professor Gordon Prange, chief of the Historical Section of General Douglas MacArthur's postwar forces in Japan and the acknowledged authority on Sorge. In his 1984 book *Target Tokyo*, Prange assumed "Ingrid" was a Swedish journalist "with an exquisite profile like Greta Garbo's." This was Aino Kuusinen's cover.

She returned to Moscow with this glamour intact. Recalling a visit to Aino's Moscow apartment in the mid-1930s, Arvo Tuominen wrote:

> She lived lavishly with elegant travel souvenirs from all over the world...She was accompanied on her trips by a retinue of a lady's maid or two, and occasionally a male servant. She passed for an English lady or an American dollar princess, and the setting had to be appropriate to the station. When we visited her, the room was overflowing with American and English trunks.

But shortly after she was recalled from Tokyo to Moscow at the height of the purges, this leisurely, glamorous, globe-trotting life came to an abrupt end.

Into the Gulag

BY THE END of 1937, even Otto Kuusinen's charmed life seemed over. In July of that year a secret police official named Zaitsev, in the presence of his chief, the dreaded Yezhov, had warned Tuominen that his friend Kuusinen could be arrested at any moment. When Tuominen relayed Yezhov's warning to his friend, the usually imperturbable Kuusinen began to tremble so badly that he could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

barely hold a cigarette in his lips. Unconsoled by Stalin's assurance that he would be safe, Kuusinen feverishly cleared out his files. His anxiety was justified: the secret police decided to have Aino condemn him as a British spy.

There is no reason to suspect that she exaggerated the sufferings she endured under interrogation. When she refused to denounce Kuusinen, she was forced to stand for days without food or drink, or to sit lightly clad in icy cold rooms while shifts of interrogators questioned her for hours on end. After about six months in the Lubyanka she was taken to the even more notorious prison at Lefortovo. For months she was kept in solitary confinement in the dungeons there, next to a torture chamber from which came tormented screams and cries. One morning she was forced to look at the mangled corpse of a man she had heard thrashed to death. And each night the document accusing Otto Kuusinen of being a British spy was thrust at her to sign, and each night she refused. Thus the "father" of perestroika survived the purges.

How did she survive the Gulag for fifteen years? Leonhard maintains that she "faced the atrocious reality of her situation without great soul-searching, without tragic disappointment, without allowing her whole inner world to collapse." This was true enough, but it was true almost by definition of any long-term camp survivor. What almost certainly allowed Aino to survive was her return to her original vocation of nursing, something which emerges quite unself-consciously from her memoirs. In the summer of 1939 a group of about forty women prisoners, most of them Finnish, set out for the city of Archangel on a paddle steamer from a transit camp called Kotlas. This was the second leg of a journey from Moscow to the frozen hell of the vast Vorkuta camp complex, beyond the Arctic Circle. Elisabeth von Fait, an Austrian doctor, was in charge of medical arrangements. Aino wrote:

> When she heard I was a trained nurse, she asked me if I would be her assistant. I hesitated but finally agreed, as I had kept up an interest in medical matters over the years. I am convinced that her offer saved my life...as looking after the sick brought with it some material alleviations as well as spiritual ones.

The Winter War

AS IT HAPPENS, it was precisely at the time of her return to nursing that Otto Kuusinen, having survived the worst of the purges, was planning his imminent apotheosis as "prime minister" of Finland. The 1939 pact with Hitler's Germany had placed Finland within the Soviet sphere. At first, Stalin seemed interested only in some Finnish territory which, being not far from Leningrad, was deemed to be of vital strategic interest to the Soviet Union. But the resolute Finns would make no concessions. On November 30, after some months of fruitless talks, Stalin launched his "Winter War" against tiny Finland. Now Soviet aims became anything but limited, and as the Red Army crossed the Finnish border and Soviet bombers raided Helsinki, Moscow radio announced the formation of a new "people's government" of Finland, led by Otto Kuusinen.

Aino Kuusinen's comments on the Winter War seemed particularly to infuriate the author of the preface to her memoirs. Hodgson objected to "the impression that...her former husband, in contrast to herself, was an embittered emigrant whose loathing for Finland...was epitomized in an alleged desire to march back to Helsinki at the head of the Red Army." This is extremely odd. There was nothing "alleged" about it: it is a matter of history that in November 1939, Kuusinen was planning to enter Helsinki precisely as Aino described.

But by January 1940 Finnish resistance had quashed any Soviet ambitions of conquest. Now, Moscow could not enter peace

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talks with the Helsinki government without implicitly disowning its own embryonic puppet regime. Eventually the Finns established secret contact with the Kremlin through the Soviet ambassador in Sweden: none other than Kuusinen's old bugbear, Alexandra Kollontay. On January 29, 1940, Kollontay, the woman whom Kuusinen had once dismissed as always being "carried away by hopeless causes," delivered a note from the Kremlin to Swedish mediators which spelled the end of the Kuusinen "government." Fighting would continue for some time. But with the note, Stalin had agreed in principle to talks with Helsinki. This was a critical reversal: Finland's independence was no longer in question and Kuusinen quietly folded his tents and went back to Moscow.

One day in the late autumn of 1940, a nurse and prisoner in Vorkuta, Aino Kuusinen was standing knee-deep in snow in front of her hut when she heard Otto Kuusinen's voice crackling over the camp speakers. It was a radio broadcast hailing the incorporation of a new country into the Soviet Union—not Finland, but poor Estonia. She wrote that when she heard from incoming prisoners about the Finns' courage in defending their country, "the news filled me with pride and thankfulness. Finnish courage and patriotism were being praised in all countries and all languages, and my country had become famous among people who till then had scarcely heard of it."

The Winter War was a disaster for the Soviet Union. Among other things, the Red Army's humiliation by a numerically far inferior foe proved to Hitler the devastation caused in the Red Army officer corps by the purges. And the delay in bringing hostilities to an end was immensely costly. As an historian of the war, Anthony Upton, remarked, "thousands died needlessly" on both sides as a result of the "pathetic charade" of Kuusinen's puppet regime-in-waiting, the formation of which had "an immense influence on the course of the war." But Otto Kuusinen survived even this. The most plausible explanation of how he did is given by Aino in her memoirs. "He was so skillful in making his ideas palatable," she wrote, "that Stalin imagined them to be his own."

* * *

ACCORDING TO Wolfgang Leonhard, when Aino Kuusinen made contact with him in 1966, shortly after her arrival in Western Europe, she was "possessed by the desire to write her memoirs." She was full of life, writing in the first pages of her manuscript, "I have been through many adventures, and have suffered fate's ironies perhaps more frequently than most of my contemporaries, but none of my unhappy experiences have broken me, and I have not lost my taste for living."

But Leonhard said that after she had finished her memoirs, a great change came over this previously "intensely active" old woman. She "complained increasingly of the state of her health, and her all-embracing optimism gave way to pessimism and despair." She became reclusive and refused to have her memoirs published until after her death. Perhaps she had begun to understand that somehow the "experts" would succeed, where the Soviets had failed, in robbing her survival of much of its meaning. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISCOVER WHAT THOUSANDS OF READERS ALREADY KNOW ABOUT THE WORLD & I

"One of the most extraordinary magazines in America."
Dictionary of Literary Biography Yearbook

"...a treasurehouse of information..."
The Daily Reflector, Greenville, N.C.

"I have canceled all my other magazine subscriptions... your magazine contains the best of them and better."
D. Stuart Carr, Richmond, VA.

THE COLLECTIBLE MONTHLY
No other single publication provides the same in-depth, entertaining, and objective coverage of national and international events as THE WORLD & I.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST
Each monthly issue contains over four hundred pages of the most thought-provoking analysis and informative features you'll find anywhere. Every issue presents over 50 articles by scholars and experts representing widely divergent schools of thought, all accompanied by hundreds of color photographs and thoughtful illustrations.

ON THE CUTTING EDGE
The diversity of topics covered makes THE WORLD & I an important publication for professionals, parents, and students alike. In each issue you'll find penetrating analyses under the headings Current Issues, The Arts, Life, Natural Science, Culture, Book World, Life and Ideals, and Currents in Modern Thought.

AN EXCEPTIONAL VALUE
For those of you who enjoy learning, THE WORLD & I provides many pleasurable hours of opening up your world to new cultures and ideas. An investment well worth the price, THE WORLD & I is an important addition to any home where education is valued.

ORDER YOUR RISK-FREE TRIAL ISSUE TODAY!

YES, I want to receive a **RISK-FREE** trial issue of **THE WORLD & I** at no cost or obligation. If I like **THE WORLD & I**, my price for one full year — all eleven remaining monthly issues — will be only $60 (regular cover price is $120 per year). If I'm not totally satisfied with my first copy, I'll simply return my invoice marked "cancel" and owe nothing. The trial issue will be mine to keep.

❑ **12 months for $60** ❑ Bill me ❑ VISA/MC
❑ **6 months for $35** ❑ Payment enclosed ❑ AMEX

Name (please print)

Address

City State Zip

Card Number Exp. Date

Signature

THE WORLD&I

For faster service call: **1-800-822-2822**

3400 New York Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20002 **UTAA95**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Hamiltonians

Max Beloff

François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 448 pp., $30.00.

Charles Grant, *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built* (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1994), 304 pp., £12.99.

NO ONE CAN seriously doubt the existence of a crisis in the affairs of the European Union. As the implications of the treaties on which it is based, including the Maastricht timetable for economic and monetary union, become ever more widely appreciated, and as the ordinary citizen in most member countries begins to participate in the debate over the future of the Union and its institutions (a debate hitherto largely confined to the United Kingdom), the glow of the European ideal begins to fade and the demand for precise definitions as to what it is all for becomes louder. We are all Euroskeptics now.

The only country seemingly unaware of this change in public attitudes is the United States of America. Washington continues to act on the assumption that a "United States of Europe" is the continent's inevitable destiny, and American ambassadors continue to proclaim in London, and no doubt elsewhere, that nothing must be allowed to frustrate this "manifest destiny," even at the expense of the solidarity of the English-speaking and Atlantic worlds.[1]

Ever since I began studying this process nearly forty years ago, I have been puzzled by the uncritical acceptance in the United States of the view that only with common institutions exercising sovereign power could Europe flourish economically, and play a proper role in its own defense. For while it is understandable that the United States should welcome the apparent decision of the countries of Western and Southern Europe to end their age old strife—did not Americans twice have to intervene to redress the balance?—the assumption that, without the institutions of Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg, these countries would once again be preparing for armed conflict is on the face of it wholly implausible.

I first looked at this question during a stay in Washington in the autumn of 1961, when it was still possible to discuss it with many of those who had taken part in the events leading up to the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and Euratom. It was obvious that in deciding to come to Europe's assistance with the Marshall Plan, both the

[1]Ignorance of the nature of the European Union and of the reasons for the growing British objections to it are not confined to official quarters. Mr. Jonathan Clarke in "Repeating British Mistakes," *The National Interest* (Spring 1995), seems to think that British "Euroskepticism" is in some way connected with imperial nostalgia. It has nothing to do with anything so grand. It is simply the case that a country which has enjoyed self-government and a parliamentary system for centuries sees no reason to have its *domestic* law made by bodies outside the United Kingdom, where the British voice must perforce be a minority one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration and Congress had hoped that by treating Western Europe as a single entity they would lay the foundations for a "United States of Europe." Thus, having failed to give the organization intended to maximize the productive use of Marshall Aid—the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)—supra-national powers, they found much to appeal in the ideas of Jean Monnet that led to the Schuman Plan, with its strong supra-national element. After relations with the Soviet Union were further envenomed by the outbreak of the Korean War, the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC), both to provide a cover for the rearmament of Germany and act as the core of a European political community, appealed further. When these plans failed through French resistance, the United States accepted the alternative method of securing German participation in Europe's defense by the creation of the Western European Union.

During this period of considerable creativity, Americans took some time to establish their preference for a "united Europe" over an Atlantic Community of some kind, which would have been more congenial to most British opinion. Understandably, what mattered most to Washington was how such constructions would fit into the struggle to prevent Western Europe from falling under Soviet domination, while making it possible to shift some of the burden of the continent's defense to the Europeans themselves, without either eliminating all hope of German reunification or resurrecting a powerful, independent and united Germany. With an ingrained hostility to "imperialism," Americans wished for both political and economic reasons to see the United Kingdom and France liquidate their overseas ties and take their place in a European Union.

American policy under both Truman and Eisenhower was the product of an exceptionally gifted and devoted set of public servants. Insofar as they were influenced by any individual European, it is abundantly clear that it was to Jean Monnet, whose wartime work on the inter-allied supply organizations had made him a familiar figure in Washington and New York, that they looked for guidance.

It is thus of the greatest interest that there should appear at this critical moment in the affairs of Europe a first-rate biography of Monnet by a close collaborator-disciple. The subtitle—"The First Statesman of Interdependence"—indicates the general flavor of the book. For François Duchêne the nation-state is obsolete; economics has determined that all our destinies are interlocked. Monnet must be regarded as the precursor of a new era in European and world affairs.

In dealing with Monnet's earlier career, including his work on the supply side in World War I and at the League of Nations, Duchêne shows that Monnet's original bias was not towards supra-national solutions. Indeed his first brush with the concept was his participation in the abortive plan for an Anglo-French Union in June 1940. But, by the time he took part in the Marshall Plan negotiations as head of the French "plan," he had come to the conclusion that without supra-national institutions nothing serious would be done to integrate the European economies, and he abandoned any interest in what became the OEEC. What Monnet needed was another country to join with France in dealing with the critical issues of the moment, notably the restoration in some non-harmful way of German industry. His failure to arrive at a common approach with Britain in 1949 meant that he had to seek partners in Germany itself, and this colored his later willingness to see European construction develop with the United Kingdom on the outside. Duchêne seems to accept the view that it was Britain that was responsible for this failure and for Monnet's subsequent German orientation. He seems not to have taken into account the version of these talks by Lord Plowden, the principal British negotiator, who pointed out that Monnet's ultimate aims were never made clear, and that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monnet, as someone outside the departmental machine, could make proposals without ministerial backing which Plowden as treasury official could not.[2]

The story of the actual negotiation of the Schuman Plan and the setting up of its institutions covers familiar ground, as does the story of the EDC. But Duchêne is clearer than some previous writers about the extent of American pressure exerted to facilitate their success. The proponents of European federalism had endeavored to enlist opinion in the United States on their side quite early in the piece, and had established an American Committee for the United States of Europe which survived until 1960. Americans were moreover giving financial support to the European movement itself.[3] But while Duchêne is well aware of Monnet's early immersion in things American and his enduring contacts with powerful figures in the United States, he somewhat plays down the extent to which Americans made the running in the early 1950s and the dependence of Monnet upon American funds to keep the momentum going.

Since Duchêne's book was published, the young British scholar Richard J. Aldrich has shed more light on the American role. He shows that the American Committee for a United Europe, though purporting to be an expression of European opinion, was in fact mainly financed from American government sources, and in all probability out of CIA funds. Once the leadership of the European Movement had passed from Duncan Sandys to the committed federalist Paul-Henri Spaak, and once the Attlee government had made it clear that Britain did not see its destiny as being part of a federal Europe, the inhibitions on American involvement were set aside and funds were made available for furthering the cause. The expenditure was not confined to the United States, but went into pro-federalist pressure groups active in Europe, particularly in France. Dr. Aldrich reckons that, in all, some three to four billion dollars were spent on this effort.[4]

Of this background, European statesmen outside the Monnet circle were obviously unaware, but that they felt that American pressure was being exercised in an improper way comes out in some of the French accounts of the period, notably in the memoirs of Michel Debré.[5] And this helps to explain the continued sensitivity of the Gaullists to American pressure after de Gaulle's return to power. It was not simply a matter of the General's personal resentment at Roosevelt's treatment of him during the war.

Monnet returned to private life in 1955 and was not again to play a leading role in the twenty-four years remaining to him. He was not thus directly involved in what Duchêne describes as the "determination of a small State Department group around Dulles and Eisenhower to give every possible efficient help to the revival of European integration after the EDC defeat." The form that this revival took in the 1957 Treaty of Rome did not in any event much appeal to Monnet. He did not think that the freeing of trade in a

---

[2]Edwin Plowden, *An Industrialist in the Treasury* (London: Deutsch, 1989), pp. 74-76. One says "seems" because there is a serious problem with Duchêne's book, in that the references to sources are so poorly organized that it is almost impossible to discover on what a particular assertion is based. The fifty odd pages of "notes" might just as well not be there.

[3]See my, *The United States and the Unity of Europe*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 72-75.

[4]Richard J. Aldrich, "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948-1960," *International Military Review*, forthcoming; and "European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection," in Anne Deighton ed., *National Decision-Makers and European Unity* (London: Macmillan, 1995).

[5]Michel Debré, *Trois républiques pour une France: Agir*, Vol. 2 1946-1958 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"common market" would conduce to the political ends he had set himself. According to Duchêne, what Monnet felt was needed was "a Financial Common Market which would lead to European economic unity." Only then would it be possible "to produce the political union which is the goal."

In the Gaullist years, Monnet's own propaganda organization, the Action Committee, made little impact and the pace of European integration slowed down. Its revival in the 1980s was to take place in a different climate and under different leadership. Indeed Duchêne seems to accept the view that Monnet was basically in favor of cooperation between heads of government and never truly a "federalist." To some extent, the beginnings of cooperation in foreign policy embarked upon in 1969 were compatible with such an approach. But the decision of the Paris Summit of 1972, after Britain's entry into the Communities, embraced economic and military union as an agreed objective and heralded what was to happen a decade later. It was delayed till the 1980s because it was only then that pessimism about Europe's role in the world created the conditions for a new generation of technocrats to bring about major changes in Europe's conduct of its affairs.

While the men of the new generation were different from those of Monnet's in origin and outlook, they resembled Monnet and his collaborators in three crucial respects. They believed that their own solutions for Europe were the only correct ones; they believed that they had the right to bring them about by whatever means were available, including if and where necessary disguising their ultimate purposes from those who might otherwise throw up obstacles; and they had no patience with the idea that it was the peoples of Europe rather than their elites who should determine their own future. In American parlance they were all Hamiltonians, not Jeffersonians. It is one of the ironies of the situation that America should pressure Britain to merge itself in a European federal structure whatever the wishes of the British, while the American federal system had been created by its leaders in partnership with the electorate, not against it.

To understand the new European system, now showing the weaknesses inevitable in a structure created from the top down, we are fortunate in yet another excellent biography—that of Jacques Delors, who came to symbolize the new era and was for the decade of his presidency a far more visible symbol of the new Europe than Jean Monnet had ever allowed himself to be. Charles Grant's book cannot of course claim to be the definitive work that Mr. Duchêne has attempted. Delors is still very much alive and Grant witnessed the Delors era in Brussels as a working journalist, from the outside.

If there could be doubts about Monnet's devotion to federalism—the supersession of the nation-state—no such doubt could exist in Delors' case. Monnet had no ideology other than what he fashioned for himself. Delors' ideology, a combination of socialism and Catholic doctrine, was fully formed before he got to Brussels. He was much closer to elements in French politics, and through them to a wider constituency, than Monnet had ever been.

True, to manipulate the destinies of Europe, Monnet had needed a political patron. He would not have succeeded had he not persuaded Schuman, a key figure in the Fourth Republic, that his vision of a Europe in which France and Germany would never again go to war could only be guaranteed through some mixing of their fortunes. We still speak of the Schuman Plan. By the time Delors took office, France could no longer take the leading role in his vision of Europe as a single Great Power. This role had to be reserved for Germany, something that became even more obvious when reunification made it unquestionably the leading nation in Western and Central Europe, both demographically and economically. Delors' great achievement was to enlist German

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the cause of European Union, who would, in turn, sell the idea to the arch-pragmatist François Mitterrand. Confident that France could look after itself and manage the relationship with Germany, he was not as bothered as Monnet had been about leaving Britain on the fringes of his new Europe.

On the formulation and negotiation of the two key documents of the period, the Single European Act (1987) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Grant cannot hope to add much at this stage to our general knowledge of the process. He does make it clear how crucial the Single European Act was in the qualitative leap from the Treaty of Rome, with its various safeguards, to a situation in which individual countries could be prevented from rejecting legislation with which they were not content. It was only after the event that Margaret Thatcher realized the extent to which she had been deceived into accepting a change of this magnitude, and her attempt to slow things down—which included a personal attack on Delors—precipitated the resignation of Geoffrey Howe and her own downfall.

More interesting is Grant's view that the Treaty of Maastricht, usually classed among Delors' triumphs, was not in fact wholly to his taste. Delors appears to have thought that it went too far too quickly on the political side, and that, apart from minor changes in the Treaty of Rome, it would have been better to concentrate on economic and monetary union. Even so, French objections prevented the full-blown degree of power for the central institutions that Kohl sought and which still figures on Germany's agenda. Mitterrand gave way on the issue of more powers for the European Parliament while leaving foreign affairs, defense, and matters of policing to inter-governmental cooperation.

Grant rightly points out that Delors sought and achieved more power for Brussels by increasing its financial calls upon its member states. He also achieved more power within the Brussels machine, and in wider international fora for the commission's president, thanks in part to the unwillingness of governments to nominate first-rate figures for commission membership. Grant makes clear what British ministers have even yet not fully understood: that the British belief that "subsidiarity" could function in some sense as a brake on "federalism" makes no sense. For Delors the two were equal pillars of the structure he was trying to bring into existence.

The central puzzle of Monnet's Europe remains equally a puzzle in Delors' time: it is hard to see why the United States would wish to imperil its close relations with the United Kingdom, still very much alive in the intelligence and other areas, for the sake of a set of institutions and ideas whose objectives include, prominently, resistance to American leadership.

The "common foreign policy" institutionalized by the Maastricht Treaty has produced, through faults of conception and execution, a failure for which the unfortunate peoples of the former Yugoslavia are paying dearly, and may yet pay a still higher price, as Noel Malcolm so cogently explained in the last issue of this journal. Who now remembers the vainglorious Monsieur Jacques Poos—prime minister of Luxembourg, no less!—proclaiming in July 1991, "This is the hour of Europe not of America"?

The long, drawn out confrontation over the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade showed how remote French protectionism was from the Anglo-Saxon idea of a global trading world. Delors could probably have echoed the remark of Adolphe Thiers that "free trade's underlying doctrine of laissez-faire" was "a blasphemy against God's design for civilization." While Delors could see some advantages in freer trade in industrial products, he remained an agricultural protectionist. What is relevant is that the GATT negotiations gave him a chance to do what he found so congenial: condemn the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States and its friends in Europe. ("The imperial power won't always be able to mock the others. One should not believe that because America has friends in Europe, and some get rather frightened when it raises its voice, that we are going to let ourselves be trampled on.")

General de Gaulle—the only first-rate statesman thrown up by post-Churchill Europe—was right in his perception that Britain was by reason of its oceanic outlook unsuited for membership in a continental system. But he was wrong in thinking that it would always choose the open sea: in 1972 it opted for the opposite. With more understanding of its own position than some American statesmen and diplomatists have shown, it may yet attempt to return to its natural stance. It is time for the United States to stop seeing Europe through the misleading prism of its own history. The United States was a nation before it had common government. Europe is not a nation. Could either Monnet or Delors be understood except as Frenchmen? □

Lord Beloff was Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at Oxford University from 1957 to 1974 and the first Principal of what is now the University of Buckingham. He has written extensively on both the United States and Europe.

Bernadotte and Shamir

Barbara Amiel

Kati Marton, *A Death in Jerusalem* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), 336 pp., $25.00.

IN ONE OF those coincidences that would have delighted Arthur Koestler, the only time I met Kati Marton, author of *A Death in Jerusalem*, was at a dinner about ten minutes before I was asked to review her book. "My book," she said immediately upon meeting me, "tells the truth about Shamir the assassin." I thought at the time there was a little too much happy enthusiasm about this dire assessment of a former prime minister.

This is Marton's third non-fiction book and its subject is, once more, a life cut short by murder (her previous books include studies of Raoul Wallenberg and the murdered American journalist George Polk). This time it is the 1948 assassination of UN Mediator Count Bernadotte by Jewish extremists in Jerusalem. The book, as reviewers like to say before getting their teeth into the author's wrist, does raise some intriguing questions. But in the case of *A Death in Jerusalem*, the questions are not only about the book's subject but about the personality and motivation of its author.

The dust jacket comes studded with endorsements. Diane Sawyer enthuses about what she calls the "human pulse-point of history," while Jim Lehrer found himself unable to put it down. No author can be blamed for the remarks of admirers and anyway the essence of these plaudits is accurate. Miss Marton is a skilled journalist who writes well. The story of how a nephew of the king of Sweden, whose chief accomplishment in life was to discover a keen interest in boy scouting at age thirty-eight, came to be the UN Mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute is intriguing. His death at the hands of members of the Jewish terrorist organization called Lehi, headed at the time by a triumvirate including former Israeli Prime Minister

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yitzhak Shamir, gave his name the sort of gravitas it never had in life. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who calls Miss Marton's book "fascinating," claims indeed that the assassination "has stained the politics of Israel ever since."

In the Palestine of the 1940s, as Marton documents, the majority of Jews in the British mandate supported the moderate Jewish Agency to which Israel's first prime minister, Ben Gurion, belonged. The Jewish terrorist underground was composed primarily of two groups, one being the Irgun, which Menachem Begin headed, and the other a splinter group from Irgun founded by Avraham Stern and known as the Lehi or the Stern Gang. When World War II broke out, Ben Gurion called all sides to a truce in the fight with the British. The truce was observed by the Irgun until 1944, but not by Lehi. Ben Gurion's Jewish Agency and later the Israeli Army, the Haganah, took the wrenching decision after the 1944 murder of Lord Moyne by the Irgun to turn Jewish terrorists over to the British—an action which gave Ben Gurion's Jewish Agency the legitimacy of a governing class.

Immediately after the UN vote that created Israel, the Arab League declared war upon the new state. The UN's answer was to send the Swedish aristocrat, Count Volke Bernadotte, to find a solution. The Bernadotte plan, which leaned heavily on British input, envisioned an internationalized Jerusalem with a large chunk of the Negev given away to Transjordan. The plan was so misconceived that support for it could come from neither Jew nor Arab, but clearly it posed the greater danger to the fledging state of Israel.

Kati Marton's book sees a straight line from Bernadotte's assassination to the massacre of Arab worshippers by an Israeli West Bank settler, Baruch Goldstein, in 1994. This line, she writes "is all too tragically obvious." The purpose of her book, she continues, is to "help put in perspective the mad dance of violence in which Arabs and Jews have been locked." The purpose is noble but her ratiocination is weak. Technically one may draw a line from Bernadotte's assassination to the murders by Goldstein, but it is not the line Miss Marton sees. She is arguing that Lehi's political philosophy, as expressed in 1948, forms a continuum with the political philosophy of Baruch Goldstein. This is complete nonsense and comes perilously close to President Clinton's notion that there is a line between anti-statist talk show hosts and the Oklahoma bombing.

The continuum or kinship that does exist is the one that joins those few hundred (or perhaps thousand) people in the world who find it justifiable to murder people for disparate ideologies. Most people can subscribe to anti-statism or oppose the peace process in Israel without committing monstrous crimes. Goldstein's extremism belongs to the realm of pathology. Lehi's assassination of Bernadotte was wrong, but it was not, alas, irrational.

As for the Bernadotte mission itself, Marton blames its tragic end on Bernadotte's optimistic naïveté. What Marton misses is that it was not Bernadotte's naïveté that led him to his death but rather the fact that he was quite dense. The significant fact about the Middle East, in terms of which a 1948-1995 line may well be drawn, was that only two ways of limiting Arab-Israeli hostilities existed: either one could say that Israel was not a viable entity and should be scrapped, or, in the alternative, the world had to commit to the establishment of a State of Israel with secure borders. This was a dichotomy that Bernadotte simply had not the wit to grasp.

Ends and Means

ISRAEL'S SHORT history raises an astonishing number of vexing issues. After one has stated, unequivocally, that the assassination of Bernadotte was morally wrong, for example, more difficult questions follow. If it was morally wrong, was it nevertheless a practical success in blocking Bernadotte's scheme? The guideposts one uses through such terrain might include a number of assumptions. It is quite possible to disapprove totally of terrorism while recog-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nizing that the interpretation of the world that a political terrorist holds may be accurate, and the policies he adopts effective. The fundamental basis of my disapproval for terrorism is moral not practical. Terrorism, alas, all too often does work, if not immediately, then in a roundabout way. And while it is perfectly true that terror also often fails to achieve the terrorists' aims, in that respect it is no different from diplomacy and war, which also do not guarantee success.

There is a further consideration I would bring to evaluating the Bernadotte mission. Both his personality and his work for the United Nations in 1948 were very much in line with an approach that goes back at least to the Congress of Vienna. The representatives of the most powerful nations of the world would meet in some palace and agree on solutions to handle what Henry Kissinger called, after Bismarck, the "sheep-stealers of the world." I am not entirely sure that this approach to problem-solving is much worse than those that have replaced it today, and those named as sheep-stealers were not always undeserving of that appellation. Nevertheless this sort of approach to crises has not worked well for the last fifty years. Whether you send in Count Bernadotte to sort out the Middle East or the infinitely cleverer Lord Carrington to redraw the map of Yugoslavia, the result is likely to be as barren. The Bernadotte mission was matched in its silliness only by its arrogance—the arrogance not of a single man, as Kati Marton suggests, but of a tradition.

What are Kati Marton's guideposts? She is censorious of Shamir's role in the Bernadotte affair, but one cannot blame her for disapproving of assassins and those who sanction assassination. One might have expected the author of *The Polk Conspiracy*—an earlier book of hers which sailed pretty close to the wind in libel matters, with its rather wild speculation about an alleged right-wing plot and cover-up in the murder of an American journalist—to be unsympathetic to the anguish that formed part of the mental landscape of Israeli terrorists. But she is not. She is well aware of the pain felt by those Jews in Palestine who watched the British turn back Jewish refugees during World War II, condemning them to concentration camps and the gas chamber—and who then turned this pain into terrorism. Nor is she oblivious to such matters as the intellectual failings of Bernadotte. Her research meets or exceeds normal journalistic standards, even if she does not reach those of historical scholarship.

Ultimately the difficulty with the book lies more in its tone and the pedestrian nature of its conclusions. It is not that the bits and pieces of analysis in the book are wrong but rather that they are severely secondhand. There is no insight or inspiration here, but only that deadly, plodding, evenhanded reporting that to some extent is the hallmark of modern American journalism. What in the end it all seems to say is that this nice noble scoutmaster, descended from the throne of Sweden, came at considerable bother to himself to offer a solution to these unruly sheep-stealers and all they could do was shoot him. This does not help us understand the world in which we live.The book is not adequate to its subject.

The real target of the book, in fact, is Yitzhak Shamir. By his own account, Shamir was told of the assassination plans by four members of Lehi, and as he said in his memoirs, "I offered no resistance." For Kati Marton, this is the confession that gives her open season on Shamir, his supporters and, ultimately, and by extension, Israel itself. If a man who knew of an assassination can not only escape punishment by the State of Israel but be elected its prime minister and allowed to serve in office, then the entire country exhibits a moral deficiency that offends Marton's sensibilities.

Though even a rather dense aristocrat deserves a better fate than Bernadotte's, Marton seems to feel it necessary to make him a more attractive and heroic figure, perhaps in order to demonize Shamir further. This requires some historical dexterity, but that, unfortunately, is not her strong suit. Her

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attempt to demonstrate it—in the process of denying or disguising some of the shortcomings of the Count—brings her into combat with British historian Trevor-Roper. The match is, to put it generously, an unequal one.

The Kersten Affair

READERS UNFAMILIAR with the story of the Latvian-born Finnish masseur, Felix Kersten, will find this one of the most fascinating chapters of Marton's book. Through a bizarre combination of circumstances, Kersten ended up as Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler's therapist. He used his influence to help prisoners of the Third Reich, beginning with the release of some Swedish businessmen in 1942 (not 1944 as Marton reports). Kersten became the conduit between Hitler's chief of espionage, Walter Schellenberg (who later became a close personal friend of Bernadotte and ghosted a book of his memoirs), Heinrich Himmler, and supplicants that included the World Jewish Congress and the Swedish government. Most importantly, he helped both Dutch and Finnish Jews, and when Hitler ordered the blowing up of the concentration camps in 1945, Kersten managed to persuade Himmler to issue orders protecting prisoners, especially suspending the killing of Jews and treating them equally with other prisoners. This is confirmed in a 1947 World Jewish Congress memorandum. In the 1950s, the Dutch nominated Kersten for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Unfortunately for Kersten, Bernadotte was rather keen on making his mark at the masseur's expense. Whether reading Bernadotte's own memoirs or Marton's account of him, it is evident that while the Count was a man of very limited abilities and intelligence, he was full of great ambitions for himself. This disparity between talent and ambition, as we all know, is a special kind of hell and it can lead people to behave in swinish ways. Bernadotte's royal relatives had managed to get the scoutmaster a perfectly respectable job as vice president of the Swedish Red Cross, and there is no gainsaying that from a Hollywood Central Casting point of view, the aristocratic, unflappable Swede had the appearance of a man cut out for greatness. Few people dared suggest that gravitas may require more than an ability to look calm under fire, in khaki shorts. Bernadotte's path crossed Kersten's when, in his role as representative of the Swedish Red Cross, he met Himmler to work out the transport arrangements to move camp victims to Sweden in the last weeks of the war. In fact, in a book of his memoirs after the war, Bernadotte claimed that he himself was responsible for the deal Kersten had authored to obtain the release of thousands of women prisoners from Ravensbruck concentration camp in 1945. It was this that gave Bernadotte the credentials to be appointed to the job that no one else really wanted: UN Mediator in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

In the controversy over the effectiveness of Bernadotte—waged largely on Bernadotte's side by his relatives and the Swedish royal family and their friends—most historians have taken the side of Kersten, albeit with some reservations. One of the most neutral assessments I could find is the 1994 essay by Raymond Palmer in *The Journal of Contemporary History* entitled "Felix Kersten and Count Bernadotte: A Question of Rescue." While this gives credit to Bernadotte for the valuable job he performed in making logistical arrangements for the transportation of the concentration camp victims, it comes down firmly on the side of Kersten.

Trevor-Roper actually suggested in an earlier article, "Kersten, Himmler & Count Bernadotte," (*Atlantic Monthly*, February 1953) that Bernadotte *refused* to take Jews back to Sweden in 1945. Marton's response is to attack Trevor-Roper at length in an epilogue to her new book. In that epilogue she maintains that Trevor-Roper refused all requests to discuss Bernadotte with her, although the historian says he has no record of any such requests. Had Marton contacted him she

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might have received the same written response I got. "In particular," wrote Trevor-Roper in answer to my questions, "I am not certain that Bernadotte *refused* to take Jews. I have some reservations about the documentation here. If he did, it may well have been that he simply had no instructions except in respect of Norwegians and Danes." Certainly, Marton is wrong in stating that Trevor-Roper published a letter purporting to be written by Bernadotte to Himmler that is anti-semitic and clearly a forgery. The letter, which Marton includes in her book, was not published by Trevor-Roper. In his preface to Kersten's memoirs, he noted that he was dubious about the letter and "since its authenticity cannot be proved, I prefer to disregard it for the time being."

Marton accuses Trevor-Roper of disliking Bernadotte because in 1947 Bernadotte wrote a critical letter to Trevor-Roper about his book, *The Last Days of Hitler*. This letter, says Marton, was "unavailable" to her because it is lost or missing. In fact, the letter—which makes no reference to Jews, is made up largely of a defense of Schellingberg and a mild complaint that the book neglects to give sufficient prominence to Bernadotte's rescue activities—is easily available since Bernadotte asked permission of Trevor-Roper, which was granted, to have their exchange published as a foreword to the Swedish edition of *The Last Days of Hitler*.

Judging Shamir

ALL THIS IS minor stuff, but once one unearths an author behaving tendentiously, doubt is cast on all the material. One begins to look at the text and footnotes and bibliography more carefully. If Bernadotte's bust as hero is being assiduously polished, what is being done to Shamir?

The source for much of Shamir's early life is given in the footnotes as Marton's interviews with an Israeli named Baruch Nadel. "Without Nadel," says Marton, "it would not have been possible for me to breathe life into a forty-five year old murder." Well, perhaps. But Nadel is a well-known character in Israel, one who simply would not be taken as a serious source for material on Shamir or Lehi by any substantial journalist or historian—left- or right-wing—that I could find. Indeed, as the polymath Middle East analyst Eric Breindel (credited by Marton in her book for his guidance on the region) puts it, "Nadel is an engaging personality. But he was, by most accounts, a minor figure at the time of the assassination and some feel that later in life he came to see himself as playing a more pivotal role in the events in question." Marton's other source is the left-wing ideologue Lenni Brenner (not to be confused with Professor Y.S. Brenner), whose thoughts also show up, unattributed, in footnotes referring to articles published by Alexander Cockburn in *The Village Voice*. Lenni Brenner and Baruch Nadel simply cannot provide the basis for a serious book. One senses here the dilemma that faces the inexperienced or—to be less generous—truly tendentious journalist who parachutes into a country and simply has dinner with the wrong people.

One can take issue with the research and the arguments of Marton without being an apologist for Shamir. She points, for example, to the futile attempts of Lehi to make contact with the Nazis in Vichy-occupied Syria during the war, and she sees them as evidence of a pro-Nazi stance and a general pull towards totalitarianism on Shamir's part. What she never grasps is that Lehi—and Shamir—were no more pro-Nazi in 1941 than they were pro-Soviet in 1948, when they briefly wooed the Soviet Union. Lehi was exclusively a nationalist group, pro-Israel, and willing to try to deal with *anyone* who might help the Jews. Which is why, unlike the Irgun which developed into the Likud party, once Lehi dissolved its members could be found all over the political spectrum from the far left to the extreme right. They had no ideology in common and were united only by the common goal of throwing out the alien British and establishing a Jewish state.

The fact is that there was a brief period at the beginning of the Cold War when the Soviet Union simply had not decided whether

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it would be in its national interest to be pro- or anti-Israel, and during that short time, it was in Lehi's interests to try to gain the Soviet Union's support. Indeed, there has always been an assumption in Israeli politics in general and the Mossad (for which Shamir later worked before entering party politics) in particular that for Israel, putting all one's eggs in one basket was hellishly dangerous. After all, there was an entire generation of people out there whose philosophy and careers were staked on traditions of Anglo-Arab, Franco-Arab, and even American-Arab cooperation and for whom the interests of Jews and Israel did not take precedence. Further, it was clear that the greatest potential source of Jewish emigration to Israel was in the Soviet Union or countries in the Soviet sphere of influence.

The question remains: how are we to judge Shamir? In his memoirs and in a subsequent conversation I had with him, Shamir reiterated his stance on the Bernadotte assassination: "The idea was conceived in Jerusalem by Lehi members operating there more or less independently. Our opinion was asked and we offered no opposition." This, of course, is in the tradition of "Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?"

There is a personality trait in some human beings as well as in nations which ascribes an overwhelming importance, superseding all other considerations of humanity, wisdom, and common sense, to the power and the glory of the nation or the tribe. Such human beings will suffer for it, endure famines and torture for it, and die for it. The tribe and national glory are worth any sacrifice—or indeed any barbarism. This attitude may be unattractive to many of us, but if you have it, you measure your achievement by the success of your efforts to make your group significant on the world stage. Which, I suppose, is why, when I asked Shamir, he confirmed Marton's claim that he greatly admires Mao Tse-tung. When I pointed to Mao's mass murders and brutality, Shamir's response was simply to say, "...but China is a world power and Mao was its father."

The trouble with this is transparent: if Stalin or Hitler had been successful (and a case can be made that Stalin was), one would have had to admire them. All the same, I find it difficult to condemn (or condone) Shamir for his attitude to Bernadotte any more than I can condemn the Jewish terrorists for their activities against the British during the late Thirties and Forties. Jews all over Europe were being sent to their deaths, and after the war to internment camps. It was all very well to call for a truce against the British because they were fighting Hitler, but Shamir and his fellow terrorists could see their relatives and families from occupied Europe being turned back from the beaches of Palestine by the British. In judging such matters, I lean to a British Admiralty court hearing that, when faced once with a captain's actions in a particularly complex life-and-death situation, ruled it had no jurisdiction—the circumstances, it said would have to be re-created and experienced in order to render judgment.

What one can properly ask, I think, is whether, later on, Shamir's election as prime minister compounded the stain on Israeli politics that the assassination of Bernadotte created. The answer to that must, I believe, be yes. That election fixed the stain and gave it a sort of good housekeeping seal of approval. If Shamir could only have admitted publicly that, while still believing in the necessity of his action in the desperate days of the Forties, he had realized that his involvement in so terrible a deed would hurt the reputation of the country he loved. It is the inability to see the consequences of such awful, if necessary, acts—the willingness to forgive himself sufficiently to seek and accept the office of prime minister—that frightens me. In this respect Shamir is unlike Menachem Begin who, after the invasion of Beirut and the Shattila refugee camp episode, went into self-imposed exile.

So Kati Marton and this review arrive at the same point in a sense: we both condemn Shamir. But, the route she treads on the way to this conclusion is, in my view, the low road, signposted by banal, left-liberal assumptions which would allow readers to say, if they took

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

her book at face value, that obviously all the good guys in Israel are doves and everyone on the other side of the fence is in the same compound as the mad Goldstein. All the same I think it simplistic to label Marton as a leftist. Her book is not devoid of the sensibility one might expect from the daughter of Hungarian Jews who were persecuted by the communists. What one senses in her writing, and what is indeed explicit in interviews she has given is her formidable ambition and realization that in order to be taken seriously by the mainstream media world, one must endorse the shibboleths, mouth the psychological observations, and endorse history according to the creed of contemporary liberalism.

In the end, Bernadotte and Marton—subject and author—are perfectly suited to one another; there is a curious psychological affinity between the two of them—each overly ambitious and too poorly equipped for the arenas in which they want to play. Perhaps Marton's qualifications to write a book about the Middle East are slightly higher than Bernadotte's were to make peace there, but in the end it comes to the same: two boy scouts setting up pup-tents in minefields. □

Barbara Amiel was senior political columnist for the *Sunday Times* in London until recently, and is a director of the *Jerusalem Post*.

The Cuba In Our Mind

Mark Falcoff

Leslie Bethell, editor, *Cuba: A Short History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 175 pp., $16.95.

Gillian Gunn, *Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 111 pp., $9.95.

Irving Louis Horowitz, *The Conscience of Worms and the Cowardice of Lions: Cuban Politics and Culture in an American Context* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1993), 80 pp., $14.95.

Marifeli Pérez Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 236 pp., $23.00.

Ernest H. Preeg with Jonathan D. Levine, *Cuba and the New Caribbean Economic Order* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1993), 94 pp., $10.50.

WHEN THE SOVIET empire imploded some six years ago, most observers—East and West—assumed that the disappearance of the Castro regime in Cuba was but a matter of time. After all, no member of the socialist family of nations had received such generous economic subsidies from Moscow; none was more culturally vulnerable to outside influences or more geographically exposed; none had made so heavy an ideological investment in Lenin's vision of the future. Having bet on the wrong horse, Castro's Cuba was therefore destined—to borrow Trotsky's durable phrase—for the dustbin of history.

So far, at least, those predictions seem to have proven excessively deterministic. True, in the absence of Soviet oil, machinery, foodstuffs and other consumer products, Cuban living standards have fallen catastrophically, and may not yet have touched bottom. True as well, ordinary Cubans, particularly young people, are deeply alienated from the regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Cuban walls now bear such pungent inscriptions as "Down with You-Know-Who!") Finally, until the recent immigration agreement, unprecedented numbers of Cubans were attempting to leave the island on makeshift boats.

Nonetheless, Castro has never seemed more firmly ensconced in power. Those who have been bold enough over the years to declare themselves his enemies are now dead, in exile, in jail, or cowering in fear of arrest. While everything else in Cuba seems to be breaking down, the repressive apparatus is more effective than ever. The small dissident movement, hounded by the police and government mobs, offers an example of high courage—but no apparent alternative for ordinary Cubans. The very fact of Castro's survival in the face of multiple predictions of his demise seems to have braced up the Cuban dictator psychologically. It has also strengthened the interpretive hand of those of his apologists, supporters, or sympathizers abroad, who would have us believe that, whatever has happened elsewhere in the world, in Cuba—a country once known for rum, cigars, beaches, gambling, and the rhumba—communism has finally found a place where it really "works."

This view is not wholly confined to the far left. Not long ago a right-wing Chilean congressman of my acquaintance urged me to consider the possibility that "in some countries, socialism, that is, Marxist socialism, can become a national project." When I objected that this particular national project seemed destined to starve an entire people to death, he agreed. It was an unpleasant project, he averred, certainly not one he would wish for Chile, but an authentic expression of that particular country's national quest nonetheless. Or consider an excerpt from a cover story of the international edition of *Time* magazine (December 6, 1993). "Through a combination of charisma and pride," wrote senior editor Johanna McGeary, Castro "still holds the island's fate in his hand...Cubans [regard] their revolutionary heroes as Americans do...Che Guevara is their Lafayette, Fidel their George Washington." If this is so, one cannot help wondering why, thirty years on, we are still awaiting the appearance of Cuba's version of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and James Monroe. Or is it rather that Cuba—unlike the United States, France, or for that matter Russia—is somehow capable of surviving indefinitely on the myth of a single cathartic revolutionary moment?

If Cuba turns out, after all, to be the one place in the world where communism really "works," Ernest Preeg has shown us just what "working" really means. In the old days (that is, before 1989), 85 percent of Cuba's trade was with the Soviet Union, 90 percent of which was restricted to *five* primary products. Because it was based not on comparative advantage but purely circumstantial political alignments, this relationship introduced radical distortions into the island's economy. For example, in 1986 Cuba received eight times the world price of sugar for its harvest. This naturally led Castro's planners to increase the acreage devoted to sugar by one third, while reducing that devoted to food products like corn by in some cases as much as 50 percent.

The sudden loss of the Soviet market is therefore a triple blow. There is no ready-made outlet for what Cuba is geared to produce (sugar); the prices it can now command for sugar are a fraction of what it formerly received; and there is no apparent alternative source of foreign exchange. This means not only that there are no resources with which to buy what cannot be produced at home (e.g., foodstuffs), but that new investment to restructure the economy must be postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile, lack of fuel, fertilizer, and spare parts has undercut even the sugar harvest, which did not quite reach four million tons in 1994 (slightly less than half what it was in the heyday of the Cuban-Soviet relationship). It is expected to be even less in 1995.

But Cuba's decline is not merely quantitative, but qualitative as well. As Preeg observes:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuba has become an undeveloping country. Bicycles are replacing automobiles. Horse-drawn carts are replacing delivery trucks. Oxen are replacing tractors. Factories are shut down and urban industrial workers resettled in rural areas to engage in labor-intensive agriculture. Food consumption is shifting from meat and processed products to potatoes, bananas, and other staples.

Cuba is not, of course, the first country in (what used to be called) the Third World to pursue a strategy of autarky leading to de-development. But—given its demonstrated superiority in political repression—it is one of the few countries capable of carrying such policies forward over the longer term. There are precious few loopholes in the system, which means that dogmatism and rigidity will not be as extensively tempered in Cuba (as in, say, Franco's Spain) by inefficiency, corruption, and administrative oversight.

The one area where Cuba can expect to move forward is in tourism, where some European and Canadian concerns have started to make new investments. But in spite of the fulsome claims made, Cuba cannot replicate the past success of Mexico or Spain in this regard, since the effects on the economy as a whole are limited by the small space reserved for market logic by the large, still nearly universal non-market economy. More to the point, an increase of tourist revenues to $250 million by 1995—which seems already to have been achieved—pales into insignificance when compared to the loss of *$6 billion* in Soviet resources since 1989.[1]

There is also much talk of new investments in nickel, sugar, telephones and such basic industries by Mexican, Canadian, British, and other European consortia. There are, in fact, some three hundred foreign firms now operating in Cuba, but most of these have yet to make a new investment commitment; rather they are positioning themselves in the eventuality that the U.S. trade embargo is lifted and the government shifts to a full-scale market rationale. (Presumably they are also betting that no successor-state will penalize them for collusion with the Castro dictatorship, a wager they may just lose.) So far the needed changes have not occurred—not, at least, on a scale sufficient to encourage the investors to move beyond the realm of speculation and marginality.

Stated succinctly, without drastic economic and political reform there is no way out. But of course, to change the system too drastically would render it unrecognizable, and altogether beg the question of whether Cuba has really proven Marx right after all.

Guilt Management as Art Form

OVER THE LAST five years there has been a subtle but perceptible shift in Cuban studies in the United States to take these new realities into account. Whereas formerly much of the emphasis was on the alleged economic and social "successes" of the revolution, particularly in the areas of education and health, today the viability of the regime is located in its historicity, in its deep roots with the Cuban past, and its continuing capacity to validate certain pre-Castro trends and tendencies in Cuban politics—a need which, to follow the logic of the argument, even now is best served by hunger, rationing, repression, and cultural isolation. If one accepts—but *only* if one accepts—the notion that Cuban history is "about" the need for independence from the United States to the exclusion of just about

[1]Cuban estimates of tourist revenues need always to be carefully balanced against the high cost of inputs, since the island is so poorly equipped to provide what is readily at hand elsewhere in the Caribbean. For example, one estimate puts gross tourist revenues for 1993 at $530 million, but discounting profits, commissions, transportation expenses, and direct imports to feed and water the visitors, the Cuban state probably netted about $265 million. "Bridging the Gap: Tourism in the 1990s," *La Sociedad Económica*, No. 29, April 19, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

everything else, then the Castro regime's demonstrated capacity to liberate the island from American influence can be represented as a towering achievement which requires little or no other justification. It is a case of heads I win (things are better because of socialism), or, alternatively, tails you lose (things are better even if they are not).

This intellectual shell game is the subject of Irving Louis Horowitz' *The Conscience of Worms and the Cowardice of Lions*. In a few brief but telling pages, it retraces the crooked path—twisted in both the geometric and moral sense—taken by what we might call "Castrology" in the United States these past three decades. (Several of the other titles under review here appeared too late for inclusion in his survey, but serve to demonstrate the degree to which the problem persists.) Horowitz is particularly qualified to undertake this task, since he is a distinguished sociologist in his own right, and for nearly twenty-five years the editor of *Cuban Communism*, long established in its many editions as the reader of record.

Horowitz reminds us that in its early days (1959-62), the appeal of the Castro regime for the intellectual left in the United States was precisely its utopian, existential characteristics (at last, a non-Stalinist version of revolutionary change!), and those who, *per contra*, pointed to its incipient authoritarian features were dismissed as philistines and Cold War provincials (C. Wright Mills, *Listen, Yankee!*, 1960). Oddly enough, however, these same people expressed no disappointment whatever when Castro shortly thereafter dropped all pretense to "humanism," and adopted the Soviet model, right down to the doorknobs and light switches.

Rather than re-examine their original premises, they simply took refuge in the argument that whatever had gone wrong in Cuba was entirely the fault of the United States. The classic exposition of this argument—guilt-mongering raised to a high art form—is William Appleman Williams' *The U.S., Cuba, and Castro* (1962), and its point of view survives in many quarters of our political culture today, in spite of the many disclaimers the Cuban dictator himself has made on the subject. (Unlike his foreign apologists, Castro fully grasps the contradiction between deploring a policy and celebrating its outcome.)

By 1968 it was clear that the Cuban regime had not made much progress towards economic development, so it was necessary to emphasize its "moral" achievements—such as the elimination of material incentives to productivity. (During this period, which lasted roughly into 1973, Che Guevara rather than Castro was the operative icon.) Castro's periodic quarrels with the Soviets gave the claim a superficial gloss of credibility. Sophisticated European ideologues like K.S. Karol (*Guerrillas in Power*), even argued that Cuba in its revolutionary purity had as its destiny "to reveal to the rest of the world [not merely] the real nature of America's foreign policy," but *also* to "la[y] bare the true nature of the Soviet bloc." "In this revisionist scenario," Horowitz dryly observes, "it was Trotsky, not Stalin, who would provide the blueprint for Cuban happiness."

By the mid-1970s such romantic *jeux d'esprit* were forgotten; Castro had fully dispensed with moral incentives and composed his differences with the Soviets. (Plans to publish a Cuban edition of the complete works of Trotsky were likewise shelved.) Now, in fact, the Maximum Leader was spending much of his time (and a huge percentage of his limited resources) advancing Soviet interests in the Third World through the export of weapons, advice, and soldiers. At that point, many of his American admirers transferred their admiration from literacy campaigns or figures on milk production, to Cuba's putatively selfless "proletarian internationalism" (e.g., the Cuban military adventurism in approved locales like Angola, the Horn of Africa, and later Central America). Strange to say, these were the very same people who were quick to denounce

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Latin American military institutions, the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" state in places like Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the U.S. relationship to both. In other words, and to paraphrase Molotov, *Cuban* militarism (like European fascism in 1940) turned out to be "a matter of taste." This methodological double standard, Horowitz writes, amounts to nothing less than "a subversion of social science in favor of covert political support for a dictatorship."

These are strong words, but if anything they understate the case. Well into the mid-1980s—that is, before the collapse of the Soviet Union—many researchers (notably Andrew Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius) persisted in arguing (in Horowitz' paraphrase) that "unqualified dependence on sugar as a crop [was] overestimated, that Soviet aid ha[d] been greatly exaggerated, and that the rectification process ha[d] been a great success." Only an unforeseen catastrophe—the end of the Socialist Commonwealth of Nations—brought Castrologists up short. Now many of them argue that all of the problems of the island, from the shortage of fuels to the lack of political liberalization, can be directly traced to the continuing U.S. trade embargo.

At the end of the day, then, it appears that we are supposed to judge the Cuban Revolution—an epochal event putatively representing one of the culminating moments in mankind's struggle for liberation and dignity—not on the basis of its production indices, contributions to human welfare, or improvement in the quality of the country's civic and cultural life, but on Castro's success in defying a *trade embargo*. Yet at the same time we are assured that whatever deficiencies persist after thirty-five years of socialism would somehow be corrected—if only American tourists could join with Canadians, Europeans and Latin Americans to gamble and whore once again at Havana's beachfront hotels!

Such logic-defying exercises make sense only if one accepts a monistic interpretation of the island's history, one which confuses the Castro regime with the country, and casts Cuba into the role of eternal victim, exempting it (and its leadership) from any responsibility for its follies or errors. Post-Gorbachev Castrology in the United States thus takes up its position at the point where Cuban nationalism and anti-Americanism (domestic or foreign) intersect.

The centrality of Cuban nationalism to Cuban historiography hardly requires emphasis. Indeed, the two are virtually inseparable. The official canon—which presented the country's struggle for nationhood as a story with a happy ending—was barely established in Cuban school textbooks at the beginning of this century before it was broadly repudiated. Disillusioned by the results of the first two decades of independence (1901-21), successive waves of "revisionists" rummaged through the past to explain their country's lingering deficiencies. These they variously attributed to the island's Spanish heritage, to its emergence as a nation-state three quarters of a century later than other Latin American countries, to the untimely death in 1895 of the great "apostol" of *cubanidad* José Martí, and above all to the United States, whose tardy but decisive intervention in the war of independence (1895-98) all but assured that the new republic would be forced into a quasi-protectorate with its powerful neighbor to the north.

The bill of indictment against the United States was long and detailed, intemperate in tone and relentlessly unforgiving: from the Platt Amendment, by which Washington arrogated to itself the right to intervene in the island (revoked only in 1934), through the two U.S. occupations (1906-09; 1917-22) and the heavy-handed involvement of Ambassador Sumner Welles in the revolution of 1933; to the creation of the "sugar quota" which reserved to Cuba a quarter of the U.S. domestic market (forcing it into a monoculture from which there was no easy escape).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some of the historians who raked these coals back and forth during the 1930s and 1940s, like Emilio Roig de Leuchenring, were communists or at least close to the Cuban party, and they remained on the island after the advent of Castro to enjoy privileged berths in the new state apparatus. But many were not. The most eminent "revisionist" of all was Herminio Portell-Vilá, who from his chair at the University of Havana trained several generations of Cuban students (one of them was, in fact, Fidel Castro) to attribute all of their country's problems to the United States. Such histrionics did not prevent Professor Portell-Vilá from marrying an American, from periodically teaching at American colleges, even from accepting a Guggenheim Foundation grant to finish his multi-volume screed *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con Estados Unidos y España* (1938).

Nonetheless, once Castro began expropriating American companies and goading the United States into suspending the Cuban sugar quota—which is to say, once he began to put his old professor's preachings into practice—Portell-Vilá took the first available ship to Miami. (He later established himself in Washington as an expert on Cuban affairs at one of the more right-wing lobbying groups.) An even more interesting case is that of Carlos Márquez Sterling, whose *Historia de Cuba*, still available as far as I know from an émigré publishing house in Miami, rants against the United States in virtually every chapter except the last—the one which, after all, explains why Señor Márquez Sterling was signing the prologue in Miami rather than Havana.

Revisionist Theories

THE IDEOLOGICAL fit between revisionism and Castroism is too evident to require comment. Rather more interesting, however, is the way that revisionist themes have resurfaced in the work of Cuban-American historians working in the United States, many of them born here or brought to this country as small children. Three particular cases present themselves for our attention. Two are chapters by Louis A. Pérez, Jr. and Jorge Domínguez in Leslie Bethell's portmanteau volume *Cuba: A Short History*. The other is Marifeli Pérez-Stable's *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy*.

For some time now Louis Pérez, Jr. has been the principal exponent of Cuban revisionism in the United States, utilizing the latest social science concepts and techniques to make some of the same points, with the rather different twist that, unlike Portell-Vilá or Márquez Sterling, he has no vested interest in separating the traditional agendas of Cuban nationalism from the Castro regime. Quite the contrary: he sees a significant continuity between the two (which has an interesting political subtext of its own). The particular period with which he deals in this volume is 1930-1959, which is to say, the runup to Castro's seizure of power, but he ranges rather more widely over time to get there.

For example, he dusts off the hoary myth that by 1898 the Cuban insurgents had virtually defeated the Spanish army, and would indeed have obtained independence on their own, had not the United States intervened at the last minute to assure itself control of the new state. This is simply untrue. (We should be grateful, however, that he forebears from claiming—as many Spanish and Cuban historians still maintain—that the United States purposely exploded its own battleship *Maine* to provide an excuse for intervention.)

He dredges up the old arguments against trade reciprocity with the United States (as if there was really much of an alternative for a small country which was shattered by nearly a decade of civil war, and whose colonial elites fled after the collapse of the metropolitan power with what capital they could take with them). "Within a decade of the war of independence," Pérez writes, "the United States had become a pervasive presence in Cuba, totally dominating the economy, thoroughly penetrating the social fabric, and fully controlling the political process." (Of the three

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assertions only the first is at all defensible; the second is true only for the urban elites, and not always them; the third would come as an acute surprise to a succession of hapless American ambassadors who struggled for more than two decades to get a handle on Cuban politics.)

It is certainly true that Cuba in the 1920s and 1930s could hardly be called an independent country in the same sense as was Argentina, Colombia, or even Mexico. American investment and American markets occupied too central a role, and the failure of Cubans to generate a political class with its own sense of self meant that the U.S. embassy in Havana was expected to play a proconsular role, whether it actually did so or not. The situation was anomalous and left the door open for many misunderstandings. Pérez, however, has no feel for ambiguity. Instead, he writes that

> Cuba participated in and depended entirely on the United States economic system in much the same way as U.S. citizens, but without access to U.S. social service programs and at employment and wage levels substantially lower than their North American counterparts.

This amounts to saying that Cuba was a slave-labor colony for American capital, and that the relationship with the United States was entirely one sided. Now, evidently, wage and employment levels in pre-Castro Cuba were substantially lower than in the U.S., but so were living costs. More to the point, thanks to a privileged position in the U.S. sugar market, Cuban living standards were significantly *higher* than most other countries in the region, (and taken as a whole) indeed higher than any Latin American country except for Argentina and Uruguay. True, the gap between urban and rural Cuba was abysmal, as was the lack of adequate social services outside Havana and a few other cities (which by the 1950s nonetheless accounted for nearly half the island's population).

But there was nothing about *the relationship with the United States* that necessarily dictated that the economic benefits of reciprocity had to be distributed in this particular fashion; how successive Cuban governments utilized the island's earnings from sugar, tobacco and rum was a matter of near-total indifference to the U.S. government or private business. What is true is that, like all other primary producing countries, Cuba was highly dependent economically on forces beyond its control—the world price of sugar, the cost of borrowing money, the ups and downs of the U.S. economic cycle. The wonder of it all is that Cuba benefited so hugely from its "dependency." If Castro and his followers missed this point (as Pérez seems to miss it now), it was not lost on the dozens of other countries that lobbied the Senate Agriculture Committee to take Cuba's place when the Eisenhower administration suspended the island's sugar quota in 1960.

Not that all Cuban governments before 1958 were completely insensitive to landlessness, illiteracy, and social injustice. As a matter of fact, at the time of Castro's seizure of power it was one of the more advanced Latin American countries in both social services and labor rights. However, it also suffered from a succession of governments (mostly civilian) who outdid themselves in cynicism, nepotism, and corruption. Pérez is aware of this problem, but apparently regards it as vestigial; instead, he defines the central issue as alleged U.S. pressure to keep Cuba from diversifying its production and trade.

No doubt many Cubans believed that this was the dominant purpose of American policy; it is even possible to find dispatches from American diplomats who thought so as well. On the evidence, American reciprocity did not promote a satisfactory level of Cuban diversification and development. But let the record show as well that its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absence has not done so either: the island today is far more dependent on sugar exports than it was at the time the United States suspended the quota in 1960.

Relative to What?

WHAT HAPPENED after Castro came to power is summarized in fifty-some brisk pages by Jorge Domínguez. A professor of government at Harvard and author of numerous books and articles on Cuba, Domínguez manages to remain faithful to the spirit of revisionism without falling into some of its obvious factual pitfalls. For example, he freely admits that Castro did not request U.S. aid during his first visit to this country as Cuban *supremo* in 1959, but manages to load the blame onto American shoulders nonetheless. "Had such aid been requested and granted, it would have tied Cuba's future closely to the world capitalist economy and to the United States." The revolutionary leaders, he adds, understood this, and also grasped that "it was impossible to conduct a revolution in Cuba without a major confrontation with the United States." Thus Castro and his associates are exonerated in advance from failing to even try to reach an understanding with Washington, while the United States (in its incarnation as a "world capitalist economy") stands condemned for existing at all!

Domínguez's evaluation of the performance of the Castro regime is even more casuistic. He freely admits that there has been a signal inability to increase production or diversify exports and markets—which is to say, Cuban living standards overall have dropped these last thirty-some years. He even concedes that this situation has been greatly aggravated by Castro's penchant for military adventures abroad, which consistently diverted managerial talents and enormous resources into nonproductive outlets. Nonetheless, since the country's economic burdens have been more equitably distributed than before, we can regard the revolution as a "relative success." Relative to what? If the socialization of poverty is a "relative success," one has to wonder whether "relative failure" is even conceptually possible.

Marifeli Pérez-Stable's book seems to promise a good deal more. In the first place, she is sensitive to the full complexities of Cuban politics in the 1950s, and does not fall into the trap of assuming that all roads necessarily lead to Fidel Castro's accession to power. Quite the contrary, she begins by insisting that "social revolution and the ensuing radical transformation of Cuban society were neither inevitable nor aberrational." The old Cuba, she writes, "sheltered these options as well as others that were never or only partially realized."

In two brilliant opening chapters she identifies a persistent structural problem: by the 1950s, sugar had ceased to be the motor of economic growth in Cuba, yet it still outweighed all the other alternatives. Moreover, Cuban politics being what they were, advocates of import-substitution industrialization were isolated and ineffective. (Paradoxically, part of the problem was the relative strength of the labor movement, itself a product of Cuba's unusually advanced version of agro-industry.) Thus, Pérez-Stable writes, Cuba was prevented from generating its own version of "dependent capitalist development," such as occurred in other Latin American countries in the 1950s and 1960s.

These observations are provocative and interesting, inasmuch as they allow us to imagine what might have happened in Cuban history. But they do nothing at all to help us understand the events that actually occurred. Castro's victory over Fulgencio Batista was the product of the dictator's unpopularity, not the need (real or imagined) for some sort of social transformation. Castro understood this better at the time than Pérez-Stable seems to understand it now, since his program before taking power was confined to the restoration of the Constitution of 1940, which was a perfectly bourgeois document to which no one on the island (or for that mat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ter, in the United States) could have taken exception.

Unfortunately, once Castro achieves power, Pérez-Stable's considerable powers of analysis sharply decline. The dividing line between the official version of Cuban events and the author's own account becomes confused and uncertain. The role of the United States is often distorted, sometimes downright wrong.[2] Also, she seems not to fully grasp the difference between Leninist and pluralist approaches to labor history. Clichés like "sovereignty, equality, inclusive development" act as self-justifying props, even though they often describe phenomena quite the opposite of their normally accepted meanings. Cuban society in all of its complexity is suddenly compressed into a one dimension, subsumed under the incantation "Fidel-Revolution-Fatherland."

In these middle chapters, Pérez-Stable veers back and forth between pinpointing the hard facts of Cuban political sociology and attempting to soften their ideological implications. Perhaps the best example is her account of "proletarian power" in socialist Cuba:

> The working class bore the burden of legitimating socialism, but workers did not have the power to make national policies. Their charge was to work hard. The Communist party exercised power on their behalf, and Fidel Castro was the premier expositor of their welfare. The correct proletarian *conciencia* was to abide by party directives and charismatic authority. In that sense, Cuban socialism was like the other contemporary socialist experiences: the working class wielded power vicariously.

What is perhaps most remarkable about this and other similar passages is the peculiar tone in which they are written—as if the revolution were still a promise yet to be tested, rather than something about which there is now a wealth of data based on actual performance. When it comes time to face the bottom line, she has no choice, then, but to let the readers down without much advance warning. After a dizzying ride through thickets of utopian rhetoric and S-curves of socialist triumphalism, Pérez Stable suddenly announces:

> Two decades after the revolution there was still no room for dissent: *Con Cuba o contra Cuba* continued to define Cuban politics. Ninety miles away from the United States and the prosperous Cuban-American communities, the Cuban government surely had to contend with unreasonable comparisons and inordinate expectations. Still, the challenge for Cuban leaders lay in satisfying basic needs—especially in the supply, diversity, and quality of food and other consumer nondurables—more efficiently, and they had barely met it.

This is a bitter pill indeed. To sweeten it, she reverts to a "revisionist" mode by blaming the United States for "undermining the future prospects for political stability in Cuba." After carefully documenting the regime's failures in almost every area of economic and political life, she concludes:

> By giving Fidel Castro cause to appeal to the patriotism of millions of Cubans, the United States was continuing to fuel radical nationalism. Because of U.S. hostility, the Cuban leadership had a credible pretext for refusing to implement meaningful changes, and consequently the probabilities for peaceful transformation were diminishing.

"A credible pretext?" Credible to whom? Perhaps credible to Professor Pérez-Stable,

[2]Though she cites the recently published volume on Cuba for 1958-60 in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, she does not seem to have read it very carefully. Among other things, it clearly reveals that the Eisenhower administration's problem with the Cuban Revolution had nothing to do with economics and everything to do with Castro's decision to align his country with the Soviet Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but not necessarily to the millions of Cubans for whom physical survival has suddenly become a daunting challenge. Nor can Castro himself—with his almost unlimited appetite to power—be so easily dismissed. It is not "hostility from the United States" which is preventing him from embracing "meaningful changes," but a disposition towards absolute rule which by now has calcified ideologically. Indeed, "bourgeois" logic alone would suggest that, on the contrary, such "meaningful changes," if carefully contained, might actually bolster up Castro's rule for as long as he requires (which is to say, for the rest of his life).

The Most Efficient Jailor

IN THE PAST, writers broadly sympathetic to the revolution tended to deny the regime's political deficiencies altogether. They also emphasized the Cuban dictator's success in attaining a truly independent role in world affairs. Today the same people (or the same kind of people) have shifted into cognitive reverse. Now the order of the day is to depict Castro and his regime as basically shaped by the vectors of American policy. This allows them to squarely and unsentimentally face the deteriorating economic, political and human rights situation while at the same time exempting Castro from any major responsibility for it.

In this category the *pièce de résistance* is Gillian Gunn's *Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy*, which has had some modest success in left-liberal foreign policy circles. Its author, who directs the Cuba Project at Georgetown University, is a frequent visitor to Cuba, and chairs a study group which makes it possible for the Washington policy community to meet upper-middle level Cuban officials. Her public posture is one of objectivity and dispassion; how convincing it is depends wholly upon the disposition, sophistication, and specialized knowledge of her readers.

Although she pretends to strike a certain equidistance between the two countries, in *Cuba in Transition*, at least, Gunn embraces a curious double standard. On one hand, there is Cuban nationalism, in whose name all manner of sins can be forgiven. On the other, we have U.S. responses to Cuban misdeeds, which even when strictly limited to verbal reprimands, merit a firm rap on the wrist. The analysis moves back and forth between positing a connection between economics and politics, and conceding that none exists. The arguments are often circular and repetitious; at times they are also extremely disingenuous.

Let it be said straightaway that Gunn is clearly in favor of some sort of *economic* reform in Cuba. She has evidently spent time with people on the island of like mind. On the other hand, she, like they, fears that swift *political* change "could jeopardize not only the current regime, but, far more importantly, Cuban sovereignty." She characterizes the current political scene as

> polarized and tense...Fear of U.S. intervention or domination, fear of racism, fear of losing the social safety net, fear of chaos, and the retribution it might occasion—all these deeply ingrained, historically rooted aspects of Cuban political culture [have been] manipulated by the propaganda machine to justify political stagnation.

In this mix, Washington's posture, she writes, "has made it easy for those opposing political reform to create a false bond between intransigence and nationalism." (At other points in the text she insists that the bond is far from false.) Surprisingly, however, Gunn's principal target is not the U.S. economic embargo, but rather Washington's failure to understand the centrality of Castro's role, without whom no change in Cuba is possible. Indeed, we are counseled to be grateful to him for the tiny measure of economic liberalization the country has already experienced:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Had the party been in power absent Castro [she writes] it would have been far more difficult to obtain...acquiescence. With Castro at the helm, the Cuban political machine is like a large ship with one captain. Though it turns slowly, the ship of state moves as a cohesive unit.
>
> Without Castro, Cuba could resemble a flotilla of small ships, each with its own captain and a different idea of what direction to take. Such a chaotic atmosphere is conducive to violence.

This statement fairly takes one's breath away, since it revives (in different ideological guise) justification for personalistic dictatorship previously employed in places like Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile, even Trujillo's Dominican Republic: namely, that however regrettable, a suffocating authoritarianism is the only conceivable form of government for a given country, since the alternative is not democracy but "chaos" and "violence." Even more disingenuous is Gunn's argument that there is a "rough correlation" between the Cuban government's "sense of vulnerability and its willingness to tolerate dissent." *Q.E.D.*, those of us who wish to see more space for independent political thought and action in Cuba should do everything we can to *reassure* the Cuban government that it has nothing to fear from us. This we can do by moderating the embargo, cooling our rhetoric, and engaging in "negotiations." We are also enjoined to address the "anxiety of the poor." According to Gunn, the Cuban poor fear

> that change will result in the destruction of the social safety net and return of white exiles perceived to have outdated racial attitudes, and the security network's preoccupation that upheaval will let loose both internal and external revenge seekers.

Now, to believe that the lack of political liberalism in Cuba is the product of external threats is to reveal a political illiteracy of the most startling kind. Evidently, there is a relationship between the two on the ideological and rhetorical level, but to go much farther than that amounts to regarding Castro as a helpless victim of larger forces, rather than—like all dictators—an actor who has consciously chosen his role. The fact that his country must face the consequences along with him is tragic, but in no way alters the basic facts of the matter.

As for the Cuban poor, the United States is ill-placed, to put it mildly, to reassure it that what remains of its social safety net will survive the Castro regime, since we seem congenitally unable to agree on the size and cost of our own. The point is becoming increasingly moot anyway, since those services are rapidly unraveling from lack of resources (the absence of a Soviet subsidy). One cannot conclude discussion of this point, by the way, without taking issue with Gunn's arch comment that Cuban concern with social justice "is not a Castro invention...[and] therefore...will not disappear as a source of friction with the United States," as if our problems with Cuban governments past and present have somehow been driven by a repugnance for school lunch programs and free medical care!

Towards the end of her book, Gunn seems herself to have lost confidence in some of her arguments, since she suddenly reverts to the panic mode. If the United States fails to change its policies, it could produce street protests, leading to violence, civil war, and U.S. military intervention ("not at all conducive to building a democratic system and a liberal economy"). She also threatens us with a huge bill for peacemaking and reconstruction costs (entirely overlooking congressional parsimony in the cases of Nicaragua, Panama, and now Haiti). She does not anticipate what happened last year—not civil war, but a spurt of outmigration, explicitly provoked by Castro. This was inconvenient for the United States, but hardly apocalyptic (and with the additional benefit to the Cuban dictator of relieving him of yet more opponents to his regime).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unquestionably the crisis of the Cuban economy and society affects the United States, if for no other reason than geographical proximity. But such is the curious relationship between the two societies that it is often difficult to decide who has won each successive round. For example, the recent agreement for the forcible repatriation by the U.S. of future Cuban boat people would seem to be a victory for Castro, in the sense that it amounts to recruiting him as the most efficient jailor we can find. However, by removing the escape valve of immigration to the United States, the accord may actually increase internal pressures for political change—more rapidly and even more explosively than anyone, least of all the Clinton administration, had in mind.

The United States, then, is supremely relevant to Cuba's future without possessing the powers to determine its ultimate shape. But the dilemma facing the island is far worse: if, as so many of our authors contend, the driving force of Cuban politics remains today—as it was fifty or sixty years ago—a peculiarly perverted version of Ruritanian nationalism, more's the pity, since there is nothing (save plunging the entire North American continent under water) that can relieve the island of "unreasonable comparisons and inordinate expectations."

Nor is there anything that can be done to reassure the Cuban government that in the event of normalization of relations with the United States, its "sovereignty" will be respected. The terms of this argument are remarkably antique, since nowadays it is not treaties but impersonal economic and demographic forces which govern relations between large states and small. What kind of sovereignty is it, anyway, that is only available as a gift from a self-effacing neighbor? The fact is that Cuba's alleged aspiration to survive as an entity wholly independent of the United States can only be met by prolonging its isolation indefinitely. (Critics of U.S. policy like Gunn, so worshipful of Cuban sovereignty, fail to see the contradiction.) Such isolation exacts a horrible price from the population as a whole, which is why one is inclined to wonder whether the island's political culture is really quite as frozen in time as we are so often told.

If there is a correlation between the external and internal dynamics of Cuban politics it is certainly not the one that Gunn has suggested. Rather, the operative relationship is between Cuba's geopolitical weakness and its deliberate political choices. Even if we assume that those choices were made freely by the majority at some point in the past—a debatable proposition, to say the very least—there is such a thing as the right to change one's mind. (Most people on the island today were not even around when the country supposedly opted for its present dispensation.) The Cubans Gunn happens to know tell her that they do not wish to abandon the existing economic model, and would rather starve to death than return to the U.S. sphere of influence. Perhaps. But until all Cubans can be freely consulted at the ballot box, the rest of us have the right to remain skeptical—of the regime, of its claims to legitimacy, and of the peculiar refractions of both in the lens of American social science. □

Mark Falcoff is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is at work on a book on U.S.- Cuban relations since 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Perils of Xenophilia

Fred C. Iklé

Sir James Goldsmith, *The Trap* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1994), 207 pp., $20.00.

SIR JAMES Goldsmith wastes no words to get to the heart of the matter. "I do not accept," he declares on the first page of *The Trap*, "that economic growth is the principle measure of the success of nations." At first blush, this may sound banal. Who in his right mind *would* accept economic growth as the principle measure of the success of nations? But upon a moment's reflection, we realize that nowadays nearly everyone does so, and without hesitation.

Worse yet, the most widely used yardstick to measure a nation's economic growth and hence its "success"—the Gross National Product—is deeply flawed. As James Goldsmith reminds us, GNP accounts only for activities that give rise to monetary transactions, hence a shift of activities from the informal economy into the monetized, official economy will register as economic growth. For example, when a farmer stops growing a variety of crops to feed his family and shifts to a single crop to be sold on the marketplace, he might produce and receive less value; yet, the GNP is inevitably increased. Moreover, GNP measures activity, not well-being. "If the crime rate increases," notes Goldsmith, "GNP grows as more police join the force and prisons are built."

"Old hat!" any self-respecting member of the economics profession will respond: these details about the GNP are taught in sophomore economics. What sophomores are likely to be taught, however, is merely that GNP, like most economic measures, has some inaccuracies. (Paul Samuelson's perennial textbook, *Economics*, treats the exclusion of non-monetarized production from the GNP in a brief aside, as one of those inevitable inaccuracies of economic data.) Even though GNP can be totally misleading (not just a trifle inaccurate) as a means of gauging a nation's growth in wealth and well-being, it is being used to this end by politicians, foreign aid officials, journalists, editors, investment managers, indeed by nearly everyone.

James Goldsmith's warning against excessive reliance on GNP estimates blends well into his gravamen against today's conventional wisdom on economic policy—his charge against GATT that made *The Trap* a bestseller in France and England. The arguments on behalf of free trade have a venerable ancestry that traces to David Hume, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo. The division of labor, in Adam Smith's words, increases "opulence," though "the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor" is limited by "the extent of the market." It seems to follow that the greater the extent of the market, the greater the opulence—or, in modern speak, the bigger the GNP.

These ideas from the old classics have since been amply enriched by economic theories and quantitative analyses, and after World War II they gained a powerfully persuasive grip on nearly everyone involved in trade policies. He who is opposed to global free trade is called a protectionist, which is nearly as derogatory as being called a racist. Protectionism has been blamed for the Great Depression (and hence World War II) and today is held responsible, at least in part, for the poverty in the Third World.

It must have been such guilt feelings about Third World poverty that moved leftist political elites in Europe and the United States toward supporting global free trade, thus abandoning their usual allies in the labor unions. That is to say, to the left of the polit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical spectrum, where homegrown protectionist sentiment surely used to carry more weight than Adam Smith and free market purism, infection by xenophilia was enough to turn opinions around.

Among conservatives, whose immune system against xenophilia is less impaired, it was of course the enthusiasm for free market policies that won the argument for free trade. For example, after the collapse of the Mexican peso, the Heritage Foundation's distinguished conservatives drew the moral that "the setbacks suffered by free trade, in fact, require that the U.S. redouble its efforts...[reaffirming its] commitment to free trade with Asia and Latin America."

It takes a conservative as thoughtful as *National Review* editor John O'Sullivan to allow that "our obligations to our fellow citizens outweigh those to outsiders." No vaccine against xenophilia needed here. Nonetheless, the intellectuals' jubilation throughout the world about our ever-expanding, homogenizing, perpetually-GNP-increasing global market creates a sense of inevitability even among the wisest of conservative thinkers. At the time of the debate about GATT, when John O'Sullivan was bold enough to make the politically incorrect distinction between fellow citizens and "outsiders," he added with a touch of resignation that "protectionism protects no one for long; it merely postpones economic change at the cost of making it more disruptive in the end" (*National Review*, November 29, 1993).

To speak up today against the global free market takes a burly temperament and a thick skin. Hence, the field tends to be left to a Pat Buchanan, a Ross Perot, or—a Jimmy Goldsmith. To make his case, Goldsmith first reminds us of a fundamental difference between today's world and that of Ricardo's times: the global demographic revolution, which had barely begun in Europe when Adam Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations*, has now reached its full momentum in the Third World. A global free market will economically merge the eight to nine hundred million people of the developed, industrialized nations with the four billion people (over six billion within thirty years) of the poor countries.

In the poor countries today three billion people still live on the land. But warns Goldsmith:

> If GATT manages to impose worldwide the sort of productivity achieved by the intensive agriculture of nations such as Australia, then it is easy to calculate that about two billion of these people will become redundant. Some of these GATT refugees will move to urban slums. But a large number of them will be forced into mass migration....We will have profoundly and tragically destabilized the world's population.

Those optimistic about the miracles of economic growth will counter by advocating faith in the "demographic transition," according to which a growing GNP slows population growth. But even if this transition occurs it will change demographic facts only after these billions of people have been displaced and perhaps many of them driven onto "illegal immigrant" ships, like those that have recently been trying to reach our shores from China.

That the spread of intensive agriculture can destabilize societies is hard to refute. But it is also hard to imagine what could prevent this spread from eventually reaching every corner of the globe. Besides—in sharp disagreement with Sir James—policymakers and agronomists regard intensive farming as one of the most beneficial developments of our time and want to hasten it along everywhere.

Quite apart from changes in agriculture, today's Third World demographics are adding billions of young people to the internal labor markets of those countries, markets which GATT is destined to make global. Even if these youths can be prevented from entering Europe or North America in search of jobs, GATT will provide the legal and regulatory endorsement to move jobs to them. Given the modern means of communication and transport, and the ease of exporting capital, even high-technology and service jobs will be moved to take advantage of the much lower wages of the enormous Third

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World labor pool. For, as Goldsmith observes, "forty-seven Vietnamese or forty-seven Filipinos can be employed for the cost of one person in a developed country such as France."

Although consumers in the developed world will have access to cheaper imported goods, the real cost to them "will be that they will lose their jobs, get paid less for their work, and have to face higher taxes to cover the social cost of increased unemployment." And in the developing countries, Goldsmith reminds us, "a small handful of people controls the overwhelming majority of the nation's resources...Thus it is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries." Well put. The definitive symptom of xenophilia is that you care more for distant, unknown people than for your neighbor.

What is to be done? James Goldsmith recommends replacing the concept of global free trade with regional free trade. But when he wrote the first edition of *The Trap*, the reformed GATT was not yet a done deal. Now it is acquiring its own bureaucracy, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Nothing is harder to eliminate in the modern age than intestinal parasites in poor countries and established bureaucracies in rich countries. It would take a popular revolution to stop the march of GATT. Sir James chose the title of his book well.

There may be some hope left. From time to time in our democracies the voters feel sufficiently provoked to command a new policy that runs smack against trendy thinking. And if the new policy shows merit, others will rush to support it, starting a political movement that will—given some staying power and good leadership—itself become the new prevailing wind. Then the whole flotilla will sail with it.

Reducing taxes is an idea now much in vogue among American politicians, particularly since the successful referendum initiative in California seventeen years ago. Similarly, the new idea of term limits for members of Congress has been endowed with political strength by citizens' referenda that succeeded in several states.

Again, last November "ordinary" citizens in California had the courage to sail against the prevailing wind by launching a referendum to cancel the government's invitation to illegal immigrants. Before its two-to-one approval, this referendum was vehemently denounced as "racist" and "xenophobic" by several establishment pundits, as well as by California's limousine libertarians who feared losing their cheap maids and gardeners.

While California voters could not legislate the necessary federal action, they did start a new wind blowing. As with cutting taxes, others will rally to the cause until the new thinking overpowers the current conventional wisdom that defines open borders as a blessing, the United States as an "immigrant country," and America's spiritual destiny as multiculturalism.

Many of the leading media chose not to review *The Trap*, or, if they did, they condescendingly wondered how someone could be so successful in his global businesses and yet so uneducated in international economics. But those who thought they could ridicule and shrug off the message of *The Trap* came to the wrong address. Goldsmith is not some political dilettante collecting the first few signatures for a citizen's referendum. He is an immensely successful entrepreneur with far-flung investments in mining, forestry products, and other businesses, including even a distinguished French magazine. With roots in England and France, he took seriously his responsibilities as a citizen of the new Europe: he co-founded a new political movement (now active mainly in France and England); and he was elected (in France) to the European Parliament in Strasbourg where he is leading a new parliamentary group. He could be the man who will lead Europe out of The Trap. □

Fred C. Iklé was undersecretary of defense policy in the Reagan administration and is currently a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sin of Ignoring the Past

Williamson Murray

Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 300 pp., $39.95.

CARL BUILDER of the RAND Corporation has written a controversial study of the decreasing influence of air power theory on the culture of the United States Air Force. In effect he argues that the air force has lost its bearings since its creation at the start of the Cold War. Unless it finds some reasonable intellectual direction and reconceptualizes its role in national security, Builder argues, it is in danger of disappearing entirely, as the other services assume the missions and purposes for which the air force was created. To a great extent this charge hits the mark, but it reflects a symptom rather than the illness itself.

This could have been an important book, particularly as new leadership assumes control of the air force. Unfortunately, Builder's account of air power theory is devoid of a solid historical context, misses a substantial body of evidence that suggests that the record is even worse, and ends with ahistorical and implausible claims about the direction in which the world is moving as it enters the twenty-first century. Thus, two separate forces pull at the reviewer: on one hand, the need to suggest the general inadequacies of Builder's research, methodology, and understanding of the dimensions of the problem; on the other, a desire to sketch out why in the larger sense Builder is right in arguing that the air force is currently close to intellectual and spiritual bankruptcy, and that only a massive effort to alter its "corporate culture" will change the course on which it is currently embarked: disestablishment as an independent service.

Certainly, something has gone seriously wrong with the institution's internal compass. I remember encountering a marine officer during the mid-1980s at the Naval War College who questioned a lecture I had given on the driving belief of airmen in the 1920s and 1930s in the crucial importance of air power to America's strategic future. "But sir," he commented, "my fiancée is an air force pilot and I know lots of air force officers; they are wonderful people. But when talk turns to war and tactics and operations, their eyes glaze over and they quickly move on to discussions of their careers, or what the airlines are offering. They certainly aren't anything like the airmen whom you described in your lecture." Builder attempts to explain how the service lost that driving belief in its mission as a combat organization.

Unfortunately, though, Builder suffers from some of the same ignorance of history of which he accuses the air force. He has presented a hurried, slapped together product that contains nothing in the way of original primary research and little serious analysis. The sections dealing with the development of air power theory in the 1920s and 1930s, and the discussions of air operations in World War II, largely consist of quotations strung together. Even Builder's knowledge of secondary sources is sketchy. His main sources are Michael Sherry's tendentious study of the use of American air power and the memoirs of various officers and policymakers. He draws on little of the substantial rethinking that has occurred about the strategic bombing of Nazi Germany during World War II. It is not that his account of the development of air power theory and its impact on World War II is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wrong, but that it fails to tell us much that is new or interesting. Worse, as Builder moves into the post-World War II period his understanding diminishes, and what he fails to understand lies at the root of the present problems: airmen have consistently rejected the evidence of past experience, virtually from the first moment that they thought about developing the airplane as a particular form of war.

Theory Without Evidence

AIR POWER theory in the 1920s and 1930s centered on an explicit claim that World War I had no relevance to the next war. Air power advocates argued that they would dominate future conflict precisely because they would remain unfettered by the dogmas of the past. Only Billy Mitchell made a conscious effort to emphasize the most obvious lesson of World War I's air combat—namely that air forces would have to gain air superiority by defeating opposing air forces before they could exploit the other possibilities that air power offered. But the stridency of Mitchell's advocacy concealed the fundamental truth of his understanding: while air power functioned in a new dimension, it would succeed or fail in war in accordance with the laws that had governed war throughout the ages. Much of the terrible cost that British and American bomber crews eventually paid in the skies over Nazi Germany was a direct result of an almost ideological rejection of Mitchell's arguments, as well as of the experiences of World War I. It reflected a dogmatic faith on the part of air commanders that the bomber would always get through.

Thus, the airmen of the 1930s—with the possible exception of those in Germany—turned their back on the past. And so have subsequent generations. World War II should have shattered their illusions. While air power played a crucial role in Allied victory, it could not win the war by itself. It moved attrition from the trenches of the World War I battlefield to the skies over Europe and the Pacific. It did have a serious impact on the morale of enemy populations and on the production of armaments, but without war on the sea and on the ground its achievements would have meant nothing.

Yet airmen emerged from World War II bathed in the glow of their contribution to Allied victory. In the Pacific that victory came with stunning suddenness at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and unfortunately, the start of the atomic age allowed airmen to ignore the disturbing questions that World War II should have raised about the employment of air power. Certainly they had the right to believe that the Combined Bomber Offensive was a crucial element in the defeat of Nazi Germany, along with victory in the Battle of the Atlantic and the battles on the Eastern Front. But they lost opportunities to learn more sobering lessons. While there was a detailed examination of the impact of bombing on the German war economy by the Strategic Bombing Survey, no similar effort assessed the operational and tactical effects of the air campaigns.

In the postwar world air force leaders basked in their independence from the army. The air force soon established itself as the pre-eminent service for the next two decades. Its emphasis, as Builder rightly observes, remained firmly on technology:

> This is the catechism: If the Air Force is to have a future of expanding horizons, it will come only from understanding, nurturing, and applying technology. There is a circle of faith here: If the Air Force fosters technology, then that inexhaustible fountain of technology will ensure an open-ended future for flight; which, in turn, will insure the future of the Air Force.

Even this love of technology was soon restricted to the narrowly circumscribed arena of manned flight. As Builder puts it: "The strategy was flawed, not so much by what it drew from air power theory, but by its narrow focus on means (which were predominantly manned airplanes) and by its expanded interpretation of ends to include all uses of mili-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tary air planes...." And so, Builder argues, in its concern for the means, the air force forgot its fundamental purpose, the application of military power through the air to achieve larger goals. There is much truth in this, but it hardly represents the full picture of how the air force has arrived at its current straits.

Controlling the "Aerospace Continuum"

IN THE LAST part of *The Icarus Syndrome*, Builder sets forth his views of the emerging world order and of the air force's place in America's strategic and operational response to that world. Builder believes, along with many others, that the current information explosion has resulted in a situation in which governments and nation-states will play a diminished role in human affairs. In addition, growing interdependence between nations created by the global economy will create a situation in which major wars between nations will become increasingly unlikely. In a line that could have been written by the optimists in 1913—virtually was written by Norman Angell—Builder claims that

> the risks of large-scale, organized warfare have become more of a threat to future trade profits; they now jeopardize existing purposes and capital...Thus, information technology erodes both the motivation and the capability for nationalist conquest.

How best to prepare the air force for its roles in such a new world order? Why, by providing a new mission statement:

> The mission of the air force is the military control of the aerospace continuum in support of the national interests.

And a new theory:

> In the emerging, less controllable world of global commerce and borderless nations, the military medium of dominance and, hence, of choice to power elites will be the aerospace continuum because of its universal, rapid access and unique vantage point. Hence, the control of that medium, more than any other, will offer the widest range of military options and the highest degree of military power.

Such is Builder's solution to the deepset problems of the current air force culture.

It is in these projections for the future that Builder's sketchy understanding of history has its most serious consequences. As the events of the past five years make abundantly clear, the information revolution has had virtually no impact on the level of combat in an old-fashioned, conventional sense. While it is dangerous to predict the future, history certainly suggests that the nation-state, or something very much like it, will be around for the foreseeable future. The nasty reality is that national communities show no inclination to disappear into multinational corporations or information revolutions. History is not dead. Consequently, it is more, not less likely that the United States will need traditional forms of military power throughout the next century.

Builder's new mission statement and theory of air power also represent a symptom of the disease that has done the air force in: a fundamental unwillingness to recognize that the service is a military force whose primary, overarching purpose—some might say its sole justification as a separate service—is to kill people from the air, wreck their armed forces, and destroy their cities, crops, and the produce of their labors.

The problem—a problem of denial, lies at the heart of the institution's culture. The early airmen, both theorists and practitioners, had no doubts that the fundamental task of air power was war. This fact has been all but forgotten through the years; one of the few senior air force generals to remember it, Michael Dugan, was sacked for mentioning it in public. The Gulf War provided a wonderful laboratory for the study of the evolving possibilities of air power, in combination with the technological revolution of the last decade. Instead, in a rush "back to the future" the air

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force showed itself so uninterested in establishing a "general lessons learned" analysis of that war that the secretary of the air force was forced on his own authority and his own money to establish an analysis group, the Gulf War Air Power Survey.

Efficiency Versus Effectiveness

THERE IS A larger, though related, problem in thinking about air power: it is relatively easy to characterize preparations for war in the air and their actual conduct in terms of their *efficiency*. On the other hand it has proven difficult, even after the event, to get a firm handle on the actual *effectiveness* of air operations. It is this complex dichotomy between efficiency and effectiveness that has bedeviled serious attempts to think through the true contribution of air power, even in an historical sense.

It is easy in peacetime to calculate air power potential in terms of operationally-ready rates, sortie generation capabilities, circular error of probabilities, ton-mile capabilities, and on and on. Such criteria break down into simple, clear, understandable figures of mathematical precision. If your unit achieves a 70 percent operationally-ready rate, generates a certain number of sorties within a given period of time, intercepts 80 percent of incoming enemy aircraft, and drops so many bombs within the target area, then the unit is judged combat ready and you have passed your inspection.

In war the numbers lose their significance. We have an almost endless parade of figures on air operations in World War II by the various air forces that conducted the air war. We know how many tons of bombs Bomber Command, Eighth Air Force, and Fifteenth Air Force dropped month by month; we know how many bombers sortied day by day against which set of targets, what percentage of aircraft was lost due to enemy action or accident, how those percentages changed month by month, what crew losses were, how many aircraft successfully dropped their bombs, and even in general terms the degree of bombing accuracy. But what really mattered were the effects, tangible and intangible, that all these figures do not catch—the indirect impact of bombing on enemy morale, the confusions and disruptions that bombing caused to the enemy economic structure, the destruction of its air force in the air rather than as a result of bombing, the collapse of the enemy's transportation system and the impact of that collapse on its economy and military forces. Many of these effects remained opaque to the commanders who waged the air campaign. The fact that historians still argue about the macro-effects of that great bombing campaign suggests how difficult it is, even with relatively complete records on both sides, to determine the true effectiveness of air operations.

Politicians and nations pay military forces to come up with tangible results. Armies can at least point to territory conquered; navies to the number of ships sunk. But air forces usually have little tangible evidence as to the real effectiveness of their strikes against targets. Not surprisingly then, air forces have attempted to overcome this embarrassment by focusing more and more on the numbers that record their efficiency rather than their effectiveness. The U.S. Air Force's approach to Vietnam, for example, became in effect an exercise in producing enormous numbers of figures, rather than in trying to maximize the effectiveness of air power. Night bombing F-4s had their flare dispensers removed to increase the number of tons dropped; C-130s carted useless cargoes back and forth between air bases in Vietnam; to maximize the reported tonnages, squadron administrative officers competed with each other in writing up the largest numbers of citations; squadrons kept tabs of hooches, fox holes, dugouts, trucks, and other assorted items destroyed.

The source of this pursuit of numbers was a belief that destruction of targets was equivalent to achievement of significant results. This reductionist approach was on show in a portion of the Gulf War's air campaign. The attack on Iraqi forces over the forty days preceding the ground war reflected an approach in which air planners simply racked up tar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gets—so many tanks, so many artillery pieces, so many ammunition dumps, etcetera—and then worked their way down from the top of the list. Nowhere in the planning documents for the air war against Iraqi ground forces was there an effort to use air power in an operational sense, as a lever to gain larger strategic effects by attacking certain portions of the enemy's ground structure, to cripple the whole. Given the fact that the Iraqis had a number of months to prepare for the coming coalition attack, such targets admittedly may not have existed, but the absence of discussions of such possibilities among those planning the air attacks against the Iraqi army is most revealing.

Luckily for the course of the war, those who guided the planning of the air war against Iraq and its sophisticated air defense system used a different approach. But their attempt to plan an operational-level campaign against Saddam's regime was not typical of air force leadership as a whole, while the difficulties they encountered in conducting that campaign underlined how little intellectual preparation at the operational level the air force had done.

In effect, Builder's argument is that the air force should return to the traditional conceptions of the air power theorists of sixty years ago. He argues that the service should abandon everything but the ability to strike deep into the heart of the enemy nation in the belief that such attacks are invariably decisive. What he misses—and what the air power theorists missed in their own day—is that air power, like ground power or naval power, must aim at achieving operational-level effects on the enemy.

And indeed the operational impact of air power has been astonishing over the past sixty years. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that air power has often been at its most effective as an operational asset supporting the goals of naval or ground power. On the banks of the Meuse on May 13, 1940, the Luftwaffe played a crucial operational role in opening the door for Guderian's panzers to break into the open; in early June 1942 naval air power destroyed four Japanese carriers and permanently altered the balance between naval forces in the Pacific; in 1943 and 1944 in the Southwest Pacific, land-based air provided a significant operational margin that enabled MacArthur to break through to the Philippines; and in 1944 American air power broke the back of the Luftwaffe and gained air superiority over the entire continent, while destroying the German petroleum network and wrecking the transportation networks of France and Germany. These were operational-level uses of air power, and only in the last case did air power operate largely on its own.

To be effective in the next century, airmen must think of air power on the operational level rather than as a mere attempt to service targets. If they persist in the belief that putting four ships on targets and racking up impressive totals of bombs dropped are what matter, or fall back on the nostrum that they can always reach deep into the enemy's country, they will do themselves and their country an enormous disservice. If they wish to survive as something more than another bureaucratic organization in Washington, they need to think seriously about their history, their purpose, and about the fundamental unchanging nature of war. If they are not willing to undertake such a critical reassessment they may well be headed towards extinction. In that case the new uniform so thoughtfully provided by the recent air force chief of staff may be seen as symbolic: suitable garb for a wonderful transition to the world of airline flying. □

Williamson Murray is professor emeritus at Ohio State University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Expanding NATO:
An Exchange between Odom and his Critics

Stephen Sestanovich:

WILLIAM ODOM [Spring 1995] insists that expanding NATO will actually be good for Russian democracy and believes he can prove his point by sitting us "Russia firsters" down for a little history lesson. He reminds us that, under both autocracy and communism, major military defeats gave a boost to reform. The Crimean War, emancipation of the serfs; World War I, the February Revolution; Afghanistan, perestroika. Get the idea? This pattern, which has been (to put it mildly) noticed before, argues for tough policies when dealing with dictatorships. But does it also tell us, as Odom seems to think, how to deal with the regimes that follow dictatorship? By his logic, we might actually be led to view the defeats that Germany inflicted upon Russia *after* the February Revolution as just another form of pro-democratic "pressure." Lenin, who picked up the pieces, knew better. (And so, of course, does Zhirinovsky, who will be extremely satisfied by Odom's tacit suggestion that NATO expansion ranks with Russia's greatest military defeats!)

The deeper problem with this kind of defense of NATO expansion is not the misreading of history on which it is based. It is the suggestion that such a momentous step can be taken at no cost. If expansion were going to help Russian democracy, who would be against it? Since it won't, we have to decide what we really want. Those who favor expansion no matter the cost are part of a serious discussion. Those who simply say there aren't any costs are not. □

Stephen Sestanovich is vice president for Russian and Eurasian Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ted Galen Carpenter:

ALTHOUGH WILLIAM Odom's brief for the prompt expansion of NATO responds (with sporadic effectiveness) to some of the objections raised by opponents, it glosses over or ignores many of the most telling criticisms. His analysis especially fails to come to grips with three crucial issues.

First, if NATO expansion is confined to the four Visegrad powers, it is not clear how that step will solve the problem of uncertainty and instability elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. As Fred Iklé has pointed out, limited expansion would merely push the "zone of instability" further to the east while implicitly consigning those nations not tapped for membership to a Russian sphere of influence. Yet as Odom himself seems to concede, incorporating the other former Warsaw Pact states—not to mention Ukraine and the Baltic republics—would raise a variety of thorny problems, including the provocation of Russia.

Second, Odom does not clarify how NATO's security commitments can be made credible to either new members or potential adversaries. It is unlikely that the nervous Central European states will be satisfied with the paper promise of assistance contained in Article 5. Sooner or later they will want NATO tripwire forces, including U.S. units, stationed on their territory. The coyness of NATO expansionists—for example Zbigniew Brzezinski's comment that troop deployments should not take place "initially"—suggests that such a follow-on measure is more than a remote possibility. Two generations of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Atlanticists have insisted that substantial numbers of U.S. troops (and nuclear weapons) must be stationed on the Continent to reassure the West Europeans of Washington's commitment to their defense. Are Atlanticists now arguing that new members of NATO, in a region that has never been as important as Western Europe to the United States strategically or economically, will be satisfied with mere paper guarantees?

Finally, Odom's contention that an enlarged NATO would contribute to greater stability in Eastern Europe begs the question of how the alliance can avoid being caught up in the many disputes that bedevil that region. Article 5 obligates all members to aid a treaty partner victimized by aggression from any source—not merely a revanchist Russia. Is the United States really prepared to incur the costs and risks of intervening in a conflict, for example, between Hungary and Romania over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania?

The enlargement case presented by Odom is merely one manifestation of a desperate search for new missions to justify NATO's existence in the post-Cold War world. NATO officials have also urged the alliance to embark on an effort to contain Islamic fundamentalism. Former Secretary of State James Baker III would have NATO intervene "anywhere and under any circumstances" when peace and stability in Europe are threatened. Accordingly, he suggests that the alliance take steps to protect Macedonia, by warning that country's neighbors, "even NATO-member Greece," that adventurism would be met with force. The notion that NATO should go to war against one of its own members to protect a tiny nation in the congenitally turbulent Balkans indicates just how dangerously fevered NATO supporters have become in their search for a new role to stem the alliance's growing irrelevance.

Odom's argument for expansion reflects the conventional wisdom of Atlanticists that the United States must remain Europe's pacifier in the post-Cold War era through Washington's continuing leadership of NATO. To remain intact, the alliance obviously needs a mission that is more credible than guarding the Fulda Gap against an invasion by the nonexistent Warsaw Pact. Enlarging NATO's membership and having the alliance pursue nebulous out-of-area missions, however, is a blueprint for disaster. □

Ted Galen Carpenter is director of foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute.

Owen Harries:

THE GOOD THING about arguing with General Odom is that one is never left uncertain as to where he stands on an issue. He spells out his positions clearly, without any hedging or obfuscation.

He is for expanding NATO. But he stresses that this should not be done without first dealing effectively with Bosnia. This, in turn, he maintains will involve keeping from 150,000 to 200,000 troops—at least 50,000 of them American—in the former Yugoslavia for at least a generation.

For one to find Odom's case persuasive, then, it is necessary to find acceptable—and conceivable—such a substantial, long-term commitment of American forces to this violent corner of the world, a region that no American leader has ever before considered one of vital concern to his country. And, as Odom honestly points out, it would be a commitment not merely to "peacekeeping," but to the more active and dangerous task of "peacemaking," which would almost certainly involve significant casualties over the years.

All this, of course, as well as the pledge to defend the borders of the new, Central European members of NATO that an extension of the Treaty would entail: a pledge of the utmost gravity, which, if honored, could cost tens of thousands of American lives—and which, if dishonored,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would damage severely the credibility of the United States.

Why, then, undertake such a pledge? Because, explain the advocates of NATO expansion, the Russia of today retains the instincts and urges of its predecessors and cannot be trusted. ("Russia has lost an empire but not yet its imperial aspirations.") There is a terrible irony involved here. Earlier in this century, Western governments allowed an unnecessary war to happen because they assumed that the foreign policy of a totalitarian Nazi regime would not be essentially different from that of the struggling democracy it replaced, and that it could therefore be appeased with concessions and compromise. It would be inexcusable and disastrous if the same error were to be made in reverse at the end of the century, by proceeding on the assumption that the policy and attitudes of the struggling democracy in Moscow are no different—indeed cannot be different—from those of its totalitarian Soviet and authoritarian Tsarist predecessors. □

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest*.

William Odom responds:

MY CRITICS' REACTIONS confirm that I got their views mostly right but that they got my views somewhat wrong.

If Sestanovich is as concerned with "cost" as I am, why has he not considered the cost of *not* expanding NATO? A Western-anchored Germany within a democratic Central Europe is more important to U.S. interests than a cooperative Russia. I advocate trying to obtain both, but if *forced* to choose, I do not share Sestanovich's priority.

On history lessons, a few "liberal" Russian scholars agree with me about NATO expansion making democracy more likely in Russia. That Zhirinovsky and General Grachev agree with Sestanovich in opposing NATO expansion, curiously, does not puzzle him.

In the spirit of his intellectual antecedent, the 1920s isolationist Senator Borah (R-Idaho), Carpenter is no more cogent about why his new isolationism makes sense in an interdependent economic world of ever-newer military technologies with intercontinental reach. This is particularly true when he describes a Europe as dangerous as the one I foresee without U.S. involvement. He seems gleeful that Europe has "disputes that bedevil" and is "congenitally turbulent" in the Balkans.

Harries unfairly puts me with those who treat "...Russia guilty until proved otherwise." I said, "The danger to Europe is not a new Russian military threat but rather Russian internal disorder, coupled with a foreign policy aimed at dividing Europe as the United States looks on passively." Yeltsin has given us the disorder (e.g., Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya); Kozyrev has given us the diplomacy (e.g., Serbia, Iraq, NATO); now Carpenter and Harries would reduce America to a spectator role.

Lastly, a neglected detail in Harries' historical analogy alters its meaning. Post-totalitarian Germany was mostly occupied by Western armies; post-totalitarian Russia is not. In the words of Robert Frost, "...that has made all the difference." □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian Aid:

BOTH PETER RUTLAND and Charles Flickner's pieces on American aid policies towards Russia (Winter 1994/95) are right on target but only begin to scratch its surface. More alarming is that the probable results of American and Western European aid and democratization policies were known from the beginning and have been kept out of internal policy debate for reasons of short term gain to a few.

From the beginning, in a region where corruption was endemic and where oversight and democratization were the most critical components of effective reform, the conscious policies of both the Bush and Clinton administrations have consciously been to give only lip service to combating organized crime, addressing the lack of legal and political infrastructure, and achieving accountability of domestic or foreign businesses—while working with, rather than seeking prosecutions of or international controls against, the overseas dealings of corrupt former communist elites and those who favored the transition of property into private hands.

What has long been known to American development contractors and scholars, and to citizens of the countries of the NIS is that only 5 percent ($37.9 million) of the $750 million in funds allocated for development has gone for legal and political reform. The priority, explicit in policy documents and reflected in much of the rest of the $2.5 billion in spending, has been to put even the monopolies in private hands, tacitly creating a situation where former Soviet assets could be drained to the West or sold to Western business.

The figures now show the results, which were predictable years ago. The interest on the $50-100 billion which Marshall Goldman reports (and which Russian news sources were reporting three years ago) as having been taken out of Russia alone, and which many would say is an understatement of the actual amount that has ended up in the West from the NIS, is considerably more than the $6 billion that the World Bank has extended in loans, and the total spent on U.S. aid.

Further, the total amount of assets that has been drained from the region and sent overseas, without any efforts in the West to stop it, dwarfs the amount being spent on "democratization" efforts by at least one thousand times. The amount of wealth now controlled in those countries by organized crime as a result of privatization efforts outweighs spending on legal and political reform by several thousand times—making it unlikely that real reform will ever occur, and obvious that such reform was never really an intention of the policy.

Indeed, those who have called attention to these issues in the policy and academic communities here have been held to a whisper, while those in the NIS attempting to stand up to government or mafia corruption continue to pay with their lives.

One of the most notable signals given by U.S. policies is that of a lack of concern about the enforcement of standards for Western enterprises doing business in the NIS, contributing to the "Wild West" atmosphere there. Another is the participation of Western banks in facilitating transfers of resources abroad. But the messages which ring loudest involve larger symbols of disregard for rule of law, starting at the top: the relative lack of outrage expressed by U.S. policymakers at Yeltsin's bombing of the Russian parliament and genocide in Chechnya; prior human rights abuses by President Gorbachev and other elites; inattention to continued purges under Gorbachev and Yeltsin of prosecutors who have sought to investigate trails of corruption leading upwards; and continued support for these figures and others who announce their commitment to "privatization," whatever the consequences and regardless of the subsequent absence of any real legal reforms.

David Lempert
George Washington University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT in an otherwise cogent assessment of American aid programs for Russia and the other former Soviet republics, David Kramer suggests that the "Title VIII" program supporting expert training and research on the area be eliminated.

To be sure, Title VIII is not a direct foreign aid program, and if it could be agreed where else to put it in the federal budget, there would be no problem. The issue, however, is whether the federal government should continue to support the maintenance and deepening of our national expertise on a critical foreign area.

Mr. Kramer endorses continued funding for exchanges, and may not be aware that Title VIII has a vital exchange component in its support of such activities as the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington (including the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and the East European Program). Like many critics of our aid programs, Mr. Kramer urges more emphasis on the non-Russian republics. But Title VIII does just this, both for the former Soviet republics and the former communist bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe, above all by providing critical support for the teaching of the rarely studied languages of the region. Along with other government educational and exchange programs, Title VIII support goes to the private sector, as Mr. Kramer prefers, in order to sustain university commitments to Russia and the rest of the region, outside of official government channels.

Let us not say, millions for defense but not one cent for understanding.

Robert V. Daniels
University of Vermont
(Former President, American Association to the Advancement of Slavic Studies)

The Future of Spying:

"THE FUTURE of Intelligence" by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt (Winter 1994/95) identifies me as "former Republican staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and conservative critic of American intelligence." The authors are identified as "successive Minority Staff Directors of the Senate Intelligence Committee"—nothing about the fact that they are Democrats, and of course no suggestion that their views of the subject might be tainted by any Point of View. The cautionary label put on me should have alerted the editors that something fishy was coming. And indeed it came.

The article attributes to me the view that "It is better for a country not to have a clandestine service at all than to have one that has been penetrated." Why this excessively summary statement, without a reference to the complex discussion of the matter in my *Informing Statecraft* (Free Press, 1992)? Because of the sentence that follows: "While it is true that a penetrated operation is positively harmful, one can't conclude that if one of its operations is compromised, all of a clandestine service's activities are worthless." Never has it occurred to me to disagree. Yet the authors plainly suggest that I believe that any penetration at all is intolerable—just what one might expect from a "conservative critic." Good thing that Shulsky and Schmitt are there to stand up for subtlety and just measure! The authors know me and my views better than that. The second edition of their book relies (very) heavily on *Informing Statecraft*. Shame on them for this little cheap shot, and shame on *The National Interest* for letting them take it.

Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Quantum Leap:

AS PHYSICS GAINS intellectual depth, it grows ever less accessible to the amateur explorer. The disquieting transcendence of familiar sorts of physical causality has tempted many to seek a return to the unbridled metaphysics that preceded the rise of science in Newton's day.

A century ago it was the dynamo and thermodynamics that blew the mind of young Henry Adams—he knew an *idée forte* when he saw one, even if he couldn't quite grasp its meaning. Now along comes Patrick Glynn, an astute analyst, so shell-shocked by "Spooky Actions at a Distance," as to speak raptly of "wholism" and quantum political science.

All memory of time seems to depart his discourse. Marshall McLuhan and Herman Kahn, Einstein and Heisenberg, Rousseau and Derrida—all melt down into a new age fondu: "Quantum mechanics reveals the universe as essentially an intelligently and intricately coordinated 'information system' which unfolds into...what we call matter in the act of being observed."

A fine Deist sentiment this, but not quite ready for any physics journal. Having published on dimensionless phonon transport in monoisotopic covalent solids, it grieves me to repeat Wolfgang Pauli's verdict on the sort of ersatz science that mars "Quantum Leap": It's so bad it isn't even wrong.

It is not Glynn's fault. Only its practitioners should attempt rendering mathematical physics into prose—it pays to actually read Hawking, Dyson, and Penrose. But Glynn has, alas, trusted in secondary sources (e.g. *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*), not physicists, per se. He might just as well have attempted to master Newtonian mechanics by studying Road Runner cartoons.

Russell Seitz
John M. Olin Institute
Harvard University

A New Service for our Australian Readers:

A one-year subscription to *The National Interest* may be ordered by sending A$42 to:

The Institute of Public Affairs
128-136 Jolimont Road
Jolimont, Victoria 3002

Please make cheques payable to the Institute of Public Affairs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Prior Question

Robert W. Tucker

ANYONE WHO TAKES the trouble to examine the current debate over the nation's foreign policy cannot but be struck by its diffuse character. To be sure, past debates also had a diffuse side, raising as they did, questions of the nation's role and purpose in the world. But these broad issues were considered in the context of a specific policy issue. The major debates over foreign policy since the 1930s all responded to what was seen as a great power threat to America's security and centered about the question of how to respond to such a threat.

The contemporary debate is evidently different. Although the security issue remains central, the absence of a great power threat gives it a quite different cast. Today's debate revolves largely around what may be termed the prior question, that is, the question of identifying what may constitute serious threats to America's security in the post-Cold War world. Its diffuse character reflects the varied responses that have been given to this question. In turn, the different responses reflect disagreement over the nature of the international system in the post-Cold War world. In the absence of some defining event or trend, the significance of which compels general recognition, we must expect this state of affairs to persist.

Meanwhile, the prevailing theme of the contemporary dialogue is "foreign policy adrift." It is one widely shared by participants who otherwise have quite different views on what the new moorings should be. The theme of foreign policy adrift of course is not to be taken literally. What is usually meant is not that the nation's foreign policy no longer has any moorings, but that what moorings it has respond to the world of yesterday, not of today and tomorrow. The expression—and its several equivalents—is rather intended to convey the need for change, both in our understanding and our policies.

It is in this vein that Leslie Gelb has recently written that "even as the physical traces of the Old World vanish, many still cling to its intellectual trappings," responding to the new world "with the old fears and the old strategies."[1] Ronald Steel has made the same point, though more bluntly. "With communism gone down the memory hole," he writes, "we have lost our yardstick." American foreign policy today "lacks either a geopolitical or an intellectual core. We no longer know what America should do or can do."[2]

The world has changed, but American foreign policy has not changed with it. To those who recall past debates, the charge is a

Robert W. Tucker is a contributing editor to *The National Interest.*

[1]Leslie Gelb, "Quelling the Teacup Wars," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1994), p. 2.

[2]Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 120.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

familiar one, having been made on a number of occasions during the long period of the Cold War and particularly during the bitter debate over the war in Vietnam. It also has a persuasiveness today, however, that it seldom had in the past.

IT WOULD OF course be absurd to press the argument of continuity to the point of insisting that there has been virtually no change in foreign policy. Given the transformation in world politics consequent upon the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet empire, there could not but have been change. Yet when due allowance has been made for this, what is striking is the apparent continuity in policy. The alliance system in Europe and Asia continues to form the core of our foreign policy despite the disappearance of the principal threat that brought the system into existence. In Asia, it does so despite serious and persistent trade differences with Japan. In Europe, it does so despite the growing number of critics who insist that NATO must either expand its borders, as well as its out of area operations, or it will die. To date, it has done neither and although broadening the alliance to include the countries of Central Europe appears likely, an expansion of out of area operations does not. The latter initiative must rest on the expectation that the alliance partners will now be able to do what they were seldom able to do in the period of the Cold War when the incentives for collective action were stronger than they are today. The Gulf War nourished this expectation but the conflict in Bosnia has had very nearly the opposite effect. The failure of NATO—and particularly of its leading state—to deal effectively with the Balkan conflict has evidently had a corrosive effect on the alliance. Even so, the *raison d'être* of the alliance must be found today, as yesterday, in Central Europe, not in the Balkans, and in Central Europe the American commitment continues to provide the reassurance that is needed despite the disappearance of Soviet power.

In the Middle East, as well, an essential continuity in American policy is clear. The end of the Cold War has not been followed by a more modest U.S. role in the region, but, if anything, by an expanded one. This is apparent in the history of the peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis since 1992. It is still more apparent in the history of the Persian Gulf since 1990. Having waged a successful war in the Gulf, the Bush administration sought to establish a military presence there that eluded previous administrations. Its only partially successful efforts have been continued by the Clinton administration. Given the ambitious current policy of "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq, the establishment of a credible military presence in and around the Gulf has become a virtual necessity. The alternative is to rely in a crisis on recreating the quite fortuitous coalition brought together to fight Saddam Hussein, a course that would be very imprudent.

If the Cold War geopolitical priorities of foreign policy persist in the post-Cold War period, so too does the great dilemma of policy during that conflict. The Cold War years were marked throughout by debate over the relationship between the core and the periphery of policy. In the contest with the Soviet Union, it was regularly contended that policy could not readily draw a meaningful distinction between core and periphery, vital and non-vital interests, if only because the inner dynamic of that hegemonial contest threatened to make of almost any discrete issue a symbol of the overall conflict. What is perceived as the periphery, the familiar argument ran, will, if treated as such, soon become the core. In the case of Vietnam, the argument was given its most notorious application. Vietnam, two administrations contended, posed the problem of how the peace of the world was to be organized and maintained, whether by consent or coercion. That issue, it was insisted, transcended Vietnam; on its favorable resolution American security was seen to depend.

The policy dilemma of relating core and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peripheral interests remains. The debate over Bosnia affords a textbook example. From the outset, critics of America's Bosnia policy have contended that it has failed to reflect the greater interests at stake in the Balkan conflict. It is these interests, the argument goes, that require giving military support to the Bosnian Muslims. The danger of passivity before this type of conflict has been generalized in a manner that is now thoroughly familiar, given four decades of cold war. The same critic who warns against clinging to the "intellectual trappings" of the Cold War also warns that a failure to stop "the scourge of civil and ethnic violence," of which Bosnia is regarded as the leading instance, "will undo much of what we value and undermine efforts to mold a just and stable international order."[3] The Clinton administration does not reject this view, at any rate as it applies to the Balkan conflict. Although it has not been willing to break from its European allies and give military support to the Muslims, it too believes that the issue of a just and stable international order is at stake in the outcome of the war in Bosnia.

How may one explain the continuity in American foreign policy? One way of doing so is in terms of the hold that the past so often exercises over the present. But that hold, it is urged, cannot persist for long; the changes that have occurred in the world since the late 1980s must eventually work their expected effects. Our Cold War allies will come to realize, if they have not done so already, that the security framework we have provided since World War II is no longer needed, and that they therefore need no longer subordinate their foreign policies to American desires. On our side, the constraints and costs of maintaining the Cold War alliance structure will prove increasingly unpopular with a public that senses growing divergences with allies over both security and economic issues, that finds a new attraction in unilateralism, and that is ever more disinclined to use military power. In sum, the Cold War compact is breaking down. What is today seen as continuity in American foreign policy is already far more apparent than real.

This view has been advanced many times in recent and even not so recent years. It was, after all, fifteen years ago that Henry Kissinger pronounced NATO an "empty shell." Yet the shell played a significant role in the last decade of the Cold War. In 1995 Kissinger's earlier dictum seems much more persuasive and Irving Kristol (never a true believer) has termed the alliance "a vast irrelevance." Still, the future of this irrelevance remains a matter of high concern to Germany, Russia, and the states that lie between these traditional adversaries. The day may come when these characterizations are borne out. It makes a difference, however, whether that day is already upon us or will arrive only after another two or three decades have passed.

This much, at least, seems clear: more than five years after the end of the Cold War, the grand structure of America's Cold War foreign policy remains on the whole intact. The above view has yet to find vindication. There has been no defining event bearing it out. The attempt has been made, it is true, to find such event in the American and European failure in Bosnia. But the effective imposition of a satisfactory settlement in the Balkans would very likely require a military commitment in size and duration that, with the possible exception of the Gulf War, the NATO states have *never* been willing to make outside the area of alliance guarantee. And the Gulf War was seen to imperil geostrategic and economic interests in a way in which, rightly or wrongly, the war in Bosnia is not considered to put at risk.

Neither a clever nor a tendentious explanation is called for to explain the broad continuity to date of American foreign policy despite the great changes in the circumstances attending policy. At the outset of the post-Cold War period, Samuel Huntington

[3]Leslie Gelb, "Quelling the Teacup Wars," p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointed to the principal explanation by raising these questions:

> What is preferable in terms of global security and stability? A world with the United States as the presiding superpower, chairman of the board, leading and working with various combinations of major powers and lesser countries to deal with the world's problems? Or a truly multipolar world, of seven or more roughly equal major powers including the United States, each pursuing its own interests and competing with and cooperating with each other in a variety of permutations and combinations? Or a world in which some other country replaces the United States as the presiding superpower?[4]

To Huntington, these questions were little more than rhetorical. He took for granted that it was preferable that the United States remain the premier global power and that, in this role, our overall strategic interest must be to promote a stable equilibrium of power in Europe and Asia. In Europe, this interest was seen to require the constraint of both Russian and German power, as well as discouraging a tighter European political entity. In Asia, the same interest dictated the placing of constraints on the expansion of Japanese power on the Asian mainland as well as efforts to limit possible Chinese expansion. More recently, Henry Kissinger has articulated a similar position:

> The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia's two principle spheres...remains a good definition of strategic danger for America, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically, and, in the end, militarily.[5]

Both Huntington and Kissinger place high value on retaining the Cold War alliance system. They do so, however, as much to limit German and Japanese power as they do to reassure these powers.

These are the views of notorious realists. Does the nation by and large share them? Clearly, there is every reason to acknowledge a national consensus on the desirability, even the necessity, of the United States remaining the premier global power. That consensus reflects, in the first instance, simple considerations of collective pride, to which America is no less susceptible than other great nations have been. Yet it also reflects a persisting conviction that the United States remains, despite all that has happened in recent decades, a great power unlike other great powers, and this because of who we are and what we have always stood for as a nation. Our role or purpose is still found to distinguish us from others and to require that our interests be seen in a light different from others. The belief that our strength and well-being are synonymous with the prospects of an ordered freedom in the world has waxed and waned in this century, but it has never been abandoned. The favorable outcome of the Cold War is seen as the latest, and possibly greatest, vindication of this belief.

Given this conviction, and the American record of the past half-century, the conclusion that the nation has, quite apart from its salient power position, a special right to the role of world leader is readily understandable. We are not dealing here merely with the age old claim that power creates responsibility, or, yet more insidious, that special power creates a special responsibility. The American claim rests on a more meritorious base. The testament to this judgment may be seen in the fact that—with few exceptions—a complaining world nevertheless desires to retain the American presence.

Ultimately, a consensus on the desirability of the United States remaining the premier global power must rest on the claims of

---

[4]Samuel Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* (January/February, 1991), pp. 16-17.

[5]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 813.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security. In the absence today of any great power threat, the nature of the security dilemma has been suddenly and radically changed. Yet this change has not resulted in a corresponding change in the claims of security, claims which remain as expansive today as they were yesterday. The insistence on equating American security not only with world order but with a certain *kind* of order, one going well beyond the requirements of a stable equilibrium of power in Europe and Asia, formed a central feature of American diplomacy throughout the years of struggle against the Soviet Union. It continues to do so today despite the disappearance of the principle threat to the order of an earlier period. Thus America's security in the post-Cold War years has been equated with an order in which weapons of mass destruction are denied to a substantial number of middle powers that do not abide by the norms of conventional statecraft. So too, it has been equated with an order that checks the scourge of civil and ethnic violence. And, of course, it has been equated with an order that promotes the expansion and consolidation of democratic political forms and free markets.

There is little reason to assume that an expansive vision of order will not continue to be found inseparable from America's security as a nation. Yet even if a narrower and more traditional concept of security were to be embraced, it might not have the political consequences expected of it. It is all well and good to urge a strategy centered upon the maintenance of a stable equilibrium in Europe and Asia, but how is one to implement this strategy if the principal means of maintaining a balance of power in the past—war—is no longer an acceptable means in an age when armed conflict between great powers promises to be nuclear? Given the absence of any real threat from a great power, the proper implementation of this strategy remains elusive. In the mutual relations of the great powers, there is a pervasive uncertainty that marks the search for security today. This very uncertainty, however, lends support to the view that an advantageous power position must be sustained. If the bases of security are no longer clear, if all bets must be hedged, this is all the more reason to hold to the position of presiding world power. It is also a strong argument for holding as long as possible to the principal elements of a foreign policy that created and maintained the post-World War II order in which we still live.

How long are we destined to do so is of course the great question. Owen Harries is no doubt right in observing that to expect or demand the same level of activism in the future that characterized the Cold War past "is to doom oneself to disappointment and the kind of embarrassment resulting from the wide discrepancy between posture and performance—between old habits and new inhibitions—that has come to be associated with Clintonism."[6] What seems increasingly apparent today is less the persistence of old habits than the strengthening of not so new inhibitions. The contradiction between a desire to remain the premier global power and an aversion to bearing the costs of this position has marked the nation's outlook and policy since Vietnam. Newt Gingrich's recent expression of that contradiction—"I am a hawk, but a cheap hawk"—is novel only in its candor. If the optimism this sentiment reflects is quite likely to be disappointed, it still remains to be seen whether the aspiration that was, after all, the essential precondition of America's full participation in the international system will indeed be abandoned. Despite growing signs to this effect, one must doubt it. □

[6]Owen Harries, "My So-Called Foreign Policy," *The New Republic*, October 10, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unlike any other magazine you have read!

Presidents & Prime Ministers®

ternational perspectives from world leaders

if you can't make it to the next meeting of the N, don't stress. You can catch up on what iplomats and world leaders are saying in the ages of *Presidents & Prime Ministers.*"
-- *Magazine Week*


"Highly recommended..." – Library Journal
Presidents & Prime Ministers
North & Central America Issue
William Clinton
This Issue Includes Speeches from:
With Reports on the APEC meetings held in the United States
Next Issue: Asia

Covers topics such as trade, diplomacy and world peace, economy and finance, health, environment, and more!
Features profiles of government leaders.
Includes speeches, statements, and news briefs from leaders and countries worldwide.
Distributed in the United States, Canada, Jordan, New Zealand, and Taiwan.
Indexed in several databases, including Public Affairs Information Service.

"Highly recommended for its innovative approach." – *Library Journal*

☐ Yes! Enter my subscription to the magazine!
- ☐ $21.60 for 1 year/6 issues ($40.60 air mail)
- ☐ $33 for 2 years/12 issues ($71 air mail)
- ☐ $50 for 3 years/18 issues ($107 air mail)

☐ Send me a sample copy for $5.75.
☐ Bill me.
☐ Check is enclosed.
☐ Charge my credit card.
☐ American Express ☐ MasterCard
☐ VISA Expiration Date _____
Card Number _____

_____
Your Signature Date

Please print or type:
Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____
Country _____ Phone _____

Fax or mail your order to:
President & Prime Ministers, 799 Roosevelt Road, #6/208, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137, USA;
Telephone 708-858-6161, Fax 708-858-8787.

NI

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED